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INTRODUCTION 
Psychology has as its main goal the understanding of be­
havior, especially human behavior. Toward this end, one of 
its main areas of endeavor has been personality theory. 
Taking "personality" as a construct summarizing an individu­
al's characteristic behaviors, personality theorists have at­
tempted to formulate laws describing the causes of stability 
and differences in behavior, both among individuals as well 
as within individual persons. 
In the past century various theories or conceptions of 
personality have been advanced to explain what causes man to 
act as he does. Many of these theories have been formulated 
in connection with the clinical endeavors of the theorists. 
These various conceptions of personality can be grouped ac­
cording to their similarities, basic assumptions, and re­
search methodologies (cf. Levy, 1970; Mischel, 1971) . 
Needless to say, many pages have been written concerning the 
advantages and disadvantages of particular theories. 
One point of controversy among the various schools of 
thought concerns the locus of causation of behavior. 
Questions have focused on whether the direction of behavior 
derives primarily from some force or tendency internal to the 
person, or if^ on the other hand, the situations, the various 
stimuli impinging upon a person, are mainly responsible for 
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the behavior exhibited, Psychodynamic and trait theorists 
have favored the former explanation where the major emphasis 
is placed on person variables, while those of the learning or 
behaviorist school have stressed the latter, the importance 
of situation variables. Recent examples of this discussion 
include articles by Hachtel (1973a, 1973b) and Hischel 
(1973a, 1973b) . 
In order to build a theoretical structure which can 
answer these questions of causation, evidence must be 
gathered which demonstrates that a given hypotheses is sup­
ported consistently in a number of situations. Consistency 
of results under controlled conditions is desired if behavior 
is to be predicted by a given theory. Consistency is what 
makes behavior describable by theoretical laws. However, the 
consistency observed is somewhat dependent on the hypotheses 
tested and the experimental methodology used. 
Part of the controversy about the primary locus of 
causation of behavior has been caused by psychology's use of 
the scientific method vith its stress on the observable and 
measurable. It is not possible to measure inner drives or 
concepts in the same way one can observe the number of food 
pellets a rat consumes under varying conditions. Therefore, 
some psychologists, especially those in the "learning" camp 
of personality theory, saw fit to observe the reactions of 
the individual to different situations, using a stimulus-
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response (S-B) paradigm in preference to a stimulus-organism-
response (S-0=R) model. Eysenck (1970) opined that many 
studies in the S=R mold have failed to obtain significant 
results because the variance due to persons (trait variance 
in his view) has been treated as error variance. He did 
admit, however, that many behaviorists have switched to the 
S-O-B paradigm. 
Opponents of learning theories of personality have prob­
ably exaggerated the benign neglect of the organism by the 
learning theorists. However, there is the trend to focus on 
the stimulus and the response in research enleavors since 
they can be more precisely measured, and this Dcocedure more 
easily allows laws of behavior to be formulated. The human 
organism, for the moment, has been allowed to be perceived as 
an almost passive being, or, at the least, as an indistinct 
"black box." Nevertheless, it must be admitted that much 
progress was made using this paradigm. 
Carlson (1971) had addressed the problem of the active 
organism by asking "Where is the person in personality re­
search?" She noted that much recent personality research has 
focused on either the general or the differential level. The 
questions asked by investigators focus on how all men are 
alike or on how groups of people are alike but different from 
other groups. She suggested that psychologists devote more 
effort to the study of the individual per se, siss;s 
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systematic differences within the individual person may pro­
vide light on some unresolved problems. 
Nevertheless, the controversy continues between the 
psychodynamic and learning schools with both sides piling up 
research evidence. Hischel (1973a, 1973b) stresses the im­
portance of the situation and his studies are designed 
accordingly. From his point of view the situation holds the 
key to observing consistency and lawfulness of behavior. 
Mischel is regarded as the leading proponent of the 
situationist point of view, and he has pointed out man's 
apparent lack of consistency across situations even slightly 
different from each other (Hischel, 1968). Wachtel (1973a, 
1973b), on the other hand, emphasizes concepts internal to 
the person, and he feels these concepts are better able to 
explain the inconsistencies observed. 
Despite their differences, however, it appears to the 
present writer that Hischel and Wachtel are heading toward 
the same conclusion. They admit that the situation and the 
person interact by means of the cognitive functioning of the 
individual. This interactionist view is regaining popularity 
among personality theorists and may be responsible in the 
future for concordance between the various schools, cronbazh 
had suggested back in 1957 that psychologists consider an 
aptitude by treatment interaction framework for research. He 
(Cronbach, 1975) has recently restated his position, citing 
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research done over the past several years within such a 
framework, Ekehamaar (1974) has also come out in favor of 
the interactionist position, although^ in a recent review, he 
claimed that this viewpoint can be traced back five decades 
to Kantor and Levin. According to Bkehammar, our 
methodologies have prevented interactionism from having the 
impact on psychological theory of which it is capable, 
Bhile Mischel (1968) may have stressed the importance of 
the situation in determining behavior, it can be argued that 
the situation is in interaction with the person. The meeting 
ground between the pcychodynamic and learning schools would 
appear to be in the field of cognition which can help account 
for this interaction. Studies of cognition must take account 
of the situational stimuli and the observable responses while 
still considering sian to bs an active organisa capable of 
making interpretations and of interacting with the environ­
ment. Because of the cognitive capabilities of a person, the 
situational stimuli may actually be different for the subject 
from that which the experimenter presumes it to be. 
In a critical review of the situationist viewpoint, es­
pecially as expounded by Mischel, Bowers (1973) has also dis­
cussed the interactionist position and its relation to cogni­
tion, He noted that in many cases the variance due to the 
interaction between situation and person is taken to be error 
variance. Yet he cited eleven articles where this interac­
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tion was evaluated; the interaction accounted for almost as 
much variance as the main effects of person and situation 
combined. Bowers pointed out that rather than assuming that 
this interaction between person and situation is experimental 
error, we should take it as evidence of a meaningful and im­
portant factor. 
Bowers summarized his viewpoint thus: 
In sum, the situation is a function of the observer in 
the sense that the observer's cognitive schemes filter 
and organize the environment in a fashion that makes it 
impossible ever to completely separate the environment 
from the person observing it. This interactionist or 
biocognitive account is quite different from an S-R 
point of view (or its social learning derivative), which 
presupposes the separateness of stimulus and response, 
and views cognition as an implicit response mediating 
the impact of situational antecedents on behavioral 
outcomes, (p. 328) 
Shortly after the appearance of Bowers' review, Mischel 
'1973c) published another article entitled "Toward a Cogni­
tive social Learning Reconceptualization of Personality" in 
which he too appears now to account for situational variance 
in terms of cognition. With this restatement of Mischel's 
position, his differences with Bowers are clearly moderated. 
He lists five factors, which he labels cognitive social 
learning person variables, that ought to be be taken into ac­
count in studying personality: "cognitive and behavioral 
construction competencies, encoding strategies and personal 
constructs, behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome 
expectancies, subjective stimulus values, and self-regulatory 
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systems and plans" (p. 252). Again an emphasis on cognition 
as a main factor is noted. 
Mischel and Bandara are colleagues at Stanford Universi­
ty, and likewise neighbors in the social learning theory 
camp. In the latter's book on behavior modification 
(Bandura, 1968) there is a chapter on the symbolic control of 
behavioral changes including the following: 
The overall evidence would seem to indicate that learn­
ing can take place without awareness, albeit a.t a slow 
rate, but that symbolic representation of response-
reinforcement contingencies can markedly accelerate ap­
propriate responsiveness. The validity of this view, 
which assumes a reciprocal interaction between awareness 
and performance gains, seems even more probable when one 
realizes the limitations of paradigms of verbal 
conditioning for elucidating the role of symbolic activ­
ities in behavioral change processes, (p. 577) 
In the applied area of behavior modification, cognitive 
factors or symbolic representations are also being taken into 
account, Heichenbaura (197 3; also ïïeicuenbaum & Cameron, 
1974) has investigated with success the modification of "what 
clients say to themselves," along with the consequent effect 
of producing more adaptive behavior. D'Zurilla and Goldfried 
(1973) worked OP. helping clients to "learn how to solve 
problems," Their goal was to help clients learn a method or 
plan for dealing with problems, resulting in more adaptive 
behavior. One very important part of this procedure was 
teaching the client to define and formulate the problem for 
himself. Lazarus (1974) has concluded that for many 
classical phobias where social interaction is precluded, the 
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treatment of choice is often desensitization. With many 
social phobias (e.g., fear of criticism or disapproval), cog­
nitive restructuring in addition to conventional desensitiza­
tion methods is more rapidly effective. Thoreson and Mahoney 
(1974) have examined the evidence leading to a position on 
covert self-control. While many theoretical and technical 
problems remain in this area, the use of covert operants (or 
"coverants;" cf. Homme, 1955) appears promising, fts Thoreson 
and Mahoney pointed out, cognitive variables are responses, 
and therefore they should be capable of modification. In 
this same area of therapy. Loveless and Brody (1974) have 
published a recent article entitled "The Cognitive Base of 
Psychotherapy." 
While writers are presently suggesting the importance of 
cognitive factors in personality theory and therapy, the 
study of cognition in the past has often been a separate en­
deavor in psychology. In 19 56, Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 
published R Study of Thinking. These writers suggested that 
perception is an active process on the part of the human or­
ganism whereby he or she interprets the stimuli impinging 
upon the senses. Han uses various learned categories to 
"make sense" out of what he senses. This theory of cognition 
requiring active, though not always fully conscious, strate­
gies in man is further exemplified by Neisser's (1967) Cogni-
tive Psychology» Because of what psychologists have learned 
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in the field of cognition, the idea of man as a passive or­
ganism is becoming obsolete. For the present writer, on the 
other hand, a precipitous return to a conception of man 
driven by inner subconscious forces also appears inappropri­
ate and nonparsimonious for understanding cognitive factors. 
This same cognitive emphasis has been advanced by Kelvin 
(1970) in the field of social psychology. He stated that man 
needs order in the environment in order to cope with it; so 
man creates his own order. Kelvin explains much of social 
psychology in terms of man's attempts to create and maintain 
this necessary order. He wrote: 
The argument can then be summarized in three main 
propositions: the behavior of the individual is a func­
tion of the order which he perceives in his environment; 
in the physical environment this order is mainly deter­
mined by the physical properties of objects, but in the 
social environment, it is created and maintained by man 
himself: and the ordec which he creates is 
predominantly based on his system of values, (p. 17) 
Most of the literature cited here, which points to a 
cognitive interpretation of personality, is of recent date. 
But approximately twenty years ago, the same ideas were pro­
posed by George A. Kelly, at about the time Brnner et al = 
(1956) were stirring up the waters of perception and learning 
with their new ideas on cognition, Kelly (1955) published a 
two-volume work entitled The Psychology of Personal 
Constructs. Bruner (1956) wrote that the "two volumes easily 
nominate themselves for the distinction of being the single 
greatest contribution of the past decade to the theory of 
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personality functioning" (p. 355). At that time Kelly de­
scribed a very cognitive theory of personality labeled by him 
as "constructive alternativism." Subsequently this theory 
has become known as Personal construct Theory. It seems 
somewhat ironic that at a time when cognition is receiving 
greater emphasis by personality theorists, Kelly's original 
work should be out of print. However, there are signs of a 
renewed interest in Kelly, In connection with the 1975 
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation which will focus on Kelly, 
Landfield (Note 1) has ascertained from the publishers that 
Kelly's tvo volumes will be reprinted soon. He has also 
learned that psychological Abstracts will begin indexing 
Personal Construct Theory and its methods sometime during the 
next year. 
Kelly stated his theory in the form of a fundamental 
postulate with eleven corollaries. These will be discussed 
later in this paper. It suffices for the moment to mention 
that Kelly viewed man as a scientist, always trying to 
further himself and his environment. His fundamental postu­
late is "A person's processes are psychologically channelized 
by the ways in which he anticipates events" (p. 46). A 
person's behavior, for Kelly, results from the interaction 
between the environment and the individual interpreting and 
giving meaning to that environment. A person is a process, 
an event, a form of motion, as opposed to a static being. 
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Kelly rejects the traditional concept of motivation as 
redundant (Kelly, 1958, 1962). By his very nature, man is 
constantly seeking to predict what will happen in his 
universe. For this to be successful, man forms hypotheses 
which he attempts to validate. Man's behavior is controllei 
by his hypotheses and by his continually searching to 
validate these hypotheses and form new ones. 
In Kellian terms, a "construct" is an individual's 
hypothesis about a particular part of the environment. Each 
individual has his own personal constructs which are related 
to each other somewhat systematically. This tendency of tha 
individual to be his own scientist or psychologist has also 
been noted by Mischel (1973c) in his paper on cognitive 
social learning theory. Schneider (1973) also has dealt with 
this same tendency in man in a recent review article of ia-
plicit personality theory. 
In considering the individual's tendency to be his own 
scientist or psychologist, it can be seen that the consisten­
cy and predictability of behavior sought by the professional 
psychologist may be very much an individual matter. Kelly's 
Personal Construct Theory has the benefit of allowing us to 
conceive of behavior as "lawful" by placing the consistency 
within the individual person in the form of a cognitive in­
teraction with a reinforcement-providing environment. The 
laws of learning still apply across individuals, but the in= 
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dividual, not the experimenter, is the one who makes the im­
portant decision as to what is reinforcing. Behavior which 
seems inconsistent to the experimenter could really be the 
result of a consistent interaction of the person with the en­
vironment via his personal constructs. This same point has 
been recognized recently by Bern and alien (1974) in an arti­
cle entitled "On predicting some of the People some of the 
Time," 
The purpose of this paper is twofold; the first aspect 
concerns putting Kelly's theory to a behavioral test. One of 
the reasons the S-R approach was so productive was its 
insistence on the use of the scientific method with a founda­
tion in the observable. Kelly's theory should be subjected 
as ouch as possible to the same method. Evidence of varying 
sorts should be gathereâ in order that Kelly's theory not 
remain an abstraction of hypothetical faculties within man. 
The relationship between constructs and behavior should be 
demonstrated in order to firmly establish the connection of 
Kelly's theory to man's observable behavior. 
The second aspect of the purpose of this research is 
more on the metatheoretical level. In other words, why 
should Kelly's theory be tested at all? Mancuso (Note 2) has 
somewhat answered the question in a preparatory paper for the 
Nebraska Symposium where he reviews recent trends in psychol­
ogy in the light of Personal Construct Theory. In the opin­
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ion of the present writer. Personal Construct Theory offers a 
fruitful framework within which to examine the consistency of 
man's behavior. In this introduction, the role of cognition 
in personality theory has been stressed; cognitive factors 
have been viewed as possible explanations for the lawfulness 
or consistency of behavior. Experimental support for the 
connection between constructs (as conceived by Kelly) and be­
havior is then support for the higher level theoretical 
questions about cognitive factors in personality. Evidence 
for Personal Construct Theory is evidence for the person by 
situation interactionist view of personality. 
In view of this investigation, the research undertaken 
within the Personal Construct Theory will be reviewed. An 
attempt will be made to demonstrate the relationship between 
an individual's constructs and his behavior. It appears nec­
essary to pursue this goal by demonstrating that as a 
person's constructions of situations vary, so does his behav­
ior. While the present paper is not designed to examine all 
facets of consistency of behavior, it is an attempt to look 
at those aspects affecting behavior which Hischel {1973c) 
calls cognitive social learning person variables, in particu­
lar the encoding strategies and personal constructs. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERftTDEE 
George Kelly was a clinical psychologist and his two 
volume work, The_Psirgfaglogz_Q£_Personal_Constructs (1955), 
developed from his thoughts about therapy. He gradually 
moved from asking about the "how" of clinical work to ques­
tioning the "why" (Patterson, 1966). In this process he de­
veloped a theory of personality and measurement which he dis­
cusses in his first volume; clinical practice is the main 
focus of the second volume. 
As noted in the introduction to this paper, Kelly did 
not see the layman as that much different from the profes­
sional psychologist or scientist. Both layman and scientist 
are trying to understand the environment and their relation­
ship to iti Kelly states his theory of persoaality in the 
form of a fundamental postulate with eleven corollaries. The 
postulate and its corollaries are the assumptions upon which 
Kelly built his personality theory; these assumptions are 
statements of how man the scientist interacts with the envi­
ronment, The corollaries can be considered as the lay 
person's scientific method. 
Personal Construct Theory 
The fundamental postulate is "A person's processes are 
psychologically channelized by the ways in which he 
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anticipates events" (Kelly, 1955, p. 46). It is important to 
note that Kelly does not postulate any particular drives or 
energies in man. Han acts, he is in process, merely because 
he is alive; to be otherwise is to be dead. From the funda­
mental postulate, Kelly derived the construction corollary: 
"A person anticipates events by construing their 
replications" (1955, p. 50). k construct is an interpreta­
tion, although not necessarily a verbal one. When one is 
construing events, he is erecting a mental structure within 
which the perceived is given meaning. A construct is a way 
of perceiving reality, a hypothesis» 
Lest we be tempted to try and force the "truth" into the 
question of constructs, Kelly poses the individuality 
corollary where he points out that persons differ in the con­
struction of events. Veridicality is not implicit to the 
idea of a construct; a construct has validity if it provides 
a meaningful hypothesis for the person using the construct in 
his interaction with the world. Ko two events are exactly 
the same. In order that the world not appear as one 
continuous flow of a stream of consciousness, and therefore 
ungraspable, a person needs constructs so that he can 
anticipate similar events. This similarity of interpretation 
and anticipation is what Kelly is referring to by 
"replications" in the construction corollary. 
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But anticipation includes knowing the differences as 
well as the similarities among these events, constructs are 
therefore dichotomous with two contrasting poles (dichotomy 
corollary) and they are organized within a hierarchical 
system (organization corollary) . Kelly uses the terms 
superordinate and subordinate to express the relationships 
between constructs; subordinate constructs such as smart-
dumb are included within superordinate constructs like good-
bad. Rosenberg and sedlak (1972) have offered as evidence 
for Kelly's organization corollary, their results indicating 
various levels of trait categories in their research of im­
plicit personality theory, 
A person chooses the alternative pole of a construct 
which best allows him to predict events. As Kelly states his 
choice corollary, it sounds as it the construct is chosen for 
the extension of the construct system per se, but Kelly makes 
it clear that while one extends his construction, it is for 
the goal of the system, the anticipation of events. 
Which construct is chosen depends upon the range of the 
construct; a construct can only be applied to a finite number 
of events (range corollary). Should the range be too large 
or too narrow, anticipation becomes more difficult. Kelly 
(1970) distinguishes between a constructs focus of 
convenience and range of convenience. Focus is more narrow 
than range. The focus of convenience is a set of objects for 
17 
which the construct works especially well, whereas range is 
applied to a larger number of events where the construct may 
be reasonably applied. 
There are various other terms Kelly uses to describe the 
dimensions of constructs, comprehensive constructs subsume a 
relatively wide number of events in contrast to incidental 
constructs of more narrow application. Core constructs, as 
opposed to peripheral constructs, are those by which a person 
maintains his identity: they govern his conception of 
himself. Peripheral constructs can be altered without 
serious modification of the core. 
Preemption is another dimension of constructs. A 
preemptive construct forces an element to belong to its realm 
only and to no other; Kelly also refers to this kind of con­
struct as a "pigeonhol'S" or "nothing-but" type of construct. 
Constellatory constructs also fix the membership of their 
elements, but in such as way as to imply the subordinate 
constructs. Kelly uses stereotypes to exemplify 
constellatory constructs; they follow the form, if A, then 
also B, C, and D. In contrast, prepositional constructs 
imply nothing about whether an element comes within the range 
of other constructs. 
The corollaries discussed so far have to do with the 
characteristics of constructs. Three further corollaries, 
the ezperience, modulation, and fragmentation corollaries. 
18 
deal Hith man's use and development of his construct system. 
Every good scientist is continually updating his system by 
gathering and examining new data. The personal construct 
system is developed by continual reconstruction of the envi­
ronment, noting recurrent themes and making necessary dis­
tinctions. The ability to construe new elements is dependent 
upon the permeability of a construct; Kelly (1955) defines a 
construct as permeable "if it will admit to its range of 
convenience nev elements which are not yet construed within 
its framework" (p. 79), No two events in our lives are ex­
actly the same. A permeable construct allows us to admit for 
reconstruction and anticipation similar events in order that 
life not appear to be a flowing river of change. 
In construing his experiences, man does not always 
appear logical. Kelly noted this fact in the fragmentation 
corollary by admitting that in successive reconstructions, 
humans use different, seemingly incompatible, subsystems of 
constructs, choosing the subsystem that at the moment leads 
to the best prediction. The ability to use different 
subsystems is dependent on the permeability of the 
superordinate constructs involved. As an example one might 
consider an older woman with the superordinate construct, 
good-bad. A subordinate construct, short hair-long hair, 
might also be part of her system whereby she anticipates in­
teractions with long-haired youths as bad. But if her 
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superordinate construct were somewhat permeable, she would be 
able to construe a long-haired young man as helpful, not 
harmful, when he offered to change her flat tire. Kelly 
noted that if a person's superordinate constructs are too 
loose or permeable, he will appear very unorganized and have 
difficulty adjusting to the environment. If however, his 
constructs are too rigid or impermeable, neurotic behavior 
will often be in evidence. 
The continual formation of constructs within a system is 
posited by the experience corollary. To stop construing is 
to be dead. Life is dealing with so many different 
experiences that change within the system is bound to occur. 
Kelly speaks of two cycles involved in construction, the C-P-
c cycle and the creativity cycle. 
Kelly (1955) defined the C-P-C cycle as a "sequence of 
construction involving in succession, circumspection, 
preemption, and control, and leading to a choice which 
precipitates the person into a particular situation" (p. 
515). In the first stage, circumspection, the person 
considers the event with various possible constructs. 
Impulsivity, in this framework, is an undue shortening of the 
period of circumspection. Preemption is a choice to use one 
construct over the other possibilities, to establish a 
regnant construct. Control (which Kelly says is equivalent 
to choice) is acting upon the preemptions, esperiaenting to 
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ascertain whether the prediction is accurate (Wiggins, 
Renner, Clore S Hose, 1971). Interrupting the cycle at 
preemption disallows further elaboration of the construct 
system by removing the opportunity for validation of the 
usefullness of the construct in anticipating other events. 
The creativity cycle is one "which starts with loosened 
construction and terminates with tightened and validated con­
struction" (Kelly, 1955; p. 528). The first stage is a very 
loose construction which m ay appear disorganized and 
unrelated to one's associates. The person may have trouble 
finding appropriate symbols for his constructs. Gradually 
after some experimentation, the person tightens up his 
constructs, tying loose ends together; he is now ready to 
try a more carefully controlled experiment in life. Kelly 
uses the creativity cycle to describe the process of setting 
up a role for his fixed Lole therapy which will be described 
later. Both Kelly (1955) and Wiggins et al. (1971) note that 
the C-P-C cycle is similar to the creativity cycle, but the 
C-P-C cycle looks more toward action decisions or problem 
solving, while the creativity cycle pertains to the develop­
ment of new constructs. 
In both cycles there is hypothesis testing in order to 
gain validation for one's constructs. Validation for Kelly 
(1961) is "the relationship one senses between anticipation 
and realization" (p. 262). It is somewhat analagous to 
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learning theory's concept of reinforcement, except that Kelly 
stresses validation is internal to the person while rein­
forcement is usually attributed to the external event or 
reinforcer. 
In the same chapter dealing with the two cycles of tran­
sition, Kelly deals with three constructs often used by 
clinicians, which he redefines in terms of his own theory. 
Threat occurs when one is aware that comprehensive changes in 
one's core system are imminent, whereas fear pertains to an 
incidental or narrow range construct about to bring change in 
one's core system. Fear is much more particular. In con­
trast to fear and threat, anxiety is "the recognition that 
the events with which one is confronted lie outside the range 
of convenience of one's construct system" (Kelly, 1955, p. 
495) r anxiety arises because one is unable to construe 
impending events, resulting in the ambiguous quality of 
anxiety. 
Kelly's two final corollaries direct attention to the 
interaction of individuals, each with his own personal con­
struct system. The commonality corollary deals with 
similarities between constructs of different people; 
commonality allows us to speak of a "culture" of a given 
group of people. Kelly stresses that different events can be 
construed in similar fashion by two persons; tao persons may 
construe the same event differently. Kelly wants to avoid 
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the assumption o£ stimulus-identity across people. While, 
tor this writer, the concept of veridicality (agreement about 
what a stimulus really is) would seem to follow from this 
corollary, Kelly appears to avoid the concept in favor of 
stressing the usefulness or validity of a construct for 
anticipating events without reference to other people's con­
struction processes. However, the sociality corollary states 
that one person can influence the construction processes of 
another. 
In his sociality corollary, Kelly (1955) makes mention 
of "role." He defines role as a "psychological process based 
upon the role player's construction of aspects of the con­
struction systems of those with whom he attempts to join in a 
social enterprise" (p. 97). He also defines role as an 
"ongoing pattern of behavior that follows from a person's un­
derstanding of how the others who are associated with him in 
his task think" (pp. 97-98). Moss (197Ua,- 1974b) has used 
Kellian techniques to analyze roles in Shakespeare's plays. 
It must be remembered that Kelly was a clinician. His 
theory rose out of his therapeutic work. Putting his own 
theory into practice, Kelly is primarily known clinically for 
his fixed rcle therapy. Basically this therapy involves 
writing a new role for the client, a new construction system 
which the client practices. Gradually the client should 
change his behavior in accord with the new construction 
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system. Research on fixed role therapy will be presented 
later in this paper. 
In light of the commonality and sociality corollaries, 
Kelly redefined three other terms commonly used in clinical 
practice: guilt, aggression, and hostility. Guilt occurs 
when someone perceives he has to construe himself differently 
from his usual core role. Because of his interactions, a 
person finds that he is not what he thought he was or wanted 
to be. He now must reconstrue himself or change his actions 
so as to validate the old construction. Guilt, as defined by 
Kelly, appears to be very similar to anxiety or tension 
caused by experiences incongruent with the self-concept in 
Rogerian theory (Rogers, 1951; Patterson, 1966). Kelly 
(1969) also describes guilt as a "sense of loss of role" (p. 
179j , 
Kelly (1955) defines aggressiveness as "the active 
elaboration of one's perceptual field" (p. 508). This con­
cept for Kelly is devoid of its usual negative connotation; 
it is somewhat synonymous with adventuresomeness (Kelly, 
1961). Kelly uses the example of a business man who is 
aggressive in his work, successful in sales and in validating 
his construction of himself as a successful business man. In 
contrast, hostility is trying to gain validation of a 
construction of a social event even when past predictions 
have been failures. Hostility is an attempt to ward off 
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anxiety or threat. 
This summary of Kelly's basic theory has been necessari­
ly brief. In addition to Kelly's presentation of his theory 
in the 1955 volume, Kelly (1 970) has also written "A Brief 
Introduction to Personal Construct Theory," to which the 
reader is referred. Concise summaries, more elaborate than 
the present one, can be found in Bannister and Hair (1968) 
and Bannister and Fransella (1971). 
The_Se£test 
The scientific method has traditionally placed great em­
phasis on the observable, which most often is translated into 
measurable. Some behavior can be measured rather directly, 
such as bar presses or number of correct responses. It is 
the indirect measurement of inner faculties or traits that 
gives rise to the difficulties dealt with by Hischel (1968) 
in Personality.and Assessment. Mischel (1973a; 1973b) is 
particularly hard on psychodynamic concepts. He stresses 
that psychologists should look more at what subjects say and 
do rather than letting these events serve merely as signs, 
indirect signs, of some underlying dispositions or traits 
(Hischel, 1972) . If, however, one is going to talk about 
cognition—definitely an inner process of some kind--then one 
is forced to use indirect measures, basing one's hypothetical 
constructs on operational definitions, in order to be useful 
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scientifically, the constructs must have a link to observable 
reality. They should be tested by diverse methods, noting 
when stability of the measured construct is related to sta­
bility of appropriate behavior, with corresponding change in 
the construct measure and behavior as theorized, 
Kelly (1955) did present a method for measuring 
constructs, the Role Construct Repertory Test (usually abbre­
viated as the Septest or the RCRT) . He desired that the 
Reptest be considered more as a technique for the clinician 
to learn how a client uses his constructs rather than as a 
test with correct and incorrect answers. It is the purpose 
of this paper to provide some validation for the theory that 
constructs guide behavior. Since constructs are measureable 
only indirectly, it is proposed to use Kelly's measure and 
search for relationships between this measure and behavior. 
At this pointf however, it appears more appropriate to look 
at the Reptest by itself: 
The Role Construct Repertory Test was designed to 
ascertain the various constructs in a person's system and to 
provide information about how these constructs are used by 
that person. Basically the subject or client is asked to 
construe in his or her own terms a number of persons 
(referred to as elements) who fit various roles. While the 
Septest can be administered in groups as well as individual­
ly, the analysis is primarily of each person's protocol indi­
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vidually. 
The Reptest involves a list of elements known to the 
subjects. Kelly provided 24 role descriptions such as "a 
teacher you liked," "your wife or present girl friend," and 
"a neighbor you find it hard to get along with." The subject 
is first asked to designate actual people who fit the 
descriptions, and no person should be designated more than 
once. These persons become the elements to be construed. In 
the next step, the subject is presented the names of three 
people from the list and asked to state how two people of 
this triad are alike and different from a third. The con­
struct is the similarity (often called the explicit pole, 
since constructs are dichotomous). The implicit pole is the 
contrast of the third person to the similar two; this con­
trast term can either be in the form "not like the construct" 
or it may be specified. This procedure is continued with 
different combinations for a number of triads Kith the one 
restriction that each element be used in an equal number of 
triads. In this way the clinician obtains a sample of the 
constructs typically used by the subject. 
The elements do not necessarily have to be those sug­
gested by Kelly. They can be whatever the clinician finds 
useful in ascertaining the constructs in which he is inter­
ested, Slater (1969) suggested that careers and even 
breakfast cereals could be used as elements. Bannister and 
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Fransella (1971) mentioned using situations as elements, 
catastrophes and people who have been helpful, and factors of 
job satisfaction. Subjects have been asked to construe vari­
ous maps as part of a study of urban development (Stringer, 
1974), The objective is to learn what constructs are used by 
a parson to deal with a range of people or events. The self 
can be an element when one is interested in how a person 
construes himself in relationship to others. Limitations can 
be placed on the constructs elicited by asking the subject 
how two people are alike and different from a third in a par­
ticular situation. 
Once the constructs have been elicited, the subject is 
then asked to take each element and specify whether that ele­
ment is more like the construct or its contrast. The subject 
makes a decision about each element on sack construct. For 
example, the client may have mentioned that his mother and 
father were dominant (the construct) and his sister 
submissive. After all the constructs have been elicited, the 
client would then decide for all elements on the list which 
are dominant and which submissive. This procedure would then 
be followed tor each construct that had been elicited by the 
triads. 
At this point, two possible techniques of interpretation 
are available to the clinician: clinical analysis (which 
Bonarius (1965) refers to as listform) and gridform. The 
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latter is the more mathematical of the two and will be dis­
cussed below. The listform involves subjective judgments on 
the part of the clinician. The protocol can be analyzed by 
its verbal content for such indications as the number of 
constructs elicited, the overlap between constructs, and the 
kinds of constructs used. Hypotheses can be formed about a 
client's anticipation of events and about his construct 
system by noting the similarities and contrasts used by the 
subject and the construction of the various elements within 
the Reptest, Landfield (197 1) has published a list of 22 
categories which can be used for verbal content analysis and 
comparison. 
When interpreting the listform, there are certain 
assumptions about which one should be aware (Kelly, 1955). 
First# one presumes that the constructs elicited are 
permeable, capable of being applied to new elements; if this 
assumption is violated, the clinician would have only a past 
history. Second, one presumes that the subject is using 
preexisting rather than newly formulated constructs. This 
assumption provides some stability between past and future 
situations. The third and fourth assumptions are that the 
elements construed are representative of the people with whom 
the subject interacts and that the elements can be subsumed 
by the construct system elicited. Another assumption is that 
the constructs elicited apply to the subject's interactions 
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with the other elements. Finally, the examiner must assume 
he understands reasonably well what the client means by the 
words and explanations he uses. Riedel (1965, 1970) worked 
out a symbolic form of the HCRT using circles to indicate 
relationships. This may be useful for persons of low commu­
nication skills. If one follows the directions provided by 
Kelly for the Reptest, these assumptions appear reasonable. 
If the clinician is aware of the assumptions, he can be aware 
if violations occur, an event that itself would provide in­
teresting hypotheses for the clinician. 
The gridform of the Reptest is described by Kelly (1955) 
in a chapter entitled "The Mathematical structure of Psycho­
logical Space." Mathematics is the key. On the gridform, 
constructs are elicited as in the listform. They are then 
written along the top of the grid, each construct forcing a 
column of the grid. The elements originally used in 
eliciting the constructs become rows of the matrix. The 
subject checks the appropriate square of the matrix if the 
construct applies to the element; otherwise the intersect is 
left void. The grid or matrix is then factor analyzed and 
the factors interpreted. Kelly (1955, 1963) provided a 
nonparametric method of factor analysis to be used on grids. 
Bannister and Hair ( 1968) pointed out that the gridform 
allows one to analyze the structure of the construct system 
as well as its content, Kelly (1953) thought the advantage 
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of his nonparametric method over conventional analysis was 
its ability to base the factors on both constructs and 
elements; he saw conventional analyses producing factors 
based on one or the other. 
The assumptions of the gridform of the Reptest are simi­
lar to those for the listform. One assumes that the elements 
used are representative of the environment of the client, 
that the triads for eliciting constructs call for 
discriminations usually made by the client, and that the 
examiner reasonably understands the meaning of the constructs 
used by the client. Since this form is a paper-and-pencil 
task, one must assume also that the client is capable of 
performing according to instructions. In addition, since 
constructs are bipolar, the contrast stated should be the 
other pole of the construct concerned and not a pole of a 
different construct dimension. This fault occurs sometimes 
when the subject has difficulty specifying his implicit pole 
or contrast in describing how the third person of the triad 
is different from the two similar ones. R and B are students 
while c is rich is an example of this violation unless the 
subject sees all students as poor. Finally an assumption 
which has been questioned is that the elements all fall 
within the range of convenience of all the constructs. 
As mentioned previously? Kelly presented a nonparametric 
method of factor analysis. His method was developed before 
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computers were so easily accessible. It involves a 
relatively time-consuming process of counting the checks and 
voids, looking for similar patterns* Around 1964, his son, 
J. V. Kelly, wrote an unpublished program at Ohio state Uni­
versity for use on the IBM-1620 computer (cited in Bonarius, 
1965). Bonarius claimed this program had better mathematical 
foundations than the formulation of the senior Kelly. 
Slater (1964, 1969) has done much of the work in the 
area of computerized analysis of Septest grids. His main 
program, INGRID, is a principal components analysis; it 
provides the investigator with a list of the relationships 
among constructs, among elements, and between elements and 
constructs, as well as information about other properties of 
the grid. INGEID-72 (Slater, Note 3) is an updated version 
of this program which proviàes for the user even sere infor­
mation than the previous one. DELTA (Slater, Note 4) 
compares two grids with the same constructs and elements and 
is useful for studying therapeutic change, COIN and NEW COIN 
(Slater, 1972) can compare grids where the elements are dif­
ferent as long as the constructs are the same. SEQUEL 
(Chetwynd, Note 5) compares an individual's grid to a 
composite grid made up from a larger group of grids; this 
procedure can provide a measure of the consensus of a given 
client with a group. These programs are available for use by 
psychologists and psychiatrists in the United Kingdom through 
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the Medical Pesearch Center in London (Slater, Note 3). It 
appears the programs themselves are available to 
institutions, but not to individuals, under certain, limited 
conditions (Chetwynd, Note 6), 
Only one other specific program for analyzing grids is 
known to this writer, a program written for the IBM-360 com­
puter by Landfield (1971). This program only provides a 
measure of the relationship of the constructs to each other 
or of the elements to each other. It does not give the 
investigator any information about factors or interactions of 
elements and constructs. 
It was mentioned above that in filling out the gridform 
of the Reptest, the subject marks by a convention of checks 
and voids whether the elements are more like the construct or 
the contrast. However; the subject may produce a very 
lopsided distribution with a great majority of either checks 
or voids, causing some artificiality in measures of similari­
ty between constructs. To obviate these difficulties three 
other methods of element allotment have been tried (Bannister 
S Hair, 1968) . Split-half allotment forces the subject to 
choose which half of the elements are more like the con­
struct. This method is impossible for dichotomous constructs 
such as male-female. Rank-order correlations can be used as 
measures of the relationship between constructs if subjects 
are instructed to rank order the elements on the constructs 
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(Bannister, 1963). Subjects can also rate the elements on a 
scale; Bannister and Hair (1968) claimed this method has 
been rarely used, although since their book, it appears that 
this method has become more popular among British 
investigators. 
The problem of element allotment touches upon the as­
sumption that the elements fall within the range of 
convenience of all the constructs. Landfield (1957) suggest­
ed a method which allows free distribution of the elements as 
originally recommended by Kelly and also takes account of the 
range of the constructs. With his method, the subject has a 
choice of four indications: like the construct; 2, like 
the contrast; K, not applicable; and unable to decide. 
The program by Landfield (1971) mentioned above is written 
for this method of element allotment, Kelly (19 55) foresaw? 
this modification and warned that it would make his 
nonparametric factor analytic procedure "considerably more 
difficult, though not impossible" (p. 272). As noted, 
Landfield's program does not give the investigator any con­
struct factors in its output. 
Hair and Boyd (1967) compared two different methods of 
element allotment. They used photographs for elements and 
provided all subjects with the same constructs. Subjects 
filled out tvo grids, one using the split-half format, the 
other with rank order. Similar patterns of relationships 
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were not obtained from the two different methods. Bannister 
and Mair (1968) suggested that more research is needed to 
ascertain the predictive usefulness of the various methods. 
One question always asked about a measure is its reli­
ability or consistency over time. Kelly (1955) appears to 
reject the concept of reliability as it is usually understood 
in psychcmetrics. Slater ( 19 65) also questions whether we 
should expect little change in a grid over time. The 
Reptest, if given more than once over a period, should proba­
bly show some variation since construction is an ongoing 
process. Slater feels that the subject by trial interaction 
is not merely error, but an indication of what is going on 
within the client. This same point was noted in the intro­
duction to this paper in a citation of Bowers (1973) about 
personality theorv. In this connection,- slater did sarn that 
seme parts of the grid may be more liable to change than 
others. 
Nevertheless, an investigator would like to see some ev­
idence of stability over time in the Reptest. Kelly (1955) 
cited evidence of Hunt of consistency around 69% in the 
constructs elicited over a week's interval with different 
elements being construed on both occasions. Mitsos (1958) 
found significant numbers of constructs repeated over a 
three-month interval {p<,02) if the same role list for 
elements was used. If a subject was asked merely to list 19 
I 
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acquaintances, the agreement was not significant over the 
same period, Fjeld and Landfield (1961) found reliability 
coefficients around .80 over two weeks; they varied the pro­
cedure, with some subjects using the same constructs and 
acquaintances, some only the same constructs or 
acquaintances, and some given neither on the second occasion. 
They concluded people tend to use the same constructs even 
with different acquaintances. Pederson (cited in Bonarius, 
1965) found 11% of the same acquaintances were supplied by 
subjects for the same roles over a week's interval. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) concluded that consistency 
depends on a number of factors. Some construct subsystems 
seem more variable than others; superordinate constructs are 
more stable that subordinate ones. Individuals and groups 
may vary in consistency,- while subjects appear %ore consist­
ent in construing objects than people. In general, it 
appears that the reliability of the Reptest is as high as 
might be desirable considering that it is not an unvarying 
trait which is being measured. Whether the same constructs 
or elements will be elicited from the subject appears depen­
dent upon the administration procedure used and the popula­
tion under investigation. 
The administrative problem of element allotment was dis­
cussed above. Which procedure is used may artificially 
affect the relationships within the grid structure. Another 
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issue concerns whether the experimenter should provide 
constructs for the grid or elicit constructs directly from 
the subject. This procedural problem is closely related to 
the difference between the gridform and the Semantic Differ­
ential Technique of Osgood (Osgood, Suci, S Tannenbaum, 1957; 
Snider 8 Osgood, 1969) , 
The problem of elicited versus provided constructs, or 
the distinction between the Heptest and the Semantic Differ­
ential, focuses on the problem of violating the individuality 
corollary which states that each person construes events in 
his own way. To provide constructs is to force the system of 
the experimenter onto the subject. Mitsos (1961) asked 
subjects to choose 9 adjective scales out of 21 which they 
found most meaningful in thinking about people. Subjects 
then applied all 21 scales to 7 roles according to the Seman­
tic Differential Technique. Analysis revealed that those 
adjective scales chosen as more personally meaningful were 
more saturated with meaning according to Osgood's technique, 
providing support for the individuality corollary. 
Bannister and Mair (196 8) view the Heptest and the Se­
mantic Differential as two different types of psychological 
approach. They perceive the Heptest as idiographic and the 
semantic Differential as nomothetic. For them, the Semantic 
Differential violates the assumption of the Heptest that 
constructs elicited are those the subject uses outside the 
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situation. Bannister and Mair (1968) wrote: 
In grid terms, the Semantic Differential is concerned 
with the placement of certain specific elements in rela­
tion to a number of constructs. Grid method allows ths 
examination of the elements in the construct space, but, 
in addition, allows the examination of the relationship 
between constructs in the element space, (p. 134) 
Slater (1969) disagrees with Bannister and Hair on this 
difference between the two techniques. He states that there 
are no essential differences, but rather differences in ap­
plication, The grid technique is specifically adapted for 
use with individuals while the Semantic Differential is pri­
marily for studying samples of populations. This writer 
tends to agree with Slater. 
Bannister and Hair (196 8) cited evidence of Jaspers 
where he had used the Rsptest and the Semantic Differential, 
Both tests were examined for factorial complexity. The two 
techniques agreed reasonably well for the average person, but 
not for the neurotic, the more intelligent, or the more 
introverted subject, 
Delia, Gonyea, and Crockett (1971) studied the problem 
of provided versus elicited constructs on impression forma­
tion, They found that subjects gave more salience to infor­
mation about the stimulus person if this information was 
given with the subjects's own constructs. They also reported 
that more organized impressions were formed if the informa­
tion was given in the subject's own terms or in constructs of 
the esperimenter, than if there were a mixture of constructs 
38 
from both subject and experimenter. Jaeckle (1965), however, 
found college students were able to use public constructs as 
easily as their own constructs in rating fraternity brothers. 
Cromwell and Caldwell (1962) and Landfield (1965, 1968) 
studied the use of own and provided constructs under the 
rubric of meaningfulness or usefullness for the client in his 
descriptions. They found that subjects, if given the 
opportunity to rate people in scalar fashion on their own or 
other's constructs, tend to give more extreme ratings in re­
sponse to their can constructs. Caine and Smail (1967) found 
more differentiation between constructs when subjects used 
their own constructs instead of provided ones. In the same 
vein, studying meaningfulness of personal and common 
constructs, Isaacson (1967) concluded that both types can ba 
used by inuiwiduals in a meaningful fashioTi; bat personal 
constructs have a greater degree of meaningfulness. 
In disagreement with the above studies, Warr and coffman 
(1970) obtained evidence that the tendency to make extreme 
ratings within a given subject was consistent across provided 
and elicited constructs. This tendency to extreme ratings 
was consistent across various measures but was not related to 
personality variables. Bender (1974), however, offered evi­
dence that contradicted warr and coffman, illustrating that 
their lack of difference in extremity ratings between provid­
ed and elicited constructs was due to their method of 
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eliciting constructs. Bender claimed that Harr and Coffman's 
triads tended to produce "trivial" constructs which perhaps 
were not as meaningful as constructs elicited in other stud­
ies. 
Provided constructs may violate the assumption of 
functional communication between examiner and subject. Hair 
(1966) supplied subjects with four pairs of constructs, one 
member of each pair being a less familiar synonym of the 
other. He tested the subjects with the same grids twice, but 
in between the sessions they were told to look up the 
meanings of words they didn't know. The relationships be­
tween pairs significantly increased over administrations. 
Mair concluded that if people know the dictionary meanings of 
words, relationships between similar constructs will be high. 
If suuiects don't know the meaning,- they may 'ise their o%n. 
Bannister and Mair (1968) appear wary of using provided 
constructs, Bonarius {1965} and Adams-Webber (1970b) both 
concluded that research has convincingly shown that an indi­
vidual prefers to express himself by using his own personal 
constructs. Adams-Webber, however, mentioned that, at least 
for normal subjects, the procedure of providing a group of -
subjects with a standard list of constructs is justified for 
assessing formal aspects of cognitive structure as opposed to 
just looking at the verbal content of an individual's system. 
Normal subjects are probably highly practiced at 
communicating with a variety of terms, and it can be presumed 
that they can work with their own or provided constructs. 
While this assumption may not be valid for neurotic subjects, 
providing constructs does have some advantages for group 
comparisons. Adams-Webber's caution, however, of explicitly 
specifying the rationale for providing constructs to subjects 
should be heeded. 
Another problem of administration concerns the contrast 
pole of the constructs elicited, constructs by Kelly's defi­
nition should be dichotomous or bipolar. In the Reptest, one 
asks the question about a given triad: "In what way are two 
of these people alike and different from the third?" It is 
possible that the subject switches dimensions in order to 
give a difference for the third member of the triad. This 
coulu provide a misleading picture of the poles of the con­
struct for the clinician as well as violating the dichotomy 
corollary. 
Some research has been done on this problem, Hesnick, 
and Landfield (1961) gave subjects the Reptest. They later 
gave subjects two constructs and their contrasts as if they 
were four different dimensions and asked the subjects to pro­
vide four contrasting adjectives, after the subjects rated 
some elements on these four construct dimensions, the 
investigators looked at the relationships between ratings and 
found similarity of ratings (and therefore of meaning) for 
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the dimensions containing corresponding poles of an original 
construct dimension even when the contrasts appeared somewhat 
peculiar to the external observer. Nair (1967a) used a some­
what similar procedure with similar results, although he 
warned after further analyzing the grids that subjects might 
relate the explicit pole of two constructs but not the con­
trast or implicit poles. It is possible that subjects do not 
have as clear a picture of what they mean by the contrast 
pole. This problem is especially true when subjects are 
given the Reptest individually and asked to put the elements 
into two piles, those like and unlike the construct pole. 
Hair mentions that "intelligent" may be related to 
"energetic," but not necessarily is "stupid" related in the 
same way to "lazy. " a construct such as "like self" may be 
more defined in a subject's mind than "unlike self." Kair 
also concluded from this research that care should be taken 
in supplying subjects with construct dimensions since a true 
contrast for the investigator may not be a contrast for the 
subjects. 
As a practical solution to the problem, Epting, Suchman, 
and Nickeson (1971) compared two groups with different 
instructions used for eliciting constructs and their 
contrasts, one group received the usual directions (differ­
ence method)f while the other group was asked to specify the 
opposite of the characteristic on which the two members of 
the triad are similar {labeled the opposite method). Using 
the procedure of Resnick and Landfield (1961), they found 
significantly more overlap for the opposite method. They 
concluded that the difference method can cause subjects to 
switch construct dimensions in order to form a contrast as 
well as perhaps eliciting constructs with a range of 
convenience limited to the original triad presented. While 
the evidence of these studies indicates that much of the time 
the subject does list a dichotomous construct (even if it is 
somewhat peculiar to the examiner), caution indicates the op­
posite method of obtaining the contrast pole is in order. 
Hair (1967b) also cautioned against using such whole-
figure constructs as "like self," "like my father." He asked 
subjects to specify ways elements were like the self, etc. 
using these specifications as constructs in a later grid, he 
found only modest relationships between ratings of elements 
on whole-figure constructs and the more specific constructs. 
It is possible that whole-figure constructs are too vague, o r  
that subjects change subordinate constructs of whole-figure 
constructs as they go through the list of elements. 
Op to this point the Reptest and problems related to its 
administration have been discussed only in the context of 
Kelly's aonpararaetric method of factor analysis of the con­
struct system. Other investigators have used diverse 
measures obtained from the grid to examine the properties of 
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constructs. Hinkle, in an unpublished dissertation summa­
rized by Bannister and Hair (1958) , developed a procedure 
called the Impgrid for examining change of constructs within 
the system. It involves asking the subject how changing the 
construing of an element on one construct dimension effects 
his standing on another. The Impgrid also involves a 
"laddering" technique for specifying the hierarchy of 
constructs. 
Jones (1959, 1951) used as a measure of identification 
the average match between the column representing the self 
and those columns for the other elements. Bieri (1953) in­
vestigated assimilative projection, the tendency of a subject 
to see a new acquaintance as more like the self than antici­
pated before a short social interaction, assimilative 
projection can be measured by comparing the construction of 
the self with the column representing the acquaintance. 
Flynn (1959) examined constellatoriness operationally 
defining this concept as the explanatory power of the first 
figure or element factor. 
The explanatory power of the first construct factor can 
be used as a measure of cognitive complexity (Jaspers, cited 
in Adams-Webber, 1970a). Cognitive complexity-simplicity is 
a measure of differentiation within a construct system. The 
greater the variance explained by the first factor, the more 
simple is the system» Bieri (1955; measured complexity by 
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comparing constructs for exact matches. The more rows 
(constructs) which match exactly, the simpler the system. 
Adams-Webber (1969, 1970b) used the average match between 
rows. 
Adams-Webber (1970b) did a discriminant validity study 
of the above indices. He found that the measures of identi­
fication, cognitive complexity, and constellatoriness all 
correlated with each other above .70. The explanatory power 
of the first figure factor correlated .89 with the 
explanatory power of the first construct factor. 
Discriminant validity for these diverse measures is not good. 
Later discussion will show that some significant results for 
these diverse measures have been obtained. Since these vari­
ous measures are so highly correlated, perhaps a better name 
must be found £r>r yihBX is possibly one phenomenon. 
One other measure has been derived from grids. 
Bannister (1960, 1962) gave a group of constructs t o  a 
normative group and a mean relationship for each pair of 
constructs was derived. A single subject's grid could be 
compared to these normative relationships to obtain a measure 
of social deviation. High discrepancies reveal a highly 
idiosyncratic construct system. Bannister and Hair (1968) 
refer to this measure as social agreement. Bannister, 
Fransella, and Agnew (1971) used a similar measure in 
studying schisophrenics although the mathematical formula was 
H b  
different. 
The reader may have noticed that so far the validity of 
the Reptest has not been discussed, validity must be estab­
lished by ascertaining the relationship of the measures ob­
tained from the Reptest with other measures and other 
behaviors. This writer knows of only one study examining the 
relationship between two different instruments used to deter­
mine construct usage, Hamilton (1958) , in a study of the 
generality of constructs, gave subjects both the Reptest and 
selected Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) pictures. Two 
judges were able to match subjects' Reptest protocols with 
their descriptions of the TAT cards, providing evidence of 
the same constructs being elicited by two different measures. 
However, validity means more than just a correlation 
with a similar measure, validation,- in Kellian theory, msans 
that a construct is useful for anticipating events. The same 
criterion is called for in the scientific world of the psy­
chologist. The question becomes, "Is the Reptest useful for 
understanding behavior?" Mischel (1968) wrote: "The funda­
mental characteristic of construct validation is the 
simultaneous validation of the test and the trait construct" 
(p. 91), Although in this statement Mischel is using "con­
struct" with the more technical psychometric connotation (cf. 
Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), this coincidence of word usage 
points out the great similarity between the task of the psy­
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chological scientist and the lay person. A goal of this 
review is to examine the literature in Kellian theory which 
provides this sort of construct validation, and to add some 
evidence to the validity of Personal Construct Theory. This 
involves, of necessity, looking at the evidence for the 
Reptest, the instrument for measuring personal constructs. 
Bather than discussing the construct validity of the Reptest 
in this section, it appears more practical to break the lit­
erature into the six smaller sections which follow. These 
sections deal with construct change and validation (taken in 
the Kellian sense), identification, cognitive complexity, 
relationships of the Reptest to other behavioral measures, 
research with schizophrenics, and therapeutic research. The 
usefulness of the Reptest for understanding behavior in these 
areas is evidence for the construct validity of the Reptest. 
Cofistruet_ÇMnae_and „Validat ion 
One step in validating Kelly's Personal Construct Theory 
is to ascertain what changes take place in the construct 
system and, in doing so, to determine the relationship be­
tween measured change and the theoretical conceptions of 
change. Construct change, in this connotation, means a dif­
ferent application of a construct to an element; e.g., a 
person previously described as good would no5 be anticipated 
as bad. Hinkle (in Bannister & Hair, 1968), using his 
Impgrid procedure, found that superordinate constructs are 
more resistant to change because a change on that level re­
quires more changes on the subordinate level. Subjects were 
also more unwilling to change poles of a construct if the two 
poles had an unequal number of implications attached to them. 
Hinkle's work provided some evidence that subjects prefer 
stability for their construct system rather than face threat, 
which Kelly had defined in terras of perception by the indi­
vidual that a change in his construct system is about to be 
forced upon him. 
Danforth (1968) hypothesized that core constructs would 
be more consistent over time than peripheral ones. He ob­
tained some support for this hypothesis, but the support was 
evident for only one measure out of three—-Landfield's (1967) 
modification, which takes account of the range of convenience 
of constructs, Danforth did not find any relationship be­
tween core and peripheral constructs and Hinkle's Iiapgrid 
measures. 
In another study of change of constructs, Bieri (1960) 
had a class fill out a Situation Questionnaire and an RCRT. 
Later subjects had to predict classmates' responses on the 
questionnaire and construe their classmates on a grid. One 
construct was then "validated" and another "invalidated»" 
When subjects were allowed to reconstrue their classmates, it 
was found that changes on other construct dimensions tended 
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to be in the direction of greater similarity to the validated 
one and away from the invalidated construct. 
Poch (1958) performed an experiment similar to Bieri's 
(1960) and found that when a prediction is validated, the 
same constructs are used again in a similar situation; after 
invalidation, a different set of constructs is used. Rehm 
(1970) observed that change in the relationships of two 
constructs was a function of validation. Meisel (1969; also 
Crockett S Meisel, 1974) concluded that change in construct 
application depended on the method of invalidation and the 
interdependence of the constructs within the system. If the 
invalidation was nonspecific, a highly interdependent system 
«as less likely to change. If invalidation was specific to a 
particular construct, more changes were likely in a tightly 
related system than a more complex system where changing one 
alternative did not require changing several others. Levy 
(1956, 1959) concluded that prepositional constructs were 
less liable to change than constellatory constructs under 
conditions of high invalidation; under low invalidation, the 
difference of change between the two types was not signifi­
cant, Zinn (1974), in a developmental study, observed that 
the relationship between construction of familiar objects and 
persons with the construction of the unfamiliar was greater 
in older subjects (ranging from ages 8-22) ; when unfamiliar 
predictions were invalidated, younger subjects exhibited 
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greater construct reorganization, 
Newman (1957) studied change in the perception of self-
movement or change. After a personality test purportedly de­
signed to measure change, subjects received false information 
about three constructs. These constructs showed change on 
retesting, but there were no systemwide changes. Change was 
dependent upon the type of bogus information presented. 
Bennion (1959) concluded (by asking subjects) that it did not 
seem to matter if invalidation came from friends or non-
friends. He did find, however, that some people were con­
sistently more hostile to change over constellatory 
constructs while others appeared consistently hostile about 
changes in prepositional constructs. 
Starting with Kelly's definition of threat as the per­
ception of imminent construct change, Landfisld, (195%, 1553) 
found that threatening people were those whom the individual 
perceived as construing him in some fashion as he saw himself 
previously or as he unhappily saw himself in the present. 
The threatening person was seen as being able to hinder 
change in the self-construction of the subject. Landfield 
(1955) also concluded that subjects construed themselves as 
less predictable in interactions with threatening persons. 
Kasper, in a 1962 monograph, investigated adjustment in 
adolescents» Subjects were divided by nomination into groups 
of well-adjusted and poorly adjusted youths along with a 
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third group of clinical clients. On the aeptest they rated 
themselves in the past, present, and ideal future. This 
three-time rating was repeated for every construct as if the 
subject were being rated by each person in the role list. 
Subjects also rated themselves as they estimated they really 
would be in five years. Threat, in line with Kelly's defini­
tion, was taken to be discrepancy between the view of the 
self and the view ascribed to others. Well-adjusted subjects 
appeared to be able to tolerate more threat than other 
subjects, without damage to their self-esteem, as measured by 
the discrepancy between the present self-construction and the 
future-ideal construction. These subjects exhibited greater 
stability and thought the future would be equally, if not 
more, to their liking than the present. Poorly-adjusted 
subjects^ by comparison, £©lt sers threatened and uriuerrateu 
by others; they also suspected the future would be less to 
their liking, clinical subjects were even more threatened 
than the other two groups, felt overrated by others, expected 
the future to be worse than the present, and had greater dis­
crepancies between their future ideal and expected future 
self-descriptions. In general, adjustment difficulty appears 
to be related to threat from the environment. The person 
sees the environment as forcing him to change his construct 
tion of himself while he also feels he cannot accomplish 
this. 
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It should be noted that the research in this section 
dealt with change as measured by the paper-and-pencil 
Reptest, Invalidation depended on the verbal report of the 
experimenter, or else the subject was asked what change would 
occur should something else change. Strictly behavioral 
measures were not involved, except, perhaps, the nominations 
of the three groups in Rasper's study. However, the studies 
reported do give support to Kelly's premise that construct 
usage depends upon the validation of their usage. From the 
Laadfield and Kasper studies, Kelly's definition of threat 
appears reasonable within his system. On the other hand, 
construct change depends upon the type of construct, the 
amount of change involved, and the type of validation. This 
l.ast factor implies that further research on change of con-
struction Eight be psrforssd mors profitably with less labo­
ratory type manipulations of a purely verbal or paper-and-
pencil nature. The research cited also points out that 
people prefer stability for their construction system. It 
allows greater anticipation of events and extension of the 
system as opposed to forming a fairly new system. 
At this point in the overall picture of this review of 
Kellian research, it should be pointed out that the study of 
construct change has been internal to Personal Construct 
Theory. Connections have not been made with other theories 
or other behaviors except for the three groups of Kasper. 
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What these studies do provide is evidence that constructs, as 
measured by the RCRT, change on paper as the theory predicts. 
The internal logic of the system has some data supporting 
it. 
Identification 
Another concept investigated within the Personal Con­
struct Theory framework has been identification, the similar­
ity the person shows between his self-construction and that 
of other figures in his environment. To the extent that 
subjects identified strongly with any family figure, Hovell 
(1955) concluded, they tended to identify strongly with all 
family figures. Jones (1959, 1961) observed that subjects 
saw themselves as more similar than different from a majority 
of sale figures in a grid., and they also preferred as 
neighbors those more similar to themselves. He also noted 
that neuropsychiatrie patients tended to either overidentify 
or under identify with significant male figures more than nor­
mal male subjects. The neuropsychiatrie patients perceived 
themselves as less like the first figure factor of the grid 
even though this factor accounted for more variance in the 
grid when compared to the grids of normals. The patients 
also had smaller discrepancies between their self-perceptions 
and their self-ideals; Jones concluded this was because 
neuropsychiatrie patients had no clear goals. 
Day (1969) studied ratings of instructors in an educa­
tional psychology course. High raters tended to see the in­
structor as more like themselves, compared to low rating 
subjects, they also perceived him as similar to mother, 
father, brother, spouse, pal, minister, doctor, attractive 
person, and happy person, Morse (1967) divided subjects into 
three groups; those who saw themselves as similar to other 
family members, as opposite to other family members, or as 
differentiated from them. Subjects interacted in an 
interview with a member of each of the three groups and then 
rated the partners on a group of constructs. The 
differentiated subjects were more accurate in their 
constructions of their partners, and.their own construct 
systems were more complex than those of the other group. 
Giles and Rychlak (1965; used four different measures of 
sex identification nith college students and observed that 
there was a significant tendency for these subjects to iden­
tify more with same sex figures. Their measure had somewhat 
low reliability and did not correlate with the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MHPI) Mf scale. Ryle and 
Lunghi (1972) compared parental and sex-r,ole identification. 
Eight instrumental (male) constructs and eight expressive 
(female) constructs were provided to students for a grid. 
Subjects of both sexes differentiated males from females on 
the instrumental and expressive constructs. Females, but not 
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males, saw themselves as significantly more like the same-ssx 
parent. Subjects of both sexes were more likely to see them­
selves as similar to either parent if that parent was 
perceived as high on both instrumental and expressive 
constructs. Identification with the opposite sex parent was 
less likely when subjects perceived parents differently, each 
with the "proper" role construction. 
In a study of Reptest identification and juvenile 
delinquency, Lederman (1961) found that delinquents showed 
less identification with parents and other authority figures 
than normals, unless the parents were themselves delinquent. 
On the whole, delinquents were less able to identify with 
anyone. They did, however, show greater identification with 
antisocial peers while at the same time the relationship of 
their ssif-ideal to the perception of their parents ar»d 
authority figures was lower than that of nondelinguents» 
In general, studies of identification within the Reptest 
framework, have obtained support for the hypotheses tested. 
Subjects tend to see themselves as more like people of the 
same sex and like people they would find acceptable as 
neighbors, Neuropsychiatrie patients and juvenile 
delinquents did not exhibit the same identification patterns 
as normals. The Jones (1959 , 1961) and Lederman (1961) stud­
ies were not restricted to paper-and-pencil measures, but 
rather related grid measures to behavioral categories with 
55 
successful results. These studies appear to lend support to 
a concept of identification as a "perceived similarity of 
self and others" (Jones, 1961, p. 275). However, in the 
opinion cf the present writer, these studies do not show 
whether or not identification is an inner psychodynamic 
process or merely the result of imitation as posited by 
social learning theory (Hischel, 1971). Nevertheless, simi­
lar construction of the self and other figures does appear on 
grids as would be expected. In accord with Kellian theory, 
similar construction should lead to similar behavior. 
at this point in the review, further evidence has been 
presented in favor of the internal logic of Personal Con­
struct Theory, Some evidence has been advanced relating 
constructs (under the rubric of identification) to very molar 
behavioral categories. The overall question of this paper 
concerns the consistency and diversity of constructs as re­
lated to consistency and diversity of behavior» The focus of 
the review to this point has shown that constructs as meas­
ured by the RCHT do have systematic properties of consistency 
and diversity. However, the behavioral end of the present 
question is still in the air. The next section, while 
emphasizing divergency of construction, provides some evi­
dence of the connection of constructs with behavior» 
Another concept which has been responsible for a number 
of studies within the Personal Construct Theory framework is 
cognitive complexity, Bieri (1955, 1960) defined the cogni­
tive simplicity-complexity dimension as a measure of the 
degree ot differentiation within the construct system. & 
simple system would allow for little differentiation in con­
struction of people, and therefore, probably little variation 
in behavior toward them. A cognitively complex person, on 
the other hand, would be able to make greater distinctions 
between persons in his environment. Crockett (1965), in a 
review of the issue of cognitive complexity and impression 
formation, listed three measures of cognitive complexity, 
while Adams-Webber (1970a) added a couple more. Basically 
these measures examine hot: much variation is shared by a num­
ber of constructs in a grid. Another way of expressing the 
measure is the strength of relationship among constructs 
within the grid; the higher the average relationship, the 
more simple the system. 
Landfield (1967, 1971) proposed another measure, 
functionally independent construction (FIC), which is very 
similar to Bieri«s cognitive complexity. This measure uses 
Landfield's modification of element allotment on the grid. 
He claimed that this measure takes account of the varying 
range of application of the constructs. Landfield chose not 
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to call the measure one of complexity because he felt that 
independent construction does not guarantee that the system 
is organized, a connotation usually attached to complexity. 
This FIC measure provides an indication of independence of 
construction for the constructs (FICc) , for the elements or 
persons (FICp), and for both aspects together (FIC). 
Landfield, Danforth, and Baugh (1968) cited test-retest 
reliability coefficients of ,82 (over two weeks, using the 
same constructs and elements), and of ,52 (two weeks, using 
different elements). Data taken over four months, using dif­
ferent constructs but the same elements, indicated consisten­
cy ratings ranging from .73 to .95 for FICc and FIC, with a 
group of therapists. Client consistency was much lower, but 
these investigators noted that their research seemed to indi­
cate maladjastroent is associated «ith high FIC scores. If 
therapy was effective in producing change in the clients, 
then this would explain part of the inconsistency of scores 
over four months. 
Tripodi and Bieri (1963) compared cognitive complexity 
scores on grids where their subjects used either their own or 
experimenter-provided constructs. Test-retest (one week) 
reliabilities were .86 for provided and .76 for elicited 
constructs. They concluded, noting nonsignificant 
differences between means and the <.50 correlation between 
forms, that, for research purposes, provided constructs were 
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just as useful as elicited ones. 
several studies have investigated whether cognitive com­
plexity has generality in varying situations. Bieri and 
Blacker (1956) observed that cognitive complexity on the 
Beptest was related to use of detail determinants on the 
Rorschach, Subjects higher in complexity tended to give more 
human responses to the inkblots. Extraversive subjects (H<Sum 
Ç on the Rorschach) have been found to be higher in cognitive 
complexity and to perceive embedded figures significantly 
faster than intraversive subjects (M>Sum C; Bieri & Messerly, 
1957) . Allard and Carlson (1963) had subjects construe three 
different sets of elements: the original role list of Kelly 
(1955), a list of famous people, and a group of geometric 
designs, correlations between measures of cognitive complex­
ity derived fro™ the three grids ranged from .67 to .57. 
Hall (1966) used the variance associated with the first 
factor as a measure of complexity. She administered subjects 
five different grids; the elements were people, animals, 
fabric swatches, color chips, and art prints. Eight of the 
possible ten intercorrelations were significant for males 
(p<.05), but none for females. Intelligence was not related 
to complexity. Greatest complexity was observed with art 
prints, with the least for people and animals {where physical 
characteristics t?sre not allowed as constructs) . Epting 
(1972) used three different grids with social issues as 
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elements. All three grids were readministerei a week later. 
Correlations ranged from ,51 to ,75 indicating stability both 
across administrations and across grids. 
Crockett (1965), in his review of cognitive complexity, 
summarized evidence from an unpublished Master's thesis by 
Supnick which pertains to the problem of the generality of 
cognitive complexity. She asked subjects to describe eight 
individuals who fit different prescribed roles and the number 
of constructs was taken as a measure of cognitive complexity 
(the dependent variable). The data were analyzed as a 2® 
factorial; factors included groups (undergraduates versus 
adults), sex, and age, sex and valence of the person de­
scribed. Females used more constructs than males, mora 
constructs were used to describe peers than older people, and 
sors constructs %ers used to describe liked rather than 
disliked people. There were a number of significant first-
and second-order interaction effects, Crockett concluded 
that this is evidence that the role category of another 
person is an important determinant of the constructs used to 
describe that person and therefore of a subject's closeness 
to that person. Crockett also concluded that the constructs 
formed and their complexity depend on the functional signifi­
cance of the people which the constructs are used to de­
scribe. 
60 
While Supnik's data seem to indicate that liked persons 
are more complexly described. Miller and Bieri (1965) ob­
served that subjects differentiated more between socially 
distant people than persons socially close to the subject. 
Irwin, Tripodi, and Bieri (1 967) noted that negatively valued 
persons were construed more differentially than neutral stim­
ulus persons, who, in turn, appeared to be more 
differentiated than positive affect people. The results were 
particularly marked for female subjects. They concluded that 
subjects were more vigilant and therefore more complex in 
their construction of negative persons. Miller (1969) did 
not find a difference in cognitive complexity as measured by 
impressions of a new positively or negatively evaluated 
acquaintance. He concluded that differences in cognitive 
complexity measures depend en long term interaction %ith the 
elements construed; cognitive complexity appears to be a 
stable trait not easily influenced by a 20-minute interac­
tion, 
While these studies appear somewhat contradictory, the 
researchers have noted a stability of cognitive complexity 
across situations. However, the varying results may partly 
be due to the different measures of complexity that were 
used. It does appear, nevertheless^ that the relationship of 
the other person to the subject is an important determinant 
of the complexity used to describe that other person. Fre­
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quency of encounter as well as valence of the other person 
appear to interact with cognitive complexity in a manner not 
yet completely understood. &t the least, however, the stud­
ies do seem to indicate that constructs are used to 
anticipate events. Across people there are differences in 
the complexity with which people interpret the environment; 
within subjects there appears to be variation across 
situations as to how much complexity is brought to bear on a 
given situation. 
Within the rubric of cognitive complexity-simplicity, 
research has been done on impression formation where 
inconsistent information about a stimulus person is presented 
to a subject. The subject is then asked in some way to 
relate his impression of the stimulus. Cognitively complex 
subjects appear better able to absorb conflicting information 
because their more differentiated construct systems allow 
greater distinction of characteristics attributed to another 
person (Tripodi 6 Bieri, 1964; Crockett, 1965). Moreover, 
Leventhal and Singer (1964) observed that more cognitively 
complex subjects searched for more information about stimuli 
that was related to inner states while cognitively simple 
subjects responded to surface qualities of behavior. Tripodi 
and Bieri (1966) also noted that cognitively complex subjects 
attributed more interpersonal conflict to characters in 
stories written about imaginary people. 
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In the same vein, it was observed that cognitively 
simple subjects tend to change their impressions more after 
conflicting information (Mayo, 1960), and they are more 
subject to the recency effect (Mayo 6 Crockett, 1964), 
Nidorf and Crockett (1965) found that cognitively complex 
subjects are better able to integrate conflicting informa­
tion; subjects low in complexity tend toward more univalent 
impressions, Rosenkrantz and Crockett (1965) were able to 
replicate this observation only for males; they conjectured 
that value incongruities resulted in female subjects 
rejecting the stimulus, leading to univalent, negative 
impressions. Following these results, Meltzer, Crockett, and 
Rosenkrantz (1966) found that cognitive complexity interacted 
with congruity of values upon the level of organization of 
impressions; They surmised that perhaps a certain 
familiarity is necessary before the subject can bring a com­
plex set of descriptors to bear on the stimulus. 
This ability to integrate inconsistent information ap­
parently has limits, Fertig and Mayo (1970) found that the 
cognitively complex wrote more integrated impressions under 
conditions of low and moderate inconsistency than the less 
complex subjects. There was no difference in integration be­
tween the groups under high inconsistency conditions, Kenny, 
Press and Crockett (1972) cautioned, however, that while 
differentiation and integration appear correlated, they 
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should be conceived of as separate processes. 
Research in the area of cognitive complexity has also 
examined the relationship of this variable to accuracy of in­
terpersonal predictions. It is hypothesized that accuracy of 
prediction would lead to better social interaction and cogni­
tive complexity should be a help in this interaction. In 
Leventhal's research (1957) subjects improved in accuracy of 
prediction of a stimulus person's responses to a question­
naire as more information was provided, with the cognitively 
simple subjects showing relatively greater improvement with 
increased information. In this study there was not a signif­
icant difference in accuracy between cognitively simple and 
complex subjects. However it appeared that the complex 
subjects tended to differentiate between themselves and the 
stimulus, while the less complex noted similarities^ Bieri 
(1955), Sechrest and Jackson (1961), and Plotnik (1961), in 
comparison to Leventhal, did obtain significant correlations 
between accuracy of prediction and cognitive complexity, 
Adams-Webber (1 968, 196 9) performed the same type of ex­
periment. Subjects were paired, asked to role play planning 
a vacation for 20 minutes, and then required to choase which 
22 out of 44 constructs the partner had used on the Beptest. 
Cognitively complex subjects more accurately identified the 
constructs of their partners. Adams-Weober reasoned that 
cognitively complex people may more readily grasp the views 
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of people they encounter because of the greater number of 
alternatives within their construct systems. Adams-Webber 
did not monitor the role plays, however, so that more exact 
information about what cues cause more accurate perception is 
not available. 
Epting (1968) attempted to investigate the relationship 
of persuasibility and cognitive complexity. He obtained weak 
support for the hypothesis that cognitive simplicity is re­
lated to persuasibility. More important, one half of his 
subjects were judged to be suspicious of the experimental 
manipulations, and suspicion was positively related to cogni­
tive complexity, Lundy and Berkowitz (1957) observed that 
attitude change was more likely in cognitively complex 
subjects, although the less complex are more prone to change 
on the basis of the authority of the source of nsv i.nfcriiia = 
tion. 
Bieri (1955), in his study of cognitive complexity, 
noted that it was negatively correlated with assimilative 
projection, the tendency to construe others as similar to the 
self after brief interactions. Assimilative projection was 
also negatively associated with accurate prediction. The 
more cognitively simple subjects were, the less available 
were choices of construction, leading them to perceive others 
as similar to the self and, therefore, to predict responses 
inaccurately. Bieri noted that cognitive complexity was es-
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pecially related to the tendency to predict accurately the 
differences between the self and others. Lundy and Berkowitz 
(1957) observed that the tendency to perceive others as simi­
lar to the self results in being more easily persuaded by 
those others. 
Flynn (1959) studied the relationship of cognitive com­
plexity and the constellatoriness of constructs in a person's 
system. He did not find a relationship between the two and 
concluded that a person may have a great amount of informa­
tion but not be able to use it because of the high 
constellatoriness of his constructs. In other words, it's 
possible to have a very descriptive set of stereotypes. 
Studies in cognitive complexity, as those in identifica­
tion, have resulted in significant results, giving some sup­
port for Personal Construct Theory^ Crockett (1955) summa­
rized his review paper by writing: 
(a) The degree of differentiation of a subject's cogni­
tive system sith respect to some domain of objects will 
vary as a function of his experiences with objects in 
that domain. (b) Subjects who develop an extensive set 
of interpersonal constructs, compared with those with a 
sparse set,- make more inferences from a standard set of 
information, are more likely to view others in 
ambivalent terms, and are better able to assimilate po­
tentially contradictory information about another person 
into a unified impression, (c) Such differences in the 
effects of cognitive complexity may be limited by dif­
ferential experiences with different categories of 
people, or by differences in the values and motivational 
states of the perceiver, (d) The empirical test of one 
large body of hypotheses depends upon the development of 
more elaborate methods for experiencing the structural 
aspects of cognitions; doubtless these methodological 
advances will not only facilitate the examination of 
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present hypotheses but will reveal the existence of more 
complex problems as well. (p. 88) 
at this point, it does, however, seam important to note 
work by Vannoy {1965a, 1965b). He factor analyzed 20 
measures of cognitive complexity and obtained six factors. 
He concluded that the results pointed to three different 
behavioral tendencies: using few or many dimensions in 
judgments about others, using few or many positions for 
judgment on a given characteristic, and maintaining a narrow 
or broad perspective of one's interpersonal environment. 
Many of the measures of cognitive complexity used, however, 
were not developed within the Kellian framework. Miller 
(1969) used Tripodi and Bieri's (1963) procedure, as well as 
Crockett's, to measure cognitive complexity. The two did not 
correlate significantly. Little (1969) used Crockett's meas­
ure and two other procedures derived by Bieri; again there 
were no significant correlations. In contrast, Adams-Webber 
(1970a), as cited above, found little discriminant validity 
for the concepts of cognitive complexity, identification, and 
assimilative projection. 
Little (1969), as well as Rosenkrantz and Crockett 
(1965), and Hall (1966), noted sex differences in their cog­
nitive compleiity studies. Basing his reflections on these 
sex differences, Little concluded that the two sexes may use 
their complex systems in varying ways in different 
situations, thus explaining the differential results obtained 
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with the various measures. In addition. Little (1969), Irwin 
et al. (1967), Landfield (1971), and Kenny et al. (1 972) all 
point out that there is a difference between differentiation 
and integration, k person may be able to list a large number 
of constructs, as Crockett's measure calls for, while he may 
at the same time lack a structure which integrates these 
constructs. Bieri's measures look more to structure. Adams-
Webber (1970a) examined only structural measures, which may 
account for his high convergent validity data. 
It would appear from the studies cited that cognitive 
complexity is a stable trait with a limited generality across 
situations. This trait appears to be a tendency to use mors 
or less differentiation in one's interpretation of the envi­
ronment, However, this trait is influencd by the situation 
to be construed; for axacpls, familiarity and valence appear 
to interact with the use of a more or less complex system in 
the description of events. While many of the studies have 
somewhat successfully examined the relationship of cognitive 
complexity as an interrelationship of constructs with other 
variables, the present writer is unaware of research on cog­
nitive complexity taking note of the hierarchy within a com­
plex system. In the light of Rosenberg and Sedlak's (1972) 
work with a hierarchy in implicit personality theory, perhaps 
subjects apply different levels of a construct system to dif­
ferent situations. 
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The crux of the matter at this point, however, is wheth­
er this trait is associated with overt behavior, since some 
of the evidence for cognitive complexity points to an inter­
action with the situation. The vast majority of studies 
cited either examined relationship patterns within grids or 
investigated relationships between paper-and-pencil measures 
(the grid and accuracy of prediction on a questionnaire, for 
example) . Adams-Webber (196 8, 1969) at least had subjects 
role play, but the effects produced by the role play are 
uncertain. Jones (1959, 1961) studied identification in 
terms of normals versus neuropsychiatries, while Lederman 
(1961) investigated identification among juvenile 
delinquents. These last studies at least investigated 
relationships of the grid (and therefore the construct 
system) with gross behavioral categories outside the labora­
tory. The next section deals with various other behaviors 
outside the clinical sphere. 
The Reptest and Other Measures 
Various attempts have been made to ascertain the rela­
tionship of constructs to other measures. These studies have 
been done in more or less unrelated fashion and citing the 
results tends to be a disjointed effort. Nevertheless, there 
are a number of significant results in this area. 
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Bieci, Bradburn, and Galinsky (1958) elicited 25 
constructs from subjects based on 7 figures. They divided 
the constructs into internal and external. Internal 
constructs emphasized underlying motivations, emotional ex­
pression, or guaiitative aspects of one's interpersonal 
relationships, while external ones focused on physical 
characteristics, relationships, activities, etc. They ob­
served that the number of internal constructs was correlated 
.37 (p<.01) with performance on an embedded figures test for 
females, but not for males. 
Hess (1959) examined the level of cognitive awareness, 
which Kelly (1955) described as a dimension of how easily the 
poles of a given construct can be expressed in socially ef­
fective symbols. He was able to obtain support for a rela­
tionship bst'iissn soas of his measures of the level of cogni­
tive awareness and problem solving tasks. He did not find a 
relationship between the level of cognitive awareness 
measures and various personality measures (Emotional stabili­
ty, Restraint, and Thoughtfulness scales of the Guilford-
Zimmerman Temperament Survey and the Hysteria and Denial 
scales of the HHPI). 
Jennings (1964) studied the creativity cycle (moving 
from loose to tight construction) in relation to poetry writ­
ing. subjects experienced three conditions representing 
tight construction, loose construction, and loose to tight 
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construction after hearing a stimulus poem. Both subjects 
and experimental judges ranked the poems written under the 
loose-tight condition as best. 
Hanson (1961) investigated choice of major field of 
study within the Kellian framework. While other studies have 
found that cognitive complexity is not related to intelli­
gence, the subjects in this study did show a correlation be­
tween complexity and grade point average. Engineering 
students did net exhibit a more masculine identification than 
other students on the Reptest, although they did show weaker 
parental identification. Onsuccessful students also failed 
to use more preemptive constructs, contrary to the hypothesis 
tested. 
Shoemaker (1952) had students fill out an RCRT and role 
play interviewing for acceptance into a clinical psychology 
program. Judges, after watching the role plays, were able to 
match RCRT protocols with the role players. These results 
were not replicated for a second group although this particu­
lar group filled out the Reptest at home and for some reason 
may have listed a different set of constructs. Shoemaker 
(1955) observed that persons construed similarly will be pre­
dicted as acting in a similar fashion in a given situation. 
Subjects were also better able to predict the behavior of 
other people in choice situations if they felt more 
comfortable with those people. 
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Bender (1968) asked subjects to fill out a Eepgrid con­
taining 20 elements. They were then asked which two people 
of a triad toward whom they would behave similarly. There 
was a significant relationship between these choices and the 
two out of three members of the same triad construed more 
similarly. Bender noted that the next step in research would 
be to match grid ratings of similar construction with observ­
er's ratings of behavior. 
Argyle and Little (1972) have written a theoretical ar­
ticle examining the role of personality traits in social psy­
chology. Subjects were asked to indicate how they behave 
toward various people and their responses were analyzed by 
grid techniques. Analysis of all subjects in a combined grid 
indicated the importance of the interaction between subject 
and stimulus figures —person by situation variance in Bowers = 
(1973) terms. In this investigation the constructs were 
perceptions of the subjects' behavior toward specified 
individuals* No attempt was made to examine the construction 
of the stimulus individuals by the subjects. Results indi­
cated the same person acts differently in some situations and 
in similar fashion in others. This study did not indicate 
whether the subjects' construction of these individuals is 
related to the subject by situation interaction. The ques­
tion of similar construction leading to similar behavior has 
not been answered by argyle and Little, although in fairness 
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to them, this was not the purpose of the article. 
Fransella and Bannister (1967) found that they were able 
to distinguish significantly between voters in a 1964 British 
general election by the subjects' grids formed from such pro­
vided constructs as "sincere," "likely to vote conservative," 
"like I'd like to be in character." There are easier methods 
for predicting voting patterns, but Fransella and Bannister 
suggest that the results indicate a method for ascertaining a 
"brand image" for use in advertising. 
Triandis (1959) investigated cognitive structure and 
communication in industry. Subjects were asked to construe a 
list of people and a list of jobs in the Reptest format with 
elicited constructs, and they then were asked to rate the 
jobs and people using the semantic Differential Technique 
'ihere constructs are provided. The protocols of supervisor 
and employee were compared. As similarity between the two 
increased on the Reptest of people and the Semantic Differen­
tial of jobs, so did ratings of communication effectiveness 
and liking of the supervisor. The other Reptest and the 
other Semantic Differential did not show these relationships. 
Triandis suggests these somewhat conflicting results may 
possibly be due to interactions with job level, and to the 
job list being less homogeneous than the people list. It 
seems to the present writer that another possibility for 
these results is that people communicate better about people 
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than jobs when they use their own constructs as opposed to 
more public constructs. Possibly jobs can be talked about in 
more objective terms. Triandis' more general conclusion to 
the study was that cognitive similarity is a significant var­
iable in interpersonal communication and liking. 
McFall (1956) investigated demand characteristics of ex­
perimental research within the perspective of Personal Con­
struct Theory. Experimenters were given different 
expectations of what was being investigated, either photo­
graph rating behavior or response time. Subjects were 
assumed to have construed the experiment by the presence or 
absence of a time device. The expectancy effect (or 
unintentional communication effect) obtained if both experi­
menter and subject had the same expectancy, the same con­
struction of the research, undsr the rating condition, but 
not with the response time condition. Conditions of 
incongruency produced no unintentional communication effect-
McFall offered alternate hypotheses for why the response time 
condition failed to show the effect of expectancy; these in­
cluded task ambiguity and differential susceptibility of 
measures to unintentional communication. 
Two other studies deal with constructs and interpersonal 
attraction. Payne (1957) found that subjects were better 
able to predict a partner's response to a guestionnaire if 
the subject had knowledge of the partner's constructs rather 
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than knowledge of constructs others had used to describe him. 
Neither the knowledge of the constructs nor accurate predic­
tion increased chances, however, of the partner being chosen 
for a possible cooperative relationship, cravens (1959) com­
pared members of a fraternity on the Reptest but no relation­
ship was obtained between use of group constructs and 
popularity. He did find that the fraternity president was 
perceived as more like the "ideal fraternity type" than the 
average member. 
Duck (1972, 197 3a, 1973b, 1973c; Duck S Spencer, 1972) 
made a number of investigations into the connection of 
constructs and friendship (as measured by sociometric 
nomination techniques) . While his studies have been primari­
ly of the content of the construct systems, he did observe 
that similarity of first factors derived from grids %as 
greater between friends than between nominal pairs. Duck, has 
noted that literal similarity of constructs is a better pre­
dictor of friendship at the beginning of acquaintanceship, 
while conceptual similarity is a better predictor of 
friendship after six months. It appears, also, that the type 
of construct used by friends changes over time from those 
emphasizing manners and physical attractiveness to those of a 
more "psychological" nature. It may be that one type of con­
struct is used by a person to judge whether friendship is 
possible, while another type comes into play for later 
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interactions. 
It would appear from Payne's (1957) investigation that 
knowledge of another person's constructs helps in interper­
sonal prediction, and therefore in playing some roles with 
the other person. As for friendship or popularity, it seems 
subjects must use the same constructs. In the course of 
friendship people may also interact in such a way that 
commonality of construct systems becomes greater. Cravens' 
(1959) failure to find a relationship between constructs and 
popularity may be due to his investigating the use of a gen­
eral set of constructs used by the group. Friendship or 
popularity may depend on greater similarity of construct 
systems than just a group norm. 
In this section, a variety of relationships of 
constructs %as examined. Shils not every hypD'chesis tested 
in this research was accepted, the majority of studies ob­
tained significant results. These add some flesh to the 
skeleton of Personal Construct Theory. Although several 
studies investigated more overt behaviors such as poetry 
writing and voting patterns, the studies on friendship and 
social behavior were still based on paper-and-pencil 
measures. Kelly's (1955) golden rule for clinical 
psychologists is ; "If you don't know what's wrong with a 
client, ask him; he may tell you" (p. 201). His rule is 
well taken. However, as Bender (1968) pointed out at 
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Bannister's suggestion, "the next step, though clearly a dif­
ficult one, is to replace the S's report with observers' 
ratings of ss in dyadic interaction with people who have been 
elements in a previously administered REP" {p. 304). 
Schiz2Ehrenia_an^Personal_Çœistruçts 
In the search for behavioral evidence of validation for 
Personal Construct Theory, one fruitful area of research has 
been carried on with schizophrenics, a prime characteristic 
of schizophrenia is lack of control of cognitive functions. 
The Beptest offers the possibility of understanding this lack 
of cognitive control by providing a sample of a client's con­
struct system and its usage. Bannister (1960) supplied the 
same ten constructs tor two different grids of 18 
acquaintances each. He derived four measures from comparison 
of the two grids. Consistency is a measure of stability be­
tween constructs across grids. Intensity measures the 
strength of the relationship between constructs within each 
grid; this is a measure of structure. The coefficient of 
variation was designed to measure the variance of the 
relationships which contribute to the intensity of the struc­
ture on the hypothesis that if the structure is weakening, 
more variation should be evident. The social deviation score 
is the sum discrepancy of a subject's relationship between 
constructs from the average relationships determined from a 
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group of normal subjects. Thought-disordered schizophrenics 
(by diagnosis) were significantly lower than nonthought-
disordeted schizophrenics and normals on both the intensity 
and consistency measures. The coefficient of variation dis­
tinguished only depressives from both groups of 
schizophrenics, neurotics, and normals. Nonthought-
disordered schizophrenics were distinguished from normals on 
the social deviation measure, but no other differences be­
tween groups were observed. 
Bannister repeated the research again (1962) , but this 
time he used two sets of ten photographs for construction. 
Again the thought-disordered schizophrenics were lower on the 
intensity, consistency, and a new social agreement measure 
when compared to nonthought-disordered schizophrenics, 
depressives,, neurotics, and normals. After observing these 
differences. Bannister concluded his article with the hypoth­
esis for further investigation that thought-disordered 
schizophrenia is the result of repeated invalidation of one's 
construction processes, resulting in the subject working with 
a very loose system. M-Issa and Robertson (1964) obtained 
significant relationships between this measure of Bannister 
and other measures of divergent thinking ability. 
Bannister (1963) attempted to test this serial 
invalidation hypothesis with normal subjects by experimental 
manipulations of validation and invalidation of their 
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constructions on his instrument. He was not able to confirm 
his hypothesis, but noted that while there were changes in 
the pattern of positive and negative relationships between 
constructs, there was no decrease in the overall intensity. 
In a retest of the hypothesis (Bannister, 1965), he found 
that validation led to increased relationships between 
constructs, but invalidation produced no change, as if 
subjects were resisting a change that would leave them with 
no alternative system. However, if, of two constellations of 
constructs, one was validated and the other constellation 
repeatedly invalidated, then the appropriate increase or de­
crease in the relationships of constructs within the 
constellation occurred. Bannister stated the experiment gave 
weak support for his hypothesis since he was unable to pro­
duce in normals the level of disorganization found in 
thought-disordered schizophrenics. However, outside the 
laboratory, schizophrenics may undergo long-term invalidation 
as compared to short-term invalidation in experimental manip­
ulation. 
Bannister and Fransella (1966, 1967) standardized this 
test for thought disorder, using eight photographs with six 
constructs; kind, stupid, selfish, sincere, mean, and honest. 
Cutoff scores below 1000 for intensity or below ,49 for con­
sistency are indicative of thought-disordered schizophrenia. 
Romney (1959a) was able to distinguish thought-disordered 
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schizophrenics on both the Bannister-Fransella measure and 
Lovibond's object Sorting Test (Lovibond, 1954). On neither 
test was he able to distinguish the parents or siblings of 
these patients. In another article (Romney, 1969b), he found 
a nonsignificant correlation between the two tests. He con­
cluded they both loaded highly on an overinclusion-
underinclusion factor, but they loaded in opposite directions 
on a verbal-nonverbal factor. Foulds, Hope, KcPherson, and 
Mayo (1967), using a continuous rating scale for the criteri­
on of thought disorder, obtained greater validity 
coefficients with acute than with chronic patients for the 
Bannister-Fransella test. 
There is some research showing that the intensity and 
consistency scores are dependent on what the subject is asked 
to construe and which constructs he uses. Bannister and 
Salmon (1966) found that both schizophrenics and normals were 
less consistent in their construction of people as compared 
to objects when physical constructs were used. However, 
whether on a grid of objects or people, thought-disordered 
schizophrenics were less stable than normals. Mcpherson and 
Buckley (1970) and HcPherson, Buckley, and Draffan (1971b) 
observed that the distinction between normals and 
schizophrenics obtained only for "psychological" constructs, 
those related to personality or emotional state. The dis­
tinction was not found for constructs describing physical, 
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social class, or background variables. Williams and Quirke 
(1972) found this was true using either photos or people as 
elements. Rohrer (1 958) had previously observed that 
neuropsychiatrie patients used more impersonal constructs as 
hospitalization continued. 
Draffan (1973) compared random grids with those of 
thought-disordered subjects and normals. The random grids 
were distinguished from those of live subjects, and the two 
groups of subjects were yet distinguished from each other. 
Draffan concluded that thought-disordered patients have some 
subsystems for psychological construing, but these are less 
organized than those of normals. These patients seem to have 
most difficulty with loose construct subsystems in the area 
of interpersonal descriptions. 
It seems to the-present writer that the uifEiculty of 
schizophrenics with psychological constructs may be due to 
validation experiences. While the normal and thought-
disordered subjects may be distinguished from each other by 
the consistency of their psychological subsystems, both 
groups have loss consistency with these same subsystems as 
compared to more physical construct systems. Hall (1965), as 
noted above, observed that cognitive complexity was greater 
among normals when the elements of the grid were art prints 
as opposed to people and animals (where physical constructs 
were not used), The use of physical constructs can be more 
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easily validated in contrast to psychological descriptions. 
It obviously is easier to affirm that a person's skin is 
black or white than whether he is joyful or sad. 
The dispute about the cause of the relationship between 
intensity and consistency, and thought disorder continues. 
It is related to the problem of schizophrenics being asked to 
construe the photos of the Bannister-Fransella test, 
Williams (1971) gave three types of grids to schizophrenics 
and normals: the Bannister-Fransella photos, a list of eight 
acquaintances of the subject, and a list of eight fictitious 
names and addresses. Schizophrenics and normals were still 
distinguished on all three tests, but as the elements in­
crease in relevant cues, so does intensity and consistency 
for both groups, Williams offered a cue insensitivity 
hypothesis- Frith and Lillie (1972) agreed, describing the 
problem as one of element consistency, contending that 
subjects were unable to extract the relevant information from 
photos. 
HcFadyen and Foulds (1972) compared the Bannister-
Fransella photographs and an eight-role Reptest where the 
constructs were elicited. They found limited support for 
equivalence between the forms, concluding that the construct 
system for known persons may be more organized and stable 
over time. Bannister (1962) originally changed to 
photographs because he felt known persons could be construed 
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with a system that had been used by subjects before the 
thought disorder occurred, Williams (1971) referred to this 
as the "remembered judgments" explanation. Bannister (1971) 
noted that whether people or photographs are construed, 
differences between groups are still evident, due to the 
disturbed construction processes of thought-disordered 
schizophrenics. He also castigated Williams' cue 
insensitivity notion by calling it not a theory but, "a 
notion half linked to a disparate bundle of other notions" 
(p. 470) . In the same line, Mcpherson, Blackburn, Draff an, 
and HcFadyen (1973) agreed with Bannister, contending that 
the loose construct system results in poor element consisten­
cy or poor information extraction. 
Haynes and Phillips (1973a, 1973b) continued the debate. 
They contendeu that the thonght-Qisordered schisophrenics 
are distinguished from normals because of the inconsistency 
in the use of the construct system, rather than due to the 
intensity (or internal relationship). They noted that 
Bannister took the low consistency scores as signs of loose 
construing. Haynes and Phillips observed that when consist­
ency scores were partialed out, the intensity scores did not 
distinguish the groups. Bannister (1973) answered that in­
tensity and consistency scores are correlated only in 
schizophrenics and not in normals. The correlation between 
intensity and consistency in schizophrenics, with both scores 
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distinguishing the psychiatric and normal groups, indicates 
for Bannister that an explanation of thought disorder must 
cover the decrease in both. For the present writer. 
Bannister's is not a convincing argument. 
Badley (1974), in a review of past studies in this area, 
tried to tie the various findings together. He concluded the 
problem may be that the schizophrenic, because of repeated 
invalidation, keeps changing the meaning of the constructs 
used; subjects apply the constructs very loosely, as if 
trying to find the most useful meaning. As Duck {1973a) 
warned in his content studies of the construct system and 
friendship, the investigator cannot always be sure that he 
and the subject mean the same thing by a construct. Radley 
wrote; "... the alternative hypothesis is that, although the 
schizoid person retains construct labels which denote highly 
abstract concepts in public use, he now uses these labels 
within the context of constructions which now are 
idiosyncratic and of a different form to those he might have 
originally employed" (p. 324). Radley has again brought 
Kellian research back to the question of provided versus 
elicited constructs; a reminder of Kelly's assumption for 
the Reptest of functional communication is also well taken at 
this point. 
Nevertheless, whatever the cause of the lower intensity 
and consistency scores of thought disordered schizophrenics 
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as compared to other populations, this difference has been 
repeatedly observed, no matter what elements are construed. 
The problem may be in the construct system (intensity) or in 
a lack of stable and consistent use of the system. Either 
way, the subject is unable to anticipate events effectively 
as Kelly's main postulate theorizes a person should be able 
to do. 
HcPherson and his associates examined flattening of 
affect in schizophrenic patients (McPherson, Harden, Hay, 
Johnstone, S Kushner, 1970; HcPherson, Barden, G Buckley, 
1970; and HcPherson, Buckley, & Draffan, 1971b). They 
elicited constructs from subjects using photographs. Those 
patients who had been diagnosed as having flattened affect 
were found to use fewer psychological constructs than other 
patients or normals» Bodiakova, Hemsley, and Muraford (1974) 
noted this distinction held whether photos or people ware 
construed, although the correlation was not as intense for 
persons as elements. Using the Bannister-Fransella test as a 
criterion, HcPherson (1969; HcPherson, Buckley, & Draffan, 
1971a) observed that thought-disordered schizophrenics exhib­
ited more delusions of nonintegration and hallucinations; 
nonthought-disordered schizophrenics complained more in terms 
of persecutory delusions, fie investigated and obtained sup­
port for this hypothesis, reasoning that persecutory 
delusions take place within a system which includes psycho­
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logical constructs, even if these constructs appear abnormal. 
Non-integration delusions should come about because there is 
no system within which to construe oneself. HcPherson (1972) 
also noted a significant correlation between the use of psy­
chological constructs and complaints of more psychological 
symptoms as opposed to somatic symptoms in acute 
schizophrenics; chronic patients exhibited the same 
tendency, but the correlation was not significant. 
Kear-Colwell (1973) studied the relationship of the 
Bannister-Fransella test to other variables. No•significant 
relationships obtained between that instrument and 
intellectual ability, age, social class, or the 16 PF test. 
However, in a 1972 article, he had concluded that there was a 
small but significant relationship of intensity and consist­
ency with fluid intelligence. Other research (Bannister, 
1962; Bannister, Fransella, 5 Agnew, 1971; Hellsop, 
Spelman, 5 Harrison, 1971; Brsakey S Goodell, 1972) have 
studied the Bannister-Fransella test in relation to various 
other psychiatric classifications, while some significant 
differences between groups have been obtained, often there is 
considerable overlap of scores. No consistent theory holds 
the significant results together at the moment. 
As for investigations of the Bannister-Fransella test 
outside the clinical area. Warren (1966) used the instrument 
in a language study of two social class groups. He found 
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that middle class subjects had a higher mean intensity score 
than the working class. He also observed that middle class 
constructs were more differentiated and the working class 
more commonly associated "unusual" with the negative poles of 
their constructs. 
In this paper, research has been surveyed for evidence 
of the relationship between constructs and behavior in order 
to provide validational evidence for the Personal Construct 
Theory of Kelly. Studies in this section indicate 
differences in the construct systems and the construct usage 
between thought-disordered patients and others. These 
patients appear to have most difficulty in the realm of psy­
chological or interpersonal constructs, probably leading them 
to poor relationships with others and the consequent 
diagnosis as schizophrenic, while the dispute continues 
about exactly what process is involved (loose construing, 
inconsistency, or cue insensitivity) , nevertheless 
differences between groups have been consistently obtained. 
There appears to be a relationship between measures of struc­
ture of the construct system and a diagnostic category of 
clients, indicating some relationship between the construct 
system and behavior. 
Nevertheless, this criterion, thought-disordered 
schizophrenia, is a broad category of behavior, based on 
clinical ratings. While the evidence indicates that either a 
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faulty construct system or inconsistent use of that system 
leads to maladaptive behavior, this evidence is still on the 
gross level. The question as to whether construing people 
differently leads to different behavior on a more specific 
level has not been answered by these studies. 
Clinical_and_Therageutic_Stud^ 
The previous section discussed research in one area pri­
marily, schizophrenia vith manifestations of thought 
disorder. The main instrument of discussion was Bannister 
and Fransella's Grid Test of Schizophrenic Thought Disorder 
(1967). A variety of other studies have been done in the 
clinical and therapeutic areas. Some studies have examined 
the various psychiatric disorders while others have looked at 
th£ therapeutic process within the Personal construct rheory 
framework, 
Mischel (1968) has been very critical of psychiatric 
categories used in diagnosis. He cited evidence that there 
is not great agreement among diagnosticians in the meaning of 
specific categories or in their application, ftgnew and 
Bannister (1973) examined diagnostic categories as used by 
eight psychiatrists, as veil as their use of lay constructs. 
There was no difference in stability over a month's duration 
between the use of diagnostic (.40) and lay constructs (.41). 
What is more important, there was no higher agreement in the 
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pattern of relationships across psychiatrists for the diag­
nostic categories (,26) over the lay constructs (.39). This 
study did not examine interjudge agreement in application of 
the constructs; each psychiatrist rated different patients. 
It was the relationship between diagnostic categories on 
which the psychiatrists had low agreement. Agnew and 
Bannister concluded these categories therefore do not consti­
tute a specialist language, in the sense that they felt a set 
of diagnostic categories should have greater consistency of 
application across professional users. 
Wright (1970), in work previous to Agnew and Bannister, 
presented an exemplar case of an agoraphobic. Wright's main 
idea was that common phobic symptoms have unique personal 
meaning tor the client; he defined meaning as the "sum of 
perceived relationships of a thing" (p. 221), The meaning of 
a symptom, according to Wright, is unique to the individual, 
and the therapist should first help the client discover the 
meaning of the symptom within the client's own construct 
system, Wright used the implication grid and the laddering 
technique of HinKle (of. Bannister 6 Hair, 1968) . He 
contended that considering the uniqueness cf common symptoms 
is preferable to lumping clients into nosological categories, 
Fransella (1972; Bannister G Fransella, 1971) advanced the 
same notion in work with 20 stutterers. Stutterers, accord­
ing to her, are unable to construe themselves as fluent and 
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"the road from stuttering to fluency is paved by 
reconstructions" (Fransella, 1972, p. 70). Both stutters 
(Fransella, 1968) and alcoholics (Hoy, 1973) , while labeling 
themselves as such, did not describe themselves on grids as 
similar to other stutterers or alcoholics. If such 
distinct ions can be realized, perhaps clients can build on 
other more positive aspects of their personalities. Other 
case studies include arson (Fransella S Adams, 1956), suicide 
(Ryle, 1967), homosexuality (Davison, Brierley, 5 Smith, 
1971), and depression (Rowe, 1971c). 
Levy and Dugan (1956) presented two case studies to il­
lustrate the formation of hypotheses about a client's con­
struct system after factorial analysis of his Reptest 
protocol. Using Slater's (1969) INGRID program, Ryle (Ryle & 
Brsen, 1971) vas able to distinguish actual patients from 
normal controls by blind analysis of Reptest protocols, Ryle 
and Lunghi (1969) also presented a case history in which 
changes in a grid during therapy eere as predicted in a 
marital depression case. 
More specific studies include an investigation of 
neurotics by Smail (1970), He observed that the number of 
different constructs elicited in the Reptest did not distin­
guish neurotics complaining of somatic symptpms from those 
with psychic symptoms. Hotîever, he did note that those with 
psychic symptoms preferred psychological constructs as 
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opposed to the somatic patients who preferred more objective 
constructs. Ryle and Breen (1972b) compared the grids of 
neurotics and normals and concluded that a neurotic is 
someone who sees himself as unlike others, is dissatisfied 
with himself, and has a less complex construct system than 
others. They also suggested that the grid could provide in­
formation about possibilities for reconstruction for the neu­
rotic. Kasper (1962) , in a previously cited study af adjust­
ment, observed that poorly adjusted adolescent subjects 
construed themselves as threatened by others, but they did 
not expect themselves to change very much toward their 
ideals. 
In a study of obsessional neurosis, Morris, Jones, and 
Morris (1970) examined the structure of the grids of 
obsessive-cosipulsivss as coir,pared to normals. They examined 
the relationship between constructs, using a procedure very 
similar to Landfield's (1971) functionally independent con­
struction measure. Obsessive patients showed either a more 
rigid construct structure or a very segmented one, while 
normals exhibited a system that was interrelated enough to 
make implications between constructs but loose enough to 
allow freedom of construction. This study, for the present, 
writer, indicates that obsessives may exhibit such symptoms 
because they have a very limited repertoire of constructs 
with which to work in anticipating events. Reker (1974), in 
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the same vein, found that the interpersonal conceptual struc­
ture of emotionally disturbed boys was characterized by fewer 
constructs than that of normal subjects; this difference was 
not found for impersonal constructs. 
Ryle and Lunghi (1970) presented four examples of a 
"dyad grid»" Basically the grid is like the usual Reptest 
grid. The difference is in the way the constructs are 
elicited; the clinician asks for similarities and 
differences using relationships between people rather than 
people alone as elements. The basic question has the form; 
"Tell me how John's relationship to you is like or unlike 
your mother's relationship to you," Using Slater's DELTA 
program (Note 1) , Byle and Lunghi (1971) obtained a coeffi­
cient of .50 between their prediction of a neurotic's grid 
and the actual grid of that client. Howe (1971b) has pre­
sented the case of a hypotaanic using the dyad grid, and Ryle 
and Breen (1972a- 1972c) have illustrated how the dyad grid 
technique can be used in marital counseling. Comparing 
adjusted and maladjusted couples, they observed that spouses 
in marriages with difficulties are more liable to see them­
selves as childlike with their partners perceived in a 
parental role as compared to control couples. 
Byle and Breen (197Waf 1974b) continued their work with 
the dyad grid and investigated the training of social 
workers. They identified problems that the students might 
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have to resolve during training and measured the change over 
two years. They observed that at the beginning of training 
many students saw the social worker-client relationship as 
similar to their relationship with their parents, possibly 
indicating a tendency of social work to attract supportive 
children. The grids also indicated the importance of the 
student-supervisor relationship as a modeling system. Howev­
er, after two years, tutor evaluations were not related to 
the predictions of problems for the students nor to change on 
these problems. The investigators pointed out that the grids 
did not originally predict the severity of problems involved, 
and the severity level may have been responsible for some 
students successfully resolving their problems while others 
failed. 
The above studies have been presented to show that some 
therapists have found the Septest useful in understanding 
various difficulties in their clients. The main advantage 
appears to be the ability of the therapist to understand the 
problem within the client's own framework, to see what mean­
ing it has for him. Learning theory would maintain that the 
client has learned maladaptive responses to various 
situations. The grid technique allows the therapist and 
client to learn what is similar (or generalized) about these 
situations or interactions. Then, through reconstruction, 
various new behaviors can be learned. 
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In addition to research about clinical disorders, other 
studies have examined the therapeutic process. Landfield and 
his associates have published a number of studies in this 
regard. Landfield, Stern, and Fjeld (1961), analyzing the 
verbal content of clinical constructs, observed that during 
therapy clients showed a decrease in the use of constructs 
denoting inconsistency of behavior or emotional arousal while 
exhibiting an increase in constructs of forcefulness. They 
concluded therapy led to an increasing concern with self ex­
pression. 
Nawas and Landfield ( 19 53) asked clients to rate their 
own and therapist constructs for raeaningfuiness several times 
during therapy. The investigators claimed there was a non­
significant trend for most improved clients to rate more of 
their own constructs as meaningful vhils therapy continued, 
with the least improved clients exhibiting the reverse trend. 
In the view of the present writer- this trend was very 
tenuous considering the small number of subjects and the 
slight differences between groups. Landfield (1 965) pursued 
the study of raeaningfuiness of constructs and found that 
subjects, given a 13-point scale, rated elements more ex­
tremely on their own than on therapist constructs. Extremity 
of rating was also related to rank of meaningfulness. 
Ourth and Landfield ( 1965) continued work with 
raeaningfuiness and observed that members of prematurely 
94 
terminating therapist-counselor dyads rated each other less 
extremely than non-prematurely terminating dyads. They took 
this for evidence that interpersonal meaningfulness is relat­
ed to successful termination. Landfield (1971) also observed 
that premature termination was negatively related to similar­
ity of meaningfulness in client and therapist constructs as 
well as to similarity of content and similarity of organiza­
tional structure. Organizational similarity was estimated by 
subtracting the functionally independent construction score 
(TIC) of the client from that of the therapist. Greater dis­
crepancies indicate less similarity. It will be remembered 
from previous discussion that FIC is somewhat analogous to 
cognitive complexity in meaning. Landfield (1970, 1971) con­
cluded that there must be congruency of construct systems be­
tween client and therapist if therapy is not to terminate 
prematurely. 
As for improvement, it has been observed that this is 
related to a shift of the client's self-description toward 
the therapist's self ideal described in the client's own 
terms (Landfield 5 Nawas, 1964) and toward his own self-ideal 
(Varble S Landfield, 1969), Landfield (1971) noted that im­
provement was also related to a moderate incongruity (meas­
ured by FIC) as compared to close congruity. He concluded 
that some similarity of construct systems is necessary for 
therapy to be maintained, but some differences are necessary 
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in order to stimulate change. 
Landfield (1970, 1971) also observed that greater con­
tent congruency of construct systems led to greater 
attribution of pathology in the client by the therapist over 
a four-week period, but the attribution dropped after eight 
weeks. It is possible that greater congruency leads to more 
disclosure of negative information. 
In addition to the previously cited work by Eyle and 
Breen (1974a, 1974b) with social work graduate students, two 
other studies have looked at the therapists themselves. 
Lifshitz (1974), analyzing the content of the construct 
systems of professional as well as student social workers, 
observed that the professional used more abstract constructs 
expressing concern for self and others; the students tended 
to exhibit mors concrete descriptive characteristics as 
constructs. The students also perceived their future clients 
negatively while the professionals did not. Ryle and 
Lipshitz (1971) illustrated ho^ Reptest grids can be useful 
towards informing therapists of countertransterence. 
Other investigators have examined understanding between 
client and therapist, Cartwright and Lerner ( 1963) compared 
client's self-descriptions and therapist descriptions of the 
clientf using the client's own constructs. This measure of 
empathy was related to client improvement only after therapy; 
empathy at the beginning of therapy appeared to have no 
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effect. The difference between this study and Landfield's 
work may be due to Cartwright and Lerner's comparing actual 
constructions of the client, while Landfield compared 
measures of the structure and content of the construct 
system. Together these studies appear to indicate that 
congruency of construct systems is necessary for successful 
therapy, while, within that system, client and therapist 
gradually arrive at more similar construction of the client. 
The therapist needs information in order to construe the 
client successfully. Watson {1970a) used Slater's DELTA pro­
gram (Note 4) to study therapist understanding of the client 
and found an increase during the therapy period. Rowe 
(1971a), using the same approach, presented a case where a 
psychiatrist had systematic errors in his construction of the 
client. 
Sechrest (1957), in a study of the therapeutic process, 
noted that, as therapy progressed, clients tended to perceive 
themselves as more like the therapist, but this perception 
was not related to outcome. During therapy they also 
perceived the therapist as less like members of the family 
and more like people similar to the therapist in age, sex, 
and occupation. 
Tippett (1959) and Paine (1971) investigated change of 
constructs during psychotherapy. Tippett observed that 
changes occurred to a greater degree with newer constructs 
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and present figures. There was an increase in discrimination 
among people and within the construct system itself. Tippett 
expressed some of her hypotheses in learning theory terms; 
her results appear to indicate that changes in behavior are 
due to better discrimination between situations. She also 
observed that as therapy continued, dependency constructs 
decreased in number and were more restricted to childhood 
figures; however, Tippett also noticed clients became more 
accepting of dependencies which still existed, recognizing 
resources available to them. When she compared therapies 
with past or present emphases, the therapy style emphasizing 
the present resulted in many more changes in the pattern of 
the constructs, the present figure constructions, and the 
complexity of the construct system, Paine (1971) studied 
various types of changes on tHo grids clients had taksn ovçr 
a 90-day interval, k composite reconstruction score was cor­
related .50 (p<,01) with client's ratings of personality 
change, but not with judges' ratings of change. Both Paine 
and Tippett suggested that more significant information is 
obtained by the study of individual cases rather than by 
assigning clients to diagnostic groups. 
Some work has been done with the Reptest in. 
investigating group therapy. Watson (1970b, 1972) illustrat­
ed the technique as he used it to demonstrate change in 
groups, Walton and Mcpherson (1968; also HcPherson S Walton, 
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1970) used the Reptest to provide a framework within which to 
describe group therapy. They obtained three factors by 
analyzing the grids of seven observer-judges describing 
clients in a group: dominance-submissiveness, emotionally 
sensitive-insensitive to others, and hinders-aids attainment 
of group goals. Pransella (1970) gave group members the 
Reptest five times in the course of group therapy. She ob­
served that intensity and consistency both exhibited an 
inverted-D curve, indicating that group members went from 
loose to tight and back to loose construction over nine 
months. Members appeared to tighten their construct systems 
in order to work more effectively with them, and then 
loosened their systems to allow further elaboration. 
Fransella and Joyston-Bechal (1971) later noted that two 
members of a group who did not follon the inverted-D curve 
were judged more improved. In this study, however, they made 
note of some difficulty with their outcome measures. Smail 
(1972) studied empathy among group members by comparing 
predictions of other members' ratings with their actual 
ratings. This measure of empathy was correlated with empathy 
ratings by group members and by the therapist. He also noted 
that, while initial similarity of construction between 
members aided empathy, the most empathie members appeared to 
be able to depart from their own views in order to predict 
the constructions of others. 
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The studies on the therapeutic process reported here, 
when taken in conjunction with those of clinical disorders, 
appear to substantiate Kelly's sociality and commonality 
corollaries. They illustrate that as one person understands 
the construction system of another, he may play a role (i.e. 
therapist) in his interaction with another (the client) . The 
first group of studies in this section emphasized the 
uniqueness of various disorders. As the therapist grows in 
understanding of the unique construction processes of the 
client, he can aid in reconstruction, although it appears 
that there must be some commonality of construction systems 
between client and therapist. The studies cited in this sec­
tion provide evidence for the validity of Kelly's sociality 
and commonality corollaries. The Reptest has proven useful 
in testing hypotheses derived to explain a patient's behavisr 
and in tracing changes during therapy» Slater (1969) noted 
that the technique has been used to record changes during in­
dividual and group psychotherapy, behavior therapy, aversion 
therapy, desensitization, and other treatments. However, 
Slater also mentioned that much of this evidence has not been 
published. 
Yet Kelly was a clinician. His Personal Construct 
Theory arose out of his work in the clinic. He proposed a 
specific form of therapy, fixed role therapy. This type of 
treatment basically involves writing a new role for the 
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client, a new construction system which the client practices. 
Gradually the client should change his behavior in accord 
with the new construction system. However, other than 
Kelly's own cases presented in the 1955 work, evidence in the 
literature has been scarce. Bonarius (1970) described an ex­
ample of fixed role therapy, but stated that he knew only of 
cases treated by Kelly and his students, of one case by 
Landfield, and of four cases in which he himself was in some 
way involved, Skene (1973) presented a case illustration of a 
homosexual client. From the grid, it was hypothesized that 
for this client, heterosexual meant being taken advantage of. 
A new role was written for the client and some changes in 
his grid were observed over the therapeutic period, as well 
as a cessation of homosexual activity. Todd (1973) used 
fixed role therapy with 12 males and 12 females, half 
introverts, half extraverts. The male extraverts and the 
female introverts exhibited significant changes in 
extraversion following three weeks of using the assigned 
roles. Todd concluded from his selective results that effec­
tiveness might be tied to the degree that the^assigned role 
fits cultural sex stereotypes, 
Karst and Trexler (1970) compared fixed role therapy 
(FRT) with rational-emotive therapy {RET; Ellis, 1958) in 
treatment of public speaking anxiety in college students. 
Both groups received three 50=minute group sessions. As far 
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as self report measures, both therapy treatments were 
superior to a waiting list control, and FRT appeared to be 
slightly more effective than RET. Results were not so con­
clusive for behavioral measures, although the reliability of 
those measures was not good. The Reptest was not included as 
a measure in this study. The authors concluded that cogni­
tive therapies, distinguished from more behavioral therapies, 
do merit further research. 
Fransella (1972) used a Kellian approach with stutterers 
that she labeled reconstruction. From the example in her 
book, it appears to be primarily an interview type of therapy 
which focuses on finding the meaning of stuttering for the 
client and then progresses to help the client find other ways 
to construe himself in various situations. She commented 
that various people labeled her procedure as behavior 
therapy, rational-emotive therapy, and client-centered 
therapy, which may be an indication that all these therapies 
involve cognitive change of some type, 
Ç2IS«Slâ£2-2£-£e£Soiiai_£2nstruct_Tt^orxJResearçh 
The discussion of the literature began with Kelly's fun­
damental postulate; "A person's processes are psychological­
ly channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events" 
{1955, p. ^5) . Han anticipates events by using constructs. 
The literature of research on Kelly's Personal Construct 
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Theory was reviewed in the context of larger issues within 
the field of personality psychology. It is the position of 
the present writer that cognition is a key variable in this 
area, and that constructs, as conceived by Kelly, offer them­
selves as one means to understand the cognitive strategies of 
individuals in their interactions with the environment. 
one area of concern is ascertaining the constructs used 
by individuals. Kelly devised the Role Construct Repertory 
Test (the Reptest or the RCRT). Research was cited dealing 
with the various ways the Reptest can be used. Other 
investigations were noted where properties of constructs were 
investigated by noting differences between individuals' grids 
and changes within grids. The bulk of the literature in this 
area provided evidence that the Reptest responded to 
manipulations as hypothesized hy the theory= It seems rea­
sonable to conclude that the Reptest is a valid measure of 
constructs, while the research is far from complete, there 
is evidence of internal validity of Personal Construct Theory 
in the investigations where the Reptest was used. The vari­
ous parts of the theory appear to adhere as a logical whole 
with some evidence of support. 
at this point it must be admitted, however, that there 
has been little research using other methods besides the 
Reptest to ascertain an individual's constructs. Campbell 
and Fiske (1959) advocated the use of the multimethod-
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multitrait matrix for studying the validity of psychological 
measures. This writer has knowledge of only one such study 
conducted within the Kellian framework, a dissertation by 
Hamilton (1958). As mentioned previously, she found that two 
judges were able to match individual TAT protocols with 
Reptest responses, further work in this area seems required 
in order to show that the constructs are not merely Reptest 
artifacts. 
This review of Personal Construct Theory literature has 
also focused upon the connection between constructs and be­
havior, One sign of good measurement (and good theory) is 
its utility either in telling us what we don't know already 
or in helping us make predictions and decisions about the 
future (Mischel, 1968). The studies in the clinical area 
provide seme evidence of the utility of the Reptest and 
Personal Construct Theory in that domain. Illustrations of 
how the Reptest can help explain the uniqueness of various 
psychological difficulties have been presented, much of it 
published within the last five years. Studies of the 
therapeutic process have also illustrated that Personal Con­
struct Theory is useful for conceptualizing therapy processes 
and strategies. 
Other studies cited have also examined the relationship 
of constructs to behavior. Grid measures of constructs were 
related to various paper-and-pencil measures of behavior as 
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well as to such gross, molar, behaviors as thought-disordered 
schizophrenia and friendship. But, as Bender (1 968) noted, 
there is very little research involving rater's observations 
of people's actual behavior on the more specific, molecular 
level with Reptest measures. 
Confirmation of the construct-behavior relationship on 
this more molecular level is necessary if psychologists are 
to increase the accuracy of their understanding and predic­
tion of situational behavior. Wachtel (1973a, 1973b) accused 
Hischel of studying general constructs by using very specific 
behaviors and situations. It appears that Wachtel thinks the 
experimental paradigms of Mischel are too simple to merit 
generalization to more complex behaviors. Obviously Mischel 
{1973a, 1973b) is not in complete accord. One thing that 
Mischel's Hork has pointed out is the great variability of 
behavior by the same person in similar situations. Yet it is 
such particular situational behaviors that not only 
psychologists, but also people in general, are interested in 
predicting, smaller situations and encounters are the quan­
tities of experience with which people most commonly deal. 
As noted above, some studies using the Reptest have ex­
amined these more molecular behaviors and their relationships 
to personal constructs; in these cases the behavioral cri­
terion was almost always a paper and pencil measure. On such 
a measure a subject is likely to respond in a way which 
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minimizes situational differences; such a measure almost 
forces a subject to summarize his past experiences in order 
to answer. His self-construction influences his responding. 
Therefore, to eliminate this possible bias, it seems fitting 
to use as a behavioral criterion a behavior that is more di­
rectly observable to the experimenter. 
In this investigation, therefore, such a behavioral ob­
servation will be made. This research will examine the 
personal construct-behavior relationship, focusing on the 
consistency in a person's behavior. Does this consistency 
reside in the individual by means of traits or in the situa­
tion to which the person responds? Or yet, as Kelly would 
maintain, is the consistency in the construction processes of 
the individual, which constructions take place in interaction 
with the environment? Consistency nsay appear to be lacking 
to the outside observer yet actually be present in the con­
struct system of the individual because of the property of 
uniqueness ascribed to constructs by Kelly» Expressed in a 
very pragmatic way, the question revolves around whether 
Person ft will act differently to Person B than to Person C 
because he construes B and C differently. Will Person D act 
towards B and C in the same manner because he construes them 
similarly? It is this very question that the present re­
search is designed to examine. 
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Since the behavioral criterion used will be a mixed-
motive game, a short review of some pertinent literature in 
that area appears appropriate. 
Mixed-motive Games 
Social psychologists have, in the past, used experimen­
tal games as part of their methods for investigating behav­
ior. These games have been labeled mixed-motive games since 
they set up conditions ahere subjects must decide between 
cooperation and competition. An excellent, comprehensive 
review of work done with these experimental games can be 
found in Wrightsman, O'Connor, and Baker (1972). 
One of these games. Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) , has been 
very popular in this kind of research, along with a variation 
called Chicken, Matrices illustrating the two games are 
given in Figure 1. In play, the subject is presented with a 
matrix indicating his own payoffs as well as those of his 
competitor. If he chooses blue, the cooperative move, he can 
gain an intermediate reward; if he chooses red, the competi­
tive move, he can either receive the largest reward or the 
smallest, depending on the decision of the competitor. 
Scodel, Hinas, Ratoosh, and Lipetz (1959) and Papoport (1973) 
have more complete descriptions of Prisoner's Dilemma, while 
Hinas, scodel, Marlowe, and Rawson (I960), and Rapoport and 


















































Fig. 1. Sample matrices for Prisoner's Dilemma and 
Chicken. (Numbers within the cells indicate payoffs for 
Players 1 and 2 respectively») 
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The primary difference between the two games is the red 
row (or column). For purposes of discussion, Red-1 will be 
used to indicate Person 1 choosing Red (the campetitive 
move). Blue-l/Red-2 indicates the decisions of both players 
on a given trial, R subject playing PD always does better by 
choosing Bad (the competitive move) no matter what the other 
player chooses, person 1 gains 7 points for a Hed-1/Blue-2 
as opposed to a 5 point gain which the Blue-VBlue-2 situa­
tion offers. Likewise, against a Red-2 decision, a Red-1 
brings 3 points while a Blue-1 earns no points. What keeps 
players from locking into the Red-VRed-2 situation is that 
the Blue-1/Blue-2 situation is the more valuable; however, 
it demands the trust and cooperation of the opponent. 
Chicken, on the contrary, offers no certain greater 
payoff» The satrix is arranged so that the Blue 
(cooperative) choice pays an intermediate reward, while Red 
(the competitive move) offers a chance at either the largest 
or smallest reward. The best strategy is to play the oppo­
site of the opponent, Dnfortunately, one does not know ahead 
of time what the other person will do. 
Many studies have investigated differences in the amount 
of cooperative play under varying conditions. Gallo (1972) 
observed that play was dependent on the type of reward used. 
Subjects appear more cooperative if relatively large amounts 
of money are involved. However, if only points or small 
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change can be earned, other symbolic rewards increase in va­
lence and play becomes more competitive. In this situation 
the value of being superior to the other player becomes worth 
the gamble of being competitive. In this case points are 
valueless and the only reinforcement comes from the game play 
itselfe Deutsch (1960a) varied instructions for PD by pro­
viding the subjects with either a cooperative or a competi­
tive orientation toward play; game behavior varied 
appropriately with significant differences between groups. 
In Kellian terms, play depends on the manner in which the 
game is construed as rewarding. 
Other investigations have been done to elucidate these 
motives. Scodel (1962) and Ells and Sermat (1968) compared 
play under both PD and Chicken conditions. Both concluded 
that the two main motives include maximization of one's own 
gain and increasing the difference between oneself and the 
other player. As Sermat (1967b) has noted, PD tends to 
confound these motives. Sermat had four conditions under 
which subjects played Chicken: a Free condition where the 
"stooge" was supposedly free to change his strategy; a 
Committed condition where the other player was committed to a 
previously chosen strategy but would be informed of the 
results; an Absent condition, where the competitor had al­
ready chosen his strategy and would not be informed of the 
results; and a Machine condition where the subject was 
no 
supposedly playing against a preprogrammed machine. Results 
indicated that, as Sermat wrote, "concern with differential 
gain or loss vis°a-°vis the other player is an important 
determinant of game behavior under conditions where the other 
player is believed to be informed of the outcome and free to 
modify his strategy" (p. 218). Sometimes a subject may play 
a certain yay to indicate to the opponent a desire to 
cooperate in hopes of changing the competitor's strategy. In 
the Absent and Machine conditions, as well as in those of the 
present research, the competitor is uninformed, his strategy 
is already fixed, and the only meaningful motivation left is 
the maximization of one's gain. 
Research has also been done on the relationship of per­
sonality characteristics to PD performance, Lutzker (1960), 
using Chicicen, and Sairslcy (19&S), using hec ovn Conflict 
Board, observed that subjects more favorable to international 
cooperation exhibited more cooperative behavior than those 
with more isolationist vie#s. Marlowe (1963) observed that 
subjects who exhibited more cooperative behavior in the PD 
game scored higher on the Gough Adjective Check List in need 
abasement and deference. More competitive subjects were 
higher in need aggression and autonomy. Deutsch {1960b) ob­
tained a significant relationship between cooperative behav­
ior and lov scores on the F Scale (measuring more 
authoritarian attitudes) . 
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In the same vein, Wrightsman (1966), using his Philoso­
phies of Human Nature Scale, found that trusting behavior in 
PD was related to belief in the goodness of human nature, 
wrightsman was not able, however, to replicate the correla­
tion between game behavior and the F scale, and in addition, 
there were a number of other personality variables in this 
study that were unrelated to cooperative play. Uejio and 
Wrightsman (1967) did replicate the results with the Philoso­
phies of Human Mature Scale. Noland and Catron (195 9) com­
pared the behavior of subjects from a local high school with 
those of a very competitive school and found there was more 
competitive behavior among the students of the latter school. 
They were not able to replicate Marlowe's (1953) results 
with the Gough Adjective Check List, 
Hhile scse studies have bssn cited indicating a rela­
tionship between personality variables or attitudes and game 
behavior, Wrightsman, O'Connor- and Baker (1972) concluded 
that recent research has shown that this relationship is very 
complex; a number of studies have failed to find support for 
this relationship. A more enlightening factor of explanation 
for behavior in the PD situation is the impression a player 
has of his opponent. It appears that while a player may not 
act consistently as trait theory might predict, he does act 
in conjunction with the traits that he ascribes to his 
opponent. 
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One method of studying the player's evaluation of his 
opponent is to provide information to the player about his 
opponent, usually this is done through bogus questionnaires 
and "responses" are manipulated for degrees of similarity. 
Tornatzky and Geiwitz (1968) found that perceived similarity 
with the opponent results in more cooperative behavior in a 
PD game. Fisher and Smith (1969) observed the same tendency 
(although the results were not significant). Kaufmann 
(1967), using another game, observed that similarity resulted 
in more cooperative play and greater expectation of 
cooperation from the opponent. Again on a different game, 
Swirsky (1968) obtained support for the hypothesis that the 
more the opponent was perceived as trustworthy and tough, the 
more likely the player planned to be cooperative in the game. 
Marioee, Gergen, and Doob (1955), on the other hand, did not 
obtain significant differences in behavior toward an 
egotistical or self-effacing opponent, but there was an in­
teraction between opponent personality and the possibility of 
future confrontation. Subjects played more cooperatively 
with a humble opponent they expected to meet after play, 
while they were less cooperative with an egotistical person 
they thought they would later have to interact with. 
Other investigators have examined the relationship of 
race to cooperative behavior. Hhile Baxter (1972b) found 
that information about the coopérât!veness or competitiveness 
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of the opponent had a significant effect on play, he did not 
obtain a significant effect for the race of the opponent 
(p<.09, that «hits players were more cooperative toward 
whites). Subsequent analysis revealed that subjects were 
significantly more cooperative toward white opponents de­
scribed as cooperative than toward blacks described the same 
way. Uejio and Wrightsman (1967) found chat favorable 
attitudes toward human nature among both Caucasian and 
Japanese American subjects correlated with cooperative behav­
ior only if the partner was Japanese. They also noted a sig­
nificant relationship between cooperative behavior and post-
game positive ratings of the opponent. 
Wrightsman, Baxter, Nelson, and Bilsky (1972) also con­
cluded that information about the opponent influences play. 
But their data indicated that svgn if the other player used a 
cooperative strategy after being introduced as competitive, 
the subject was more prone to be less cooperative than he was 
against a "cooperative" opponent, Wrightsman, et al., sug­
gested that further research is needed as to what channels of 
communication facilitate reception of information about the 
opponent, wrightsman, O'Connor, and Baker (1972) also noted 
that communication between opponents facilitated cooperation 
between players. 
Wrightsman, O'Connor, and Baker (1972) concluded that 
information about the opponent influences cooperative behav­
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ior in mixed-motive games. The studies cited above would 
lead one to that conclusion, although there seems to be some 
interaction with other variables such as possible future in­
teraction with the opponent or communication with him during 
play. Previously cited studies about the effect of personal­
ity variables on the part of the subject showed that that 
factor was very complex in its relationship to behavior. 
However, where significant results were obtained, they pri­
marily were with measures designed to ascertain the attitudes 
of the subject toward people in general. It is possible to 
consider these personality variables as cognitive structures 
which the subject uses to evaluate the opponent. Viewed in 
this way, a main factor in cooperative behavior is the 
subject's evaluation of the other, whether this construction 
is experimenter-proviued or self-provided through frequently 
used constructs. The conclusion of Deutsch (1960b) appears 
reasonable: "His [the subject's] behavior toward the other 
is congruent with what he expects from the other, and also, 
what he expects from the other is congruent with his behavior 
toward the other" (p. 139) . 
Some of the conflicting evidence may be due to 
variations in what has been used as a measure of cooperative 
behavior. PD can be played over many trials and cooperative 
behavior is frequently the number of cooperative choices over 
trials. However? there is some evidence that the effects of 
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personality variables and of the impression of the opponent 
wash out after several trials. Tedeschi, Lesnick, and 
Gahagan (1968) concluded from their evidence that during 
later trials, factors associated with the conflict of the 
game itself are more important determinants of game behavior. 
This may happen as early as ten trials. Baxter (1972a) sug­
gested this washout effect as one possibility for the many 
significant findings of personality variables correlating 
with game behavior on one- or two-trial games, but not on 
longer games. 
While investigating sex differences in game performance, 
investigators have noticed that conflicting results are ob­
tained. Komorita (1965) found that females were more 
cooperative than males on the last block of four 20-trial 
blocks of PB. Two other studies (Bixenstine & "ilson^ 1953; 
Bixenstine, chambers S Wilson, 1964) also observed sex 
differences over numerous trials. These investigators sug­
gested that the results indicate possible different 
expectations of the opponent and differing standards of 
confirmation for these expectancies. However, Gallo and 
McClintock (1965), after citing a number of studies, conclud­
ed that the sex of the player is not related to cooperative 
behavior. 
Nevertheless, ses of subject appears to interact with 
other variables. Rape port and Chammah (1965) grouped 
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subjects in same sex and opposite sex pairs for PD play. 
Over the long run of 300 trials, all-male pairs were most 
cooperative, mixed pairs less cooperative, and all-female 
pairs least cooperative, indicating an interaction between 
the sex of the player and the sex of the opponent. There was 
no difference, however, between the sexes on the first two 
trials. These same results were reported by Rapoport and 
Chammah (1966) for Chicken, Sermat (1967a) had observed some 
sex differences in interactions with other variables in a 
Chicken study, while Grant and Sermat (1969) found a signifi­
cant interaction over numerous trials of chicken between sex 
of subject, sex of opponent, and order of play (against an 
opposite or same sex opponent first). The sex of the 
opponent, not the sex of the subject, had a significant 
effect on play; variations of design naks comparisons across 
studies difficult; even the notion of "cooperation" can vary 
between studies. After reviewing the literature in this par­
ticular area of sex differences and inspecting their own 
data, Kahn, Hottes, and Davis (1971) concluded that males and 
females do not differ in the motivation to cooperate. 
Bather, the two sexes respond to different aspects of the 
game situation with males choosing the optimal strategy for 
winning and females reacting to more social aspects of the 
game situation. Translated into Personal Construct Theory 
terras, it appears that the sex differences noted over game 
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trials may be the result of different constructions of the 
game situation by the two sexes and of different changes in 
construction over trials. 
In summary, it appears that subjects approach the game 
situation with certain constructions about the game itself 
and about their opponent, since the opponent is usually 
unknown or unfamiliar to the subject, he must take the exper­
imenter's word about the opponent or use customary 
presumptions about unfamiliar people. In similar fashion, 
the experimenter can influence the subject's construction of 
the game experience or the subject must draw upon his past 
constructions of similar situations. As play continues 
through successive trials, the construction of the game and 
the opponent may change depending on the player's choices. 
At that point the subject can rely more on the play of the 
game for information, although as Wrightsman, Baxter, Nelson, 
and Bilsky (1972) pointed out, he may not avail himself of 
this information. 
For purposes of research on the problem of whether dif­
ferent construction leads to different behavior, the mixed-
motive game appears apropos. Research has shown that one's 
impression of one's opponent influences play. If it can be 
shown, using the Reptest, that a subject construes his 
opponents differently, it is to be expected that his play 
will vary accordingly. 
118 
Summary and Hypotheses 
An attempt has been made in this review to relate the 
Personal Construct Theory of George Kelly to behavior by the 
individual. This review has been set in the context of the 
larger question about ths consistency of human behavior. In 
search of an understanding of behavior, psychologists have 
attempted to fomulate laws of consistency. Over the years, 
much progress has been made in attempts to relate various 
traits to behavior. However, a person is not 100% 
predictable through knowledge of his traits; to the outside 
observer, his behavior does not always appear consistent. 
Theories change over the years and recently the pendulum 
has swung away from traits and stability towards situations 
and differentiation as the prime determinants of behavior, 
resulting in a greater stress on the inconsistency within the 
individual. However, consistency continues to be apparent in 
many cases, and the notion of complets lack of consistency is 
probably abhorrent to scientists. It is the contention of 
the present writer that cognition—personal constructs, to (fA T , ' ' ,  ^ . I . • ' 4 • • s, 
use Kelly's term—provides an explanatory factor which allows 
the pendulum to swing back toward the center. Expressed in a 
different way, a person's construction of his universe 
contains consistencies and distinctions. These consistent 
hypotheses or interpretations of the environment provide the 
basis for consistent behavior, while the distinctions lead to 
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differentiated behavior. Instead of the person (through 
traits) or the situation (the stimulus) being the main factor 
determining behavior, it appears more reasonable to assume 
that the interaction between person and situation is the pri­
mary factor of consistency J, this interaction occurring 
through personal constructions. A given person or group may 
use the same construction fairly often in interpreting a num­
ber of situations, providing evidence for trait theory. At 
other times a person may vary in his hypotheses, giving rise 
to a situationist interpretation of behavior. The present 
paper contends that Personal Construct Theory allows both 
consistency and differentiation to be covered under one theo­
retical umbrella. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship 
of constructs to behavior on a molecular scale, is similar 
construction of Stimulus A and B related to similar behavior 
toward them; is different construction of Stimulus A and C 
associated with different behavior? other studies have at­
tempted to answer this question either on a broad basis or 
using questionnaire type measures where a construct system 
may influence the responses. In this investigation, an at­
tempt will be made to answer the question by observing 
subject's behavior on (48 trials of Chicken and examining this 
behavior in the light of previously elicited constructions of 
the opponents. Constructs will be elicited from each subject 
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by means of the Septest to account for individual variation 
in construction. 
Even though it is posited that the situation vs. person 
interaction is a primary determinant of behavior, it is nec­
essary to examine the independent effects of persons or 
situations. Accounting for the strength of these main 
effects would lend more credence to the importance of the 
person by situation interaction, which interaction is often 
presumed to be experimental error. The decisons made in 
Chicken in this particular study can be taken as measures of 
competition or caution (rather than cooperation) . Using the 
number of cautious choices as the dependent variable, the 
following hypotheses will be tested: 
1) There will be no significant effect on cautious 
moves due to the ses: of the subject. Since subjects will 
participate in only 12 trials against each stimulus opponent, 
it is expected that these data will replicate the findings of 
no differences between sexes on early trials (Rapoport 5 
Chammah, 1965, 1956) , 
2) There will be no significant effect on cautious be­
havior due to the differentiation subjects exhibit in their 
construction of the stimulus opponents. " Should there be a 
significant effect, this would mean that as subjects tend to 
differentiate among stimuli, they tend to be more (or less) 
cautious. This relation bet Keen cautious behavior and cogni-
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tive complexity does not appear to be a plausible hypothesis, 
3) There will be no significant effect on cautious 
decisions due to the sex of the stimulus opponent. Again due 
to the relatively small number of trials, these data are ex­
pected to agree with those of Rapoport and Chammah (1965) for 
early trials. 
U) There will be a significant effect on cautious be­
havior due to the stimulus opponent, since the population 
for this study is composed of normal subjects, it seems rea­
sonable to assume that across subjects there would be simi­
larity of construction leading to similar behavior on the 
part of the individuals in the sample. Support for this 
hypothesis would be in agreement with the conclusion of 
Hrightsman, O'Connor, and Baker (1972) that impression of the 
opponent influences gams behavior, a conclusion based on 
studies of group data. The stimulus opponent can be consid­
ered as a "situation," and support for this hypothesis would 
be evidence for a situation effect, A significant stimulus 
effect would also be evidence for the commonality corollary 
of Kelly's theory. 
5) The person by situation interaction will account for 
a greater proportion of the total variance than any of the 
main effects. Support for this hypothesis would indicate the 
interaction between the person and the situation is an impor­
tant variable to be considered in personality research. This 
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hypothesis is necessary to substantiate the use of the S - o - R  
paradigm. 
6) The variance of the individual subject's Chicken be­
havior against the four stimulus opponents will be associated 
with differing construction of these opponents. This is a 
crucial hypothesis of this study. Support would indicate 
that as the stimuli are construed similarly, behavior is sim­
ilar. Where there is variation of construction, behavior 
will be dissimilar. 
Studies have been cited earlier in this paper concerning 
cognitive complexity. This concept has been used to describe 
the amount of complexity within a person's construct system. 
The more complexity to the system, the greater should be the 
number of alternatives available to a person with which to 
construe his environment. More alternative constructions 
should lead to greater possibility of divergency in behavior. 
To examine this proposition, the following hypothesis will 
be tested. 
7) Cognitive complexity will be associated with greater 
variation in Chicken behavior. The functionally independent 
construction measure of Landfield (1971) as well as an 
adaption of his method will be used as measures of complexi­
ty. In distinction to the preceding hypothesis, this one is 
examining whether a characteristic of the person's construct 
system is related to varying behavior. The preceding hypoth­
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esis examines the relationship between construction of the 
immediate situation and behavior. 
Finally, construct usage depends on its utility in 
predicting events. Validation of this anticipation will lead 
to further use of a construction, while invalidation should 
lead to change. As subjects play PD, they will be asked to 
predict the opponent's decision. After a subject has 
finished the 15 trials with a given opponent, he will be al­
lowed to change the construction of the opponent which he 
made previous to play. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
will be tested. 
8) There will be a positive relationship between the 
amount of change of construction of an opponent and errors of 




The sample for this investigation consisted of 50 col­
lege students from psychology courses at Iowa State Universi­
ty, equally divided between males and females. Subjects 
received credit toward their course grades for participation 
in this research. 
Procedure^aM-Instrumentati^n 
Subjects came for two experimental sessions approximate­
ly ten days apart. In the first session, a Reptest was ad­
ministered in order to elicit a set of constructs used by 
each individual. Materials for the Reptest are included in 
Appendix A. Each subject was asked to name acquaintances who 
fill 15 descriptive roles. Host of these roles have been 
taken from Kelly's (1955) original list, while others have 
been add?d to elicit constructs pertaining to cooperation and 
competition. These 15 people, the subject himself, and his 
ideal self became the 17 elements to be construed on the 
grid. These 17 elements had been randomly divided into 17 
triads; each element was part of three triads, and it was 
never grouped with another particular element more than once 
(cf. Construct sheet of Appendix a). 
As part of the Reptest, subjects then considered each 
triad, asking themselves the question, "In what important way 
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are two of these people alike, and, at the same time, essen­
tially different from the third?" This similarity became the 
construct. at the suggestion of Epting, Suchman, and 
Nickeson (1971), subjects were asked to write what they be­
lieved to be the opposite of these constructs only after all 
the constructs had been listed. This opposite became the 
contrast pole, thereby forming a construct dimension on which 
subjects rated all 17 elements, all elements were rated on 
all 17 construct dimensions using a 99-point scale, the con­
struct and contrast being the end points of the scale. While 
the rating method for grids has been discussed by Bannister 
and flair (1968) and is currently in use by many British 
investigators, the use of the 99-point scal& (as opposed to a 
9-point or a 5-point scale) was adopted at the suggestion of 
Leroy «olins (Hoiins & Dickinson, 1973; Liu G «olins. Note?). 
This larger range decreases reliability somewhat; however, 
systematic irrelevant variance is reduced and thus validity 
increased. These ratings «ere done on the Grid Sheet shown 
in appendix A. 
A concrete example at this point appears useful. One 
triad included these three persons: self, a neighbor, and a 
cooperative, kind acquaintance. A subject, might decide that 
he and the cooperative person are both lonely. After all 17 
triads have been evaluated, the subject could then list happy 
as the contrast. LDnely-happy would then be a construct di-
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mension on which this subject would rate all 17 elements, 
self, father, mother, and so on through ideal self. A com­
plete example taken from a subject's protocol is illustrated 
in Appendix ft. Ratings were made on a 17x17 grid; a sample 
portion of a grid is shown here in Figure 2. The horizontal 
axis represents constructs while the elements have been 
placed on the vertical axis. These axes have been reversed 
from Kelly's original format to allow easier computer proc­
essing. A mark of 99 indicates that the element is like the 
construct, a 1. indicates that the contrast (the second 
adjective) more aptly describes the element, and a 50 means 
the subject cannot decide. 
In the first experimental session, subjects took between 
60 and 90 minutes to complete the Reptest. The second ses­
sion lasted approximately 10 5 minutes. This second meeting 
involved watching tyo videotapes (each one containing a 
married couple interacting), construing these four stimulus 
persons, and playing Chicken against these four stimulus 
opponents. 
Videotapes were made in order to guarantee stimulus 
identity for all subjects. The manner in which subjects 
react differently to these stimuli is the focus of this re­
search. As a preparation for the two videotapes of the 
investigation proper, the experimenter was prerecorded 
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Self 164 -84 0 -128 104 
Mot her -164 25 -84 -128 84 
Neighbor -164 128 -84 -128 67 
Cooperative 164 -84 -52 -25 128 
Disliked 0 0 104 0 -67 
CONSTRUCTS & B C D E 
StandardizedjGrid 
3^1 f u u / 4 27 5 08 385 DUa 
Mother 350 532 427 385 5Q9 
Neighbor 3 50 632 4 27 385 573 
Cooperative 667 427 4 58 484 632 
Disliked "508 508 609 508 444} 
CONSTRUCTS A • B C D E 
Mean = -8.96 
S.D. = 103.54 
Differênci_pf_çonstruçtion 
Between Self and: 
Mother = 523 
Neighbor = 639 
Cooperative = 172 
Disliked = 529 
Fig® 2. Sample portion of Reptest grid . with 
illustrations of transformation, standardization, and DC 
scores. 
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divided between Blue and Red. Two videotapes were then made, 
using a different married couple for each one. 
These videotapes consisted of an interview about various 
topics such as the women's Liberation Movement, the place of 
sports in the university, amnesty for Watergate offenders and 
draft dodgers, and job quotas for minorities. Certain 
biographical facts about the couples were also elicited. The 
transcripts are included in Appendix B. The persons 
interviewed were not told previous to taping what they should 
say. They were given only a brief summary of what they would 
be asked and told to be honest in their answers. In each 
case, however, one of the persons interviewed was told to 
appear somewhat more dominant and competitive than the other. 
In reality this particular instruction to the interviewed 
persons reflected, in the experimenter's judgment, their 
characteristic normal behavior outside the taping situation. 
The experimenter asked questions to stimulate discussion, but 
otherwise he stayed out of the dialogue. Each videotape was 
about 20 minutes long. 
Also recorded on videotape was each stimulus opponent 
playing Chicken against the experimenter (whose decisions had 
been prerecorded and were the same against each person). 
Stimulus opponents did not see each other play. The experi­
menter's play was deleted before the tape was viewed by the 
subjects. In sum, two videotapes were made; each tape con­
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tained a married couple in discussion followed by the spouses 
playing Chicken individually against the experimenter. 
The second session began with subjects viewing one of 
the dialogue tapes. Each subject had been given a list (Grid 
Sheet II) of the constructs he had used on the Reptest of the 
first session, along with nine other constructs provided to 
all subjects to facilitate comparisons across the group. 
These constructs were; friendly-unfriendly, cooperative-
uncooperative, dominant-submissive, ambitious-lackadaisical, 
generous-selfish, helpful-demanding, competitive-
uncompetitive, affection at e- expresses little affection, and 
merciful-vindictive. After viewing a tape, subjects rated 
both stimulus opponents on their own as well as the provided 
constructs. 
Subjects were then given printed instructions for 
Chicken, These instructions had been adapted from Knox and 
Douglas (1972) and are contained in Appendix A. Points 
earned were converted to chances in a lottery at the rate of 
one chance for each ten points. There were three prizes of 
$5.00 and seven of $2.50. Since some extra subjects had been 
included in case of drop-outs, a person had approximately a 
one-in-six chance of winning before points from Chicken play 
Here taken into account. 
Chicken was chosen as the criterion game because the in­
vestigation of Serraat (1967b) had indicated that, with 
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Chicken, the motivation to maximize one's gain could be sepa­
rated from the motive to win more points than the opponent. 
In the present investigation, since the stimulus opponents 
were prerecorded, the conditions for play were similar to 
Sermat's Absent condition. As the opponent could not be 
influenced, and since no record was kept of the stimulus 
opponent's score vis-a-vis the subject, the only plausible 
motivation for play in this investigation is maximization of 
one's gain. Chicken, in contrast to PD, has no dominant 
strategy, since the subject has no way to influence the 
stimulus opponent, the blue choice (for intermediate rewards) 
should probably be considered as the cautious move rather 
than as the cooperative move. The red choice is the competi­
tive or more gambling choice. 
Chicken, then, was a gambling situation tor these 
subjects. Since the subjects had not met the stimulus 
opponents previously, they have only their constructions of 
the opponents made after viewing the videotapes to anticipate 
the opponent's move. The situation is analogous to a poker 
game with an unknown player where only one bet is allowed. 
The cards are already dealt and one must decide whether the 
other player is holding a winning hand {Red-2) or is bluffing 
(Blue-2) and gauge his bet accordingly. 
Subjects played 15 trials of Chicken against both stimu­
lus opponents on the tape. Each trial consisted of a subject 
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making his own decision (Red or Blue), estimating what the 
opponent chose, viewing the stimulus opponent's move on 
videotape, and calculating one's points. After all 30 
trials, subjects were then given the opportunity to change 
their construction of the two stimuli. 
This process of viewing the videotape, construing the 
second pair of stimulus opponents, playing Chicken against 
each member of the pair, and changing construction was re­
peated using the second tape. The overall result, then, in­
cluded construction of four people viewed on tape, 60 trials 
of Chicken, 15 against each stimulus opponent, and changes of 
the construction after play. 
Analysis 
Keptest analysis. The grids were marked by the 
subjects on a scale of from 1 to 99. The grids were 
transformed, using the normal deviates corresponding to the 
ratings and multiplying these by 100. The rating of j became 
-233, a 50 was equal to 0, and a 95 changed to 168. This 
transformation gave more weight to an extreme rating. Each 
individual grid was then standardized using the transformed 
ratings of the 17 original elements and the 4 stimulus 
opponents across the subject's own constructs. Standardized 
ratings were calculated with a mean of 500 and a standard de­
viation of 100. Based on the mean and standard deviation of 
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the grid, the subject's ratings on the provided constructs 
were likewise standardized. Figure 2 shows a sample 
standardized gird; Appendix A includes a sample of a com­
plete transformed and standardized protocol. 
This transformation-standardization procedure was 
adopted since Wolins' research (Solins & Dickinson, 1973; Liu 
& Wolins, Note 7) has indicated such procedures increase the 
validity of such scales by controlling for any response set. 
This possibility of response set on the Reptest has been 
shown by Warr and Coffraan (1 970), 
a difference of construction (DC) score was calculated, 
indicating the degree of similarity in a subject's construal 
of two different elements. This score is the sunt of the 
differences between the entries in any two rows, the signs 
disregarded. In the example of Figure 2, the DC scores be­
tween self and the other four elements are; mother (523) , 
neighbor (539), cooperative person (172), and disliked person 
(629). This would indicate that the subject construes 
himself as most like the cooperative person and relatively 
differentiated from the other three. 
This DC score was calculated between all six possible 
pairings of the four stimulus opponents. These calculations 
were performed using the constructs elicited from the 
subjects on the original Reptest (DC-Own), and the nine pro­
vided constructs (DC-Provided) , These two were combined to 
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form a DC-Total score. In this way a measure of how much the 
four stimulus opponents were differentiated by each individu­
al was obtained. The standardized ratings on the provided 
nine constructs of the stimulus opponents were also subjected 
to an analysis of variance and the Duncan procedure for 
testing the difference between means in order to ascertain if 
the group of subjects as a whole differentiated the four 
stimulus opponents. 
As Duck {1973a) remarked, occasionally subjects list the 
same construct more than once, or they use two that are very 
similar in meaning. It was also very possible that some of 
the constructs elicited from the subjects on the Reptest 
coincided with the provided constructs. As this would affect 
the DC scores, the DC-Own and the DC-Provided scores were not 
summeu for each individual for all analyses. In addition, 
the functionally independent construction (FIC) score of 
Landfield (1971) a as calculated, based on the 21 by 17 grid 
using the subject's own constructs as applied to the original 
17 elements and the H stimulus opponents. 
The FIC procedure required collapsing ratings to three: 
like the construct (J,) , undecided (0) , and like the contrast 
(2). This analysis yielded a measure of independent con­
struction for constructs (FICc) , for persons (FICp) , and a 
composite score (FIC) These measures were obtained by com­
paring the rows or columns of the grid. For constructs 
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(columns), a matching score of 13 was considered a signifi­
cant relationship (p<.01), while for persons (rows), a score 
of 16 was necessary (p<.01). Where significant relationships 
were found, clusters were formed; FIC is the number of inde­
pendent clusters. Appendix A includes an example of FIC 
calculations, 
Landfield's FIC procedure requires that a construct is 
considered as part of a cluster as long as it is related to 
any other in the cluster. For example, in a cluster of seven 
constructs, these constructs could all be tightly 
interrelated, or two constructs might be related to only one 
other of the seven, forming a looser cluster. However, FIC 
scores do not take into account the strength of the clusters. 
Therefore, another measure was derived by counting the num­
ber or significant relationships in the FIC matrix. This 
measure was called the sum of system relationships, and is 
abbreviated as sum=C (constructs) or Sum-P (persons) in this 
paper. Sum-T is the combination of the two. These Sum 
measures are inverse to FIC measures since lower Sum scores 
indicate higher differentiation within the construct system. 
Again the reader is referred to Appendix A. 
Chicken Analysis. Although the subjects had played 
15 trials of Chicken against each stimulus opponent, only the 
first 12 were used. They were divided into three blocks of 
four trials each. The number of blue choices, the cautious 
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move, was used as the dependent variable. 
Hypothesis testing. The first four hypotheses stated at 
the end of the last chapter deal with the main effects on 
Chicken behavior. The significance of these effects was 
tested by analysis of variance; the factors, degrees of 
freedom, and estimated mean squares are shown in Table 1. 
Three of the factors are self-explanatory: Sex of Subject, 
Sex of Stimulus Opponent, and the particular stimulus within 
either sex, "Trial Block" refers to the first, second, or 
third block of four trials against each opponent. The other 
factor was differentiation of construction (DC scores). 
Subjects were divided into quintiles for each sex on the 
basis of these DC scores. 
The fifth hypothesis pertains to the proportion of vari­
ance explained by the subject variables, the situation 
variables, and the subject by situation interactions. In the 
ANOVA design of Table 1- interactions of subject with other 
factors could not be tested by the conventional F-test. 
Therefore a procedure described by Endler (1955) was used. 
This involves solving the equations of the form. Observed 
Mean Square X = Expected Mean Square X. In this way 
estimates of the variance components associated with each 
variable (e. g.g 6^2, g etc.) can be obtained and the 




Analysis of Variance of Chicken Behavior 
Source df Estimated Mean Square 
Between 
A Sex of Subject 1 * CdtCTïï 2 + nbcdtSoj 2 
B DC Quintile 4 + cdta-iT 2 + nacdt8g z 
AxB 1 V + cdtc^ir 2 + ncdt0c(g 2 
S(AB) Subjects UO + CdtCJiT 2 
Within 
C Sex of Stimulus 1 + dt + nabdt0yZ 
AxC 1 + dt Oy^z + nbdt 0^2 
BxC 4 0E= dt + nadt 0gyZ 
AxBxC 4 Oe* dt Oy^Z + ndt GqgyZ 
CxS(AB) 40 + dt 
D(C) stimulus 2 + tea/ + nabtegZ 
nXD \C) 2 4 ûbt 8(^gZ 
BxD(C) 8 » 
^ ^ 6/ -5- nat Gog2 
AxBxD{C) 8 + t05%: + 
D(C)XS (AB) 80 + t*6n: 
Table 1 continued 
Source 













AxBxD (c) xT 
D(C)xTxS{AB) 
Estimated Mean Square 
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The sixth hypothesis was designed to test the relation­
ship between the differentiation of construction and the var­
iance of behavior. Since each subject played Chicken against 
four stimulus opponents, the standard deviation of his 
cautious moves against these four opponents was calculated 
tor the various blocks of trials and for the total 12 trials. 
Regression analysis was then performed between the DC scores 
and the standard deviations. The same kind of regression 
analysis was used to examine the relationship between cogni­
tive complexity and variation of Chicken behavior. In this 
case FIC scores and Sum scores replaced DC scores in the 
regression calculations. 
To examine change of construction after invalidation, a 
regression analysis was again planned. The independent vari­
able %as to have been the number of incorrect guesses of the 
opponent's decisions in Chicken with the dependent variable 
being the DC score between the constructions of the opponent 
before and after Chicken play. For reasons to be discussed, 




After all individual grids had been transformed and 
standardized, the ratings of the four stimulus opponents on 
the nine provided constructs (a total of 36 ratings per 
subject) were used as the dependent variable for the analysis 
of variance presented in Table 2. Figure 3 illustrates the 
differential construction of the four stimuli by the group; 
Duncan's multiple comparison test was used to examine the 
difference between means. 
The main question at this point concerns whether the 
stimuli were perceived differently by the group. Both the 
Stimulus effect and the Construct by Stimulus interaction 
were highly significant. From the data presented in Figure 
3, it can be seen that Rick and Dot are perceived similarly, 
yet in a dissimilar manner from Paul and Barb. People on the 
same videotape were not construed alike, nor were stimuli of 
the same sex (cf. the lack of significance for the Sex of 
Stimulus effect) , 
From the results in Table 2, other significant effects 
can also be seen. The highly significant construct effect 
indicated that subjects as a group used the constructs 
differently. Mean ratings for all nine provided constructs 
are shown in Table 3. They are divided into two groups. 
Duncan's multiple range test revealed that the construct 
140 
Table 2 
analysis of Variance for Comparison of Stimuli 






A Sex of Subject 1 12853.3 12853.389 0.484 
S Subjects 48 1273575.5 26532.822 
Within 
B Constructs 8 359067.4 44883.424 11.771**  
C Sex of Stimulus 1 2601.6 2601.609 0.682 
D(C) Stimulus 2 168839.9 84419.931 22.140** 
AxB 8 61199.4 7649.928 2.006* 
AxC 1 15948.9 15948.980 4.183* 
AxD(C) 2 8953.3 4476.644 1.174 
BxC 8 96776.7 12097.085 3.  173**  
ExD (C) 16 2708130.5 169258.154 44.390**  
fixBxC 8 32643.8 4080.481 1.071 
AxBxD (C) 16 57575.5 3598.467 0.944 
Pesiduali 1680 6405821=8 3812.989 
















400 MALE STIMULI» FEMALE STIMULI: 
RICK DOT ©• 
BARB O 375 PAUL 
Fig. 3. Comparison of the construction of stimulus 




Mean Ratings on the Provided Constructs 
Construct 5ean S.D. 
GrouE_Ii 
Ambitious-Lackadaisical 539,355 66.271 
Cooperative-Uncooperative 537.945 70.229 
Friendly-Unfriendly 530.720 68.893 
Competitive-Uncompetitive 528.565 96.585 
Grou2_IIi 
Dominant-Submissive 513.525 110.589 
affectionate-Expresses little 508.700 71.424 
affection 
Merciful-Vindictive 508.420 71.036 
Generous-Selfish 505.325 50.867 
Helpful-Demanding 500.065 70, 824 
iMeans in one group are significantly different from 
means in the opposite group (p<.05), but not different 
from other means in the same group. 
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means within each group were not significantly different from 
each other; however, there was a significant difference be­
tween all pairs of construct means which cross group lines 
(p<.05). The variances of all nine constructs were tested 
for equality. Two constructs, dominant-submissive, and 
coBipetitive-uncompetitive, had larger variances than all the 
other seven constructs (p<,01). 
Intercorrelations between construct ratings are shown in 
Table 4. While the majority were significantly different 
from .00, only one quarter of these correlations explained 
more than 20% of the variance between a given pair of 
constructs. These higher correlations appeared to fall into 
two groups. The first included dominant, ambitious, and com­
petitive; the second group contained such constructs as 
friendly, cooperative, helpful, generous, and affectionate. 
The highest correlation was between the dominant and competi­
tive constructs (.713), the two which also exhibited the 
highest variances. While many constructs are interrelated, 
there appeared to be enough unexplained variance between 
constructs to conclude that each one offered useful informa­
tion in its own right. 
&s Table 2 indicates, there were other significant 
interactions in this analysis of the provided construct 
ratings. The data for these interactions were also tested 
using Duncan's technique. Figure 4 indicates that Sex of 
Table I* 
Correlations between Construct Ratings 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Ambitie >as- - .029 .158 .599** .580** -.040 -.033 .072 -.061 
LacJsadc lisical 
2. Cooper; itive- .578** -.197* - .21*8** ,401** . 160* .364** .377** 
Oncoop< ;rativ3 
3o Friend: Ly- -.0«7 -.180* o 556** .308** .470** .509** 
Unfriei idly 
4. coapet; -ti ve- - .713** -,,119 -.069 -.121 -.206* 
Oncom p< stitiVQ 
5. Dominai it- - -.298** -. 167* -.159* -.260** 
Submisi ;ive 
6. Affect: Lonate- - .376** .471#* .517** 
Little affection 
7. Mercifi il- - .380** .257** 
Vindic^ .ive 
8. Genero! is- - .555** 
SelfisI 
9. Helpfu; L- -
Demand] .ng 
•Significantly different from -00, p<.05. 











































Fig. Sex of subject by Construct interaction» (The 
only significant difference, p<.05, is on the dominant-
submissive construct.) 
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Subject by Construct interaction is primarily due to females 
rating the stimuli in general more highly on the dominant-
submissive construct than did males. Figure 5 shows that 
male stimuli were rated higher on dominant-submissive, while 
females were rated significantly higher on the merciful-
vindictive construct (cf. the Sex of Stimulus by Construct 
interaction) . Figure 6 illustrates the data for the Sex of 
Subject by Sex of stimuli interaction. Males perceived the 
female stimuli as more submissive compared to the male stimu­
lus opponents. Female subjects perceived the female stimuli 
as more helpful relative to the male opponents. The ratings 
on the construct, affectionate-expresses little affection, 
also exhibited this interaction with the female stimuli being 
perceived as more affectionate by male subjects. 
Although the Sex of Subject by Stimulus interaction was 
not significant, Duncan's test revealed that one person. 
Barb, was perceived differently by the two sexes. The female 
subjects saw her as more helpful and dominant when compared 
to the perceptions of the male subjects (p<,05). Otherwise 
the individual stimulus opponents were all perceived the same 
by both sexes on all nine constructs. 
Mffermtiati^n_of_Constructi^n 
Differentiation of Construction (DC) scores were calcu­
lated for each individual using both the subject's own 
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Fig, 5. Sex of Stimulus by Construct interaction. {The 
only significant differences, p<.05, are on the dominant-
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added to the DC-Provided score to obtain DC-Total, The means 
and standard deviations for both males and females are shown 
in Table 5» There were no significant differences between 
males and females of the means or of the variances on any of 
the three measures, correlations between the three measures 
are given in Table 6. Ml the correlations are highly sig­
nificant; the correlations of DC-Total with the other tiio 
are so high that DC-Total appears to be redundant. While the 
DC-Own and DC-Provided scores are also highly correlated, 
they each are based on different data, and the DC-Provided 
score eliminates the chance of an overlap of constructs upon 
which these scores are based, Male and female groups were 
then divided into guintile groups for both DC-Own and DC-
Provided scores. 
Each subject had played Chicken for 15 trials against 
each stimulus opponent. The first 12 trials were divided 
into three blocks of four trials each. The number of 
cautious (blue) moves per block was then taken as the depen­
dent variable for the analysis of variance, the model of 
which was described in the previous chapter (Table 1), The 
results of this analysis are shown in Table 7, The DC factor 
is representative of the guintile groups for each sex based 
on DC-Provided scores. Another analysis of variance was com­
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Correlations between DC Scores 
Measure Sample Own Provided Total 
Own Hales - .615** .930** 
Females - .737** .971** 
Whole - .669** .954** 
Provided Males - .862** 
Females - .877** 
Whûlê - ; 862** 
**Significantly different from «00, p<.01. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Variance of Chicken Behavior 





A Sex of Subject 1 36.0150 36 .0 150 10.889**  
B DC auintile u 14.9100 3.7275 1.127 
AxB It 22.6100 5.6525 1. 709 
S (AB) Su bj ects 40 132.3000 3.3075 
Within 
C Sex of Stimulus 1 7.0416 7.0416 5.441* 
AxC 1 6.2016 6.2016 4.792* 
BXC U 0.8500 0.2125 0.164 
AxBxC 4 4.3900 1.0975 0.848 
CxS (AB) 40 51.7667 1 .2942 
Dx (C) Stimul us 2 14.0567 7.0283 3.784* 
AxD(C) 2 8.2167 4.1083 2. 212 
BxD (C) 8 13.4933 1.6867 0.908 
AxBxD (c) 8 10.4667 1 .3083 0.704 
D(C)xS (AB) 80 148.6000 1.8575 
T Block of Trials 2 30.1900 15.0950 13.373** 
AxT 2 3.2700 1.6350 1.449 
BxT 8 8. 1100 1.0138 0.8981 
AxBxT 8 7.1300 0,8913 0.7896 
TxS (AB) SO 90.3000 1,1288 
CxT 2 5.2033 2.6017 3.240* 
AxCxT 2 6.0433 3.0217 3.763* 
BxCxT 8 4.8300 0.6038 0.752 
flxBxCxT 8 6.6900 0.8363 1.041 
CxTxS (AB) 80 64.2333 0.8029 
D(C) XT 4 30 . 1933 7.5483 8.410** 
AxD(C) XT 4 1,6333 0=4083 0; 455 
BxD (C) XT 16 15,4067 0,9629 1.073 
AxBxD (C) xT 15 15.8333 0.9895 1. 103 
D(C) xTxS (AB) 150 143.6000 0.8975 
*p<.05. 
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were not appreciably different. The results from Table 7, 
using DC-Provided scores, were used to test the following 
five hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. There will be no significant effect on 
cautious moves due to the sex of the subject. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, females were more cautious overall than males 
(F 1,40 = 10,889, p<.01). The average number of cautious 
choices per trial block %as 2.54 for females and 1.85 for 
males. The result is contrary to much of what has been found 
in experimental game research, although it must be granted 
that the Chicken situation in this investigation is somewhat 
different from most other studies. 
Hypothesis 2. There will be no significant effect on 
cautious behavior due to the differentiation subjects exhibit 
in their construction of the stimulus oppoasrits. As can be 
seen from Table 7, this hypothesis of no effect for DC scores 
was supported. 
Hypothesis 3. There will be no significant effect on 
cautious decisions due to the sex of the stimulus opponent. 
As with the first hypothesis, the opposite obtained (F 1,40 = 
5.441, p<.05) . fts a group, over all three blocks of trials, 
subjects were more cautious toward male stimuli. Per block, 
subjects chose cautiously 2,20 times against males versus 
1,99 cautious choices against females. 
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Hypothesis 4. Thars will be a significant affact on, 
cautious behavior due to the stimulus opponent, fts seen from 
Table 7j this hypothesis was supported (F 2,80 = 3.783, 
p<.05). Duncan's a-altiple range test indicated that the 
largest difference was toward Dot, She had been described is 
most submissive, and subjscts were least cautious against her 
(mean of 1,77 per block). There was not a significant dif­
ference in their behavior toward the other three stimulus 
opponents. Rick (mean of 2.2 4), Barb (mean of 2.20), or Paul 
(mean of 2.17 par block). 
Summarizing the first four hypotheses, it appears that 
female subjects, compared to males, were more cautious over 
12 trials, playing for intermediate rewards. Subjects as a 
group were more willing to compete against the females, al­
though this appears to be primarily the result of their play 
against Dot, the stimulus seen as most submissive. 
Table 7 also indicates that there were significant 
sources of variation in Chicken behavior not specifically 
tested by the above four hypotheses. Blocks of Trials were 
responsible for a highly significant variation (F 2,80 = 
13.373, p<.001). Subjects were more cautious on the first 
block of trials against a given opponent than they were on 
the other two. 
The sex of the subject, as mentioned in hypothesis 1, 
and the sex of the stimulus, as noted in hypothesis 3, were 
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both significant effects. In addition there was an interac­
tion between the two factors, Duncan's multiple range test 
was used to examine the difference between the means of the 
four cells. Female subjects were as cautious toward 
opponents of both sexes. The difference between the block 
means toward male opponents (2.35) and toward female stimuli 
(2.33) was not significant. However, males, relative to 
female subjects, were more competitive toward males (mean of 
2.06 cautious decisions per block), and yet more competitive 
toward females (mean of 1.6%, p<.05). The Sex of Stimulus by 
Block interaction was also significant (F 2,83 = 3.240, 
p<.05), Furthermore, all three of these factors. Sex of 
Subject, Sex of Stimulus, and Trial Block, were involved in a 
significant interaction; cell means are illustrated in 
Figure 7, «.Ithoiigh femaLe subjects no become sosewhat wore 
competitive against stimuli of both sexes after the first 
block, the largest increase in competitive moves occurs in 
the male subjects' reactions to the male stimuli. 
Subjects also reacted differently to the individual 
stimuli over trial blocks; this interaction was significant 
(F 4,160 = 8.410, p<,001), and is also illustrated in Figure 
7, Against Barb, the female stimulus opponent perceived as 
more dominant and competitive, subjects tsndei to remain 
steady in their play, exhibiting a slight nonsignificant de­

































1 2  3  1  2 
BLOCK OF TRIALS 
Fig. 7» Hean caatious choices over trial blocks of 
Chicken» Left; Sex of Subject by sex of stimulus interac­
tion, flight; Reactions of subjects to individual stimulus 
opponents. 
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more competitive in the course of the 12 triais (p<,05) ; 
these two opponents had been perceived as less dominant and 
competitive. Finally against Paul, there is a significant V-
shaped reaction where subjects were very cautious at first, 
became more competitive, and then reverted to more caution. 
Part of this may be due ta the fact that Paul began a string 
of seven competitive choices at Trial 4, and subjects may 
have been guessing he was bound to change to Blue sooner or 
later, especially during Block 2. This reaction to Paul on 
the right side of Figura 7 is probably primarily responsible 
for the male-toward-male trend on the left side of that 
figure. 
&t this point, the data appear to indicate an affect on 
Chicken behavior both due to the person (sex of the subject 
but not DC scores} and ths situation (sex of stimulas and the 
individual stimulus) . Both person and situation also inter­
act over time (trials) although trials themselves can also 
be considered a situation effect. The relative effect of 
these factors was ejcamiaed in the next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis,„5. The person by situation interactions 
will account for a greater proportion of the total variance 
than any of the main effects. In order to test this hypothe-
sisp 29 simultaneous equations containing the variance 
components as unknowns were solved. They all had the form 
Kean Square X = Estimated Mean Square X, taking the data on 
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the left of the equation from Table 7, and that on the right 
from Table 1. 
Unfortunately there aere two problems connected with 
these equations. First, there were 30 unknowns in 29 
equations, making a unique solution impossible. Therefore, 
the set of equations were solved three times, each time 
assuming one of the variance components was equal to zero. 
The other problem was that occasionally a variance com­
ponent obtained from the solution of a given equation was 
less than zero. Since variance is a squared number, a nega­
tive number is not possible. Therefore, in those cases, the 
particular variance component was assumed to be zero. This 
situation arose whenever the F-ratio was less than one, and 
in the great majority of cases, this was always associated 
with the DC factor^ KirJc (1 958) ssntionsa that an F-ratio 
less than zero has no maaning. It may due to chance because 
of sampling error, to a failure in randomization of an impor­
tant factor, or to an inappropriate linear model. Since this 
case occurs primarily in association with the DC factor, per­
haps this factor should not have been included in the model, 
especially since it had been hypothesized that this effect 
would not be significant. Of course, the F-ratios 3f less 
than 1.0 in this case could also be due to chance error. 
The variance components are shown in Table 8 along with 
the percentage of the total variance for which they account. 
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Table 8 










































. 0 0 0  
.000  
. 216  
.0 34 
.030 
. 0 0 0  
. 0 0 0  
.619 






0 .  00  




0 . 0 0  





.  201  
. 019 
. 032 
. 0 0 0  




. 0 0 0  
. 0 0 0  
. 3 2 0  
5 . 1 7  
0.19 




0 . 0 0  
0 . 0 0  
3.13 
1 . 6 1  
1.43 
0 . 0 0  
0 . 0 0  
15.18 






. 0 0 0  




. 0 0 0  
. 0 0 0  
.351 
4 . 9 9  
0 .  18  
1.79 
9 . 5 6  
0.87 
1.46 
0 . 0 0  





0 . 0 0  








. 0 0 0  
. 0 0 0  




0 .  00  





J 9 -j 
0.24 
0 . 0 0  
0 . 0 0  
rO?e 
,005 
0 0 0  
0 0 0  
(ÎHl 
0.23 
0 . 0 0  













Q c t y j Z  








. 0 1 8  
.044 



















.  0 1 8  
.044 






. 0 1 8  
.898 
0.85 
2 . 0 9  
0 . 0 0  
0.14 
0 . 0 0  
6.31 
0 . 0 0  
0.33 
0.85 
4 2 . 6 0  
.018 
.044 
. 0 0 0  
.003 
.133 
. 0 0 0  
.007 




2 . 0 1  
0 . 0 0  
0.14 
5.09 





Total 3.257 100.00 2.108 100.00 2.186 100.00 
^Symbol definitions: A  ( o i ) ,  Sex of Subject; 8(6), DC Quin-
tile; Cfy), Sex of Stimulus; 0(5), Individual Stimulus; 
T(x) , Trial Block; S(n), Subject; e, fixed factor; or 
random factor. 
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The variance component for error, was assumed to be zero 
in one case, in the second case the Stimulus by Trial 
by Subject variance, and in the third case, the component due 
to Ses of Stimulus by Trial by Subject, Since, when 
was assumed to be zero, also became zero, the 
third column of Table 8 is probably" the best solution. 
Whatever column is examined, the ranks of the percentages are 
still the same, assuming to be equal to zero is not a 
very practical solution since it would be very rare that 
there would be no measurement error. 
In Table 9, the percentages from the third column of 
Table 8 (where was assumed to be zero) are divided into 
groups representing variance components due to person, situa­
tion, or person by situation interactions. If we take only 
the variance due to subjects, then almost 10% of the 
variance has been explained. This 10%, however, explains a 
variance composed of unknown factors within the subjects. If 
the variance due to botHeen-group factors is added, just over 
16% of the variance can be ascribed to person factors. 
In the model under examination, three variables can be 
classed as situations: the sex of the stimulus, the particu­
lar stimulus, and the trial block. Considering the variance 
components due to these three variables or their 
interactions, less than 13% of the total variance is 
accounted for. This is even less than the variance due to 
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Table 9 
Variance Component Percentages Divided into Groups 
Variance Component % Sub- Group Cumulative 
total Total Total 
£eEson_lariabl9s 
A 6 0(2 4.99 
B Qgz 0.18 




D Ggz 1.56 
T 3.20 
CT GyTZ 0.82 
DT 6ôx2 6.09 
6.96 6.96 6.95 
9.56 16,52 16.52 





DTS * .35 27.87 27.87 56.93 
AC Gay 2 1.46 
AD 8a62 1.37 
AT 0.23 
ACT GoYTZ 2.01 
ABCT ®a3yT2 0.14 
BDT GggT? 0.32 
&BDT ®a3ÔT2 0.82 6.35 34.22 63.28 
Error 36.72 36.72 36.72 100.00 
iSymbol definitions; A (a). Sex of Sub ject;~B (3 r7~Dc"Quin-
tile; C(y), Sex of Stimulus; D (0 ) , Individual Stimulus; 




This hypottesis was designed to examine primarily the 
person by situation variance. Taking only those factors 
which include an interaction of Subject with another within-
group effect, 27.87% of the total variance was accounted for. 
Adding the 6% due to interactions of between- and within-
group variables, the person by situation interaction 
accounted for over 34% of the variance. This was more than 
that due to person and situation combined; the result agrees 
with those cited by Bowers (1973). The largest single per­
centage (excluding that due to error) was due to the 
interaction of the stimulus opponents with subjects. 
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis was accepted. 
At this point, evidence has been obtained that a major 
factor to be considered iri this type of personality research 
is the person by situation interaction» Whether a mechanism 
for this interaction is one's personal constructs has not 
been demonstrated yet. This is the focus of the next hypoth­
esis. 
Hypothesis 6. The variance of the individual 
subject's Chicken behavior against the four stimulus 
opponents will be associated with differing construction of 
those opponents. Each subject had made a different number of 
cautious moves against each stimulus opponent, ks a measure 
of variation in Chicken behavior, the standard deviation of 
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the mean cautious decisions against these opponents was cal­
culated. This was done for all three trial blocks, as well 
as for the combinations of the first two and of all three 
blocks. The regression of these standard deviations on the 
various DC measures was then analyzed. Tables 10-12 contain 
these regression analyses. 
As can be noted in those tables, the hypothesis was sup­
ported only for Blocks 1 and 2 separately, but not over both 
blocks combined, when the regression model contained the DC-
Provided score. It can be concluded that construing the 
opponents differently on the provided constructs was associ­
ated with variation in Chicken behavior. Since the hypothe­
sis was not supported with the other DC measures, it is 
probable that for the appropriate effect to be observed, 
constructs more relevant to the situation should be consid­
ered, The provided constructs in this research were more ap­
propriate to Chicken than were those originally elicited from 
subjects on the Eeptest. 
The fact that the relationship between chicken variation 
and difference of construction was not evident as play pro­
gressed, is similar to other washout effects noted in 
Prisoner's Dilemma research (cf. Tedeschi, Lesnick, & 
Gahagan, 1968) » If hy the relationship of DC-Provided scores 
was significant for the first four trials, and for the second 
four trials, but not for those eight trials combined, is not 
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Table 10 
Regression Analyses of Chicken Variation on DC-Own Scores 







Regression 1 0.092 0. 092 0.%%0 .095 
Residual 48 9.983 0. 208 
Corrected Total 49 10.075 
Regression 1 0.447 0.447 2.015 
Residual 48 10.642 0.222 
Corrected Total 49 11.089 
. 2 0 1  
Regression 1 0.032 0.032 0.110 .048 
Residual 48 13.981 0.291 
Corrected Total 49 14.013 
Blocks 1+2 Regression 1 0=566 0.655 1.276 .161 
Residual 48 25.062 0.522 
corrected Total 49 25.728 
&11 Blocks Regression 1 0.690 0.690 0.718 .121 
Residual 48 46.161 0.962 
Corrected Total 49 46.851 




degression Analyses of Chicken Variation 
on DC-Provided Scores 




Block 1 Regression 1 0,979 0.979 5.165* 
Residual 48 9.096 0.190 
Corrected Total 4 9 10,075 
312* 
Block 2 Regression 1 0.872 0.872 4.098* .280* 
Residual 48 10.217 0.213 
Corrected Total 49 11.089 
Block 3 Regression 
Residual 
1 0.015 0.015 0.051 
48 13.998 0.292 
,033 
Blocks 1+2 Regression 1 1,033 1.033 2,007 .200 
Residual 48 24=695 0.514 
Corrected Total 49 25.728 
All Blocks Regression 1 0,344 0.344 0.356 .086 
 ^m ••• •« *1 
V\r= 48 469 507 0» 969 
Corrected Total 49 46.851 




Regression Analyses of Chicken Variation 
on DC-Total Scores 
Chicken Source df Sum of Mean Fi Corre-
Sguares Square lation 
Block 1 Regression 1 0.368 0.368 1.821 .191 
Residual 48 9.707 0.202 
Corrected Total 49 10.075 
Block 2 Regression 1 0.696 0.696 3.214 ,251 
Residual 48 10.393 0.217 
Corrected Total 49 11.089 
Block 3 Regression 1 0.005 0.005 0.018 .0 19 
Residual 48 14.007 0.292 
Blocks 1+2 Regression 1 0. 938 0. 938 1 .816 . 191 
Residual 48 24.790 0.516 
Corrected Total 4 9 25,728 
All Blocks Regression 1 0.648 0.648 0.673 .118 
Residual 48 45.203 0.953 
Corrected Total 49 46.851 
iBeta values and correlations not significantly different 
from 0.0. 
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certain at this point. Perhaps, around the fourth or fifth 
trial, subjects temporarily used some construction other than 
personality characteristics measured by the present 
instruments to guide their behavior. 
Although this hypothesis was not completely supported^, 
the hypothesized result was evident under limited conditions. 
Variation in Chicken behavior was associated with differing 
construal of opponents in early trials when relevant 
constructs were considered 
Hypothesis 7. Cognitive complexity will be associ­
ated with greater variation in Chicken behavior. Cognitive 
complexity -was measured by using Landfield's FIC technique, 
as well as an adaption of that measure labeled the sum of 
system relationships, devised by the present investigator. 
Six measures were therefore available: FIC for persons, for 
constructs, and both combined, along with Sum-P, Suia-C and 
the total of the two. These measures are described in the 
previous chapter and illustrated in Appendix A. 
Table 13 contains the means and standard deviations of 
all six measures of complexity, correlations between the six 
are shown in Table 14, The FIC and the Sum scores were 
negatively correlated, since higher FIC scores indicate 
greater complexity while the reverse is true for sum scores. 
The very significant correlations were to be expected since 
all measures originated from the same Eeptest grid. However, 
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Table 13 
Means and Standard Deviations of 
Cognitive complexity Measures 
Measure Mean S.D. 
FICp 7.26 3.984 
FICC 6.40 3.918 
FIC 1 3.68 7 . 5 9 3  
Sum-P 54.64 39.149 
SUIB-C 3 3.26 28.322 
Sum? 8 3 . 9 0  60.797 
Table U 
Intercorrelations of 
Cognitive Complexity Heasures^ 
Ksasurs 1 2 3 a  5 Ô 
1. FICp .834 . 9 5 7  - . 7 4 5  -, 696 -, 756 
2. FICc - . 9 5 8  -  . 7 8 1  - =765 - . 7 8 7  
3. FIC - -.796 - .763 -.805 
4 a Sum-P - .973 . 9 5 9  
5. Sum-C - .938 
6. Sum-T 
lAll correlations significantly different from .OU, p<.0001. 
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the correlations of FIC and Sura measures explained only be­
tween 55% and 65% of the variance involved between both 
measures, indicating they provided some different informa­
tion. within the FIC or the sum groups, less different in­
formation was provided by each individual measure. 
The previous hypothesis was designed to examine whether 
diversity in construction of a situation was associated with 
diversified behavior. The present hypothesis, on the 
contrary, questioned the association between the construct 
system itself and the behavior. Regression analyses were 
calculated of Chicken standard deviations on complexity 
measures. Only two out of thirty analyses indicated a sig­
nificant relationship; FICp with variation in Block 2 and 
Sum-C with diversity in Block 1, Tables 15 and 16 include 
regrsssion analyses on FICp and Siiir.=C; the others, for lack 
of significance, have been omitted. 
The support for the question »as limited to such few 
instances that it seems better to reject the hypothesis. 
While the previous hypothesis also received limited support, 
in that case the independent variables, especially DC-Own and 
DC-Provided scores, were not as highly correlated, and they 
were based on different data bases. Diversity within the 
system did not appear to be predictive of varying behavior in 
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Pegression Analyses of Chicken Variation 
on Sum-C Scores 
Chicken Source if Sum of Mean F Corre-
Sguares Square lation 
B1 Regre 1 0.788 0.788 4.073 ,280 
Re 48 7 0.193 Total 
49 10.07 
B1 Begre 1 0.177 0.177 0.779 -.126 
Re 48 2 0.227 Total 
49 11.08 
B1 Begre 1 0.016 0.158 0.541 .034 
Re 48 7 0.291 Total 
a a 1 u  n i  
B1 Regre 1 0. 211 0.21 1 0.396 -.090 
Re 48 7 0.532 Total 
49 25.72 
'il Regre 1 0. 133 0.1 33 0.137 -.053 
Pe 48 8 0,973 
49 4 6 . 8 5  
*Beta value and correlation significantly different from 
0.0, p<.05. 
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Hypothesis 8. There will be a positive relationship 
between amount of change of construction of an opponent and 
errors of estimation of that opponent's play on trials of 
Chicken, since very few subjects indicated any change of 
construction of the stimulus opponents, this hypothesis could 
not be tested. This lack of change may be due to a number of 
problems. One appeared to be experimental fatigue. Subjects 
were given instructions indicating thay could change con­
struction if they wished; these instructions were 
deliberately mild so that subjects would not feel impelled to 
indicate a change. In reality, subjects may have been 
anxious to get on %ith the experiment. 
On the other hand. Miller (1969) noted little change ia 
cognitive complexity over 20 minutes time. Perhaps subjects 
either do not change construction that rapidly, ot else 
present instruments do not measure such rapid change. 
Further_Investi2ation 
Only limited support m s obtained for the relationship 
between differentiated construction of the opponents and var­
iation in Chicken behavior. The connection between cognitive 
complexity measures and Chicken variation was not supported 
by the present data. Further investigation was done in order 
to ascertain if a model containing more than one independent 
variable could predict variation of behavior. 
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For this purpose, two statistical computer programs, 
ESQUAEE and STEPWISE, were used to examine the data further. 
These programs are part of the Statistical Analysis system 
(SAS) developed by Barr and Goodnight (cf. Service, 1972) . 
The RSQUARE program performs regressions of a dependent vari­
able on a number of independent variables and indicates for 
the user the multiple correlation squared between the depen­
dent variable and various models of k variables. STEPWISE 
examines the Rz statistics and selects the best model, pro­
viding the user with the regression analysis of this best 
model. 
Using these programs, the various standard deviations 
dependent variables; the DC scores and the cagnitive com­
plexity msasarss were the inuspsrident variables. The multi^ 
pie correlations for two and three variable models associated 
with the variation of behavior in the first block of Chicken 
are shown in Table 17. The STEPWISE procedure chose DC-
Provided and Siim-C as the best two variable model; DC-
Provided, Sum-C, and DC-Own made up the best three variable 
model. The regression analyses for these two combinations 
are shown in Table 18. 
It would appear that the Dc-proviâed-sum-c model is the 
better of the two. it should be pointed out that the SAS 
regression program adjusts the regression sum of squares of 
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Table 17 
Multiple Correlations of cognitive Differentiation Measures 
with Chicken Variation in Block 1 
Independent Variables R2 Mult.R 
1! 
variables in model 
1. DC-Total Su m-c 
. 1339 . 3 6 6 *  
2. DC-Provided FIC 
. 1430 .378* 
3. DC-Provided FICc 
.1585 . 3 9 8 *  
4. DC-Provided Su m-P 
. 1976 .444* 
5. DC-Provided Sum-T 
.2016 . 4 4 9 * *  
6. DC-Provided Sum-c 
.2135 . 4 6 2 * *  
Th£ie_variables_. in model 
1. DC-Provided FICc FIC .1654 . 4 0 7 *  
2. DC-Provided FICp FIC . 1656 .407* 
3. DC-Provided FICp FICc . 1656 . 4 0 7 *  
4. DC-Prpvided DC-Total FIC . 1790 . 4 2 3 *  
5. DC-Own DC-Provided FIC .1790 . 4 2 3 *  
6. DC-Own DC-Total FIC . 1790 . 4 2 3 *  
7. DC-Provided DC-Total FIC , 1956 .442* 
8. DC-Own DC-Provided FICc . 1956 .442* 
9. DC-Own DC-Total FICc . 1956 . 4 4 2 *  
10. DC-Provided FICc Sum-P .1975 .444* 
11. DC-Provided FICC sum-P 
.2012 . 4 4 8 *  
12. DC-Provided FICc Sum-T .2019 . 4 4 9 *  
13, DC-Provided Su m-P Sum-T 
. 2021 .449* 
14, DC-Pro vin eft FIC Sum-T .2079 .455* 
15. DC-Provided FICp Sum-P .2089 . 4 5 7 *  
16. DC-Provided Sum- c  Sum-T . 2 1 3 6  . 4 6 1 *  
17. DC-Provided FICc Sum-c .2140 . 4 6 2 *  
18. DC-Provided FICp Sum-T .2161 . 4 6 4 *  
1 9 .  DC-Provided Sum- c  Sum-P .2176 .466* 
20. DC-Provided DC-Total Sum-P . 2 1 8 0  . 4 6 6 *  
2 1 .  DC-Own DC-Provided Sum-P .2180 . 4 6 6 *  
22. DC-Own DC-Total Sum-P .2180 . 4 6 6 *  
2 3 ,  DC-Provided FIC Sus-C ,2182 . 4 6 7 *  
24. DC-Provided FICp Sum- c  . 2235 . 4 7 2 * *  
25. DC-Provided DC-Total Sum-T .2277 .477** 
2 6 .  DC-Own DC-Provided Sum-T 
. 2277 .477** 
27. DC-Own DC-Total Sum-T . 2 2 7 7  . 4 7 7 * *  
28. DC-Provided DC-Total Sum- c  . 2 3 7 6  . 4 8 7 * *  
29. DC-Own DC-Total Sum- c  
.2376 . 4 8 7 * *  
30. DC-Provided DC-Own Sum- c  . 2 3 7 6  . 4 8 7 * *  
^Multiple correlation greater than .00, p<.05. 
**Multiple correlation greater than .00, p<.01. 
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Table 18 
Multiple Regression Analyses of Chicken Variation, 
Block 1, on Cognitive Differentiation Measures 
l2g_variable_Eodel 





Regression 2 2, 1514 1.0757 6.381** .2135 
Residual 47 7.9236 0.1686 
Corrected Total 49 10.0750 
Source df Seguen- F 




DC-Provided 1 0.9786 5.806* 1.3634 8 . 0 8 7 * *  0.00012 2.944** 





mrractaH Total UQ 














DC-Provided 1 0,9789 5 . 8 6 2 *  1.4407 8 . 6 2 8 * #  0,00016 2.937** 
Sum-C 1 1. 1726 7.023* 1. 1808 7,072* 0.00057 2.659* 
DC-Own 1 0.248 1.454 0.2423 1,454 -0.00004 -1.206 
* p < . 0 5 .  
**p<.01. 
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any variables for those Variables which precede it in the 
analysis (cf. the sequential sum of squares in Table 18). 
Each partial sum of squares contains an adjustment for all 
variables in the model. In the present case, the DC-Own 
scores do not appear to add that much to the model. 
In addition, it can be noted that? in all but one case, 
the significant two variable models included the DC-Provided 
score and a measure of cognitive complexity, with the Sum 
measures accounting for slightly more variance than the FIG 
measures. These results appeared to indicate that, in order 
to obtain a significant relationship between construction 
differentiation and different behavior, both relevant 
constructs and the complexity of a person's construct system 
should be taken into account. 
The STEPSISS prccsiurs indicated the best model foc 
Block 2 included only one variable, DC-Provided, As for 
other blocks or combinations of blocks, there were no signif­
icant relationships found. 
The other area of exploratory investigations concerned 
the relationship of the subjects' ratings on the provided 
constructs with cautious Chicken behavior. Again the data 
were subjected to the BSQURRE and the STEPWISE techniques; 
the construct ratings werfe the independent variables aith the 
number of cautious plays in the various blocks as the depen­
dent variables. 
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The best model for Block 1 is shown in Table 19, In 
this model, the following construct poles were associated 
with more cautious play: expresses little affection, compet­
itive, lackadaisical, friendly, and vindictive. In various 
other models significantly associated with Block 1, cautious 
play was also associated with more dominant ratings. These 
other models are also shown in Table 19. No one construct by 
itself was significantly associated with more cautious play; 
however, the correlations of three constructs with Chicken 
behavior were close to significance: expresses little 
affection, vindictive, and dominant. 
Ho model could be found which obtained a significant 
multiple correlation with Chicken behavior in Block 2. How­
ever, during this block, Paul had played a long series of 
competitive moves, and there uas a significant drop in 
cautious plays against him, later to be reversed (cf. Figure 
7) . Therefore his data were temporarily eliminated, and the 
STEPWISE procedure was applied to the data from the other 
three stimulus opponents. In this case, cautious play could 
be predicted by dominant ratings, and by a model of dominant 
and vindictive ratings. While the dominant construct alone 
may be the better model, the regression analysis associated 
with the two-variable model is shown in Table 20, 
For Block 3, the data from all four stimulus opponents 
sere again considered. There were significant models prédis-
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Table 19 
Multiple Regression of Chicken Behavior, Block 1, 
on Construct Ratings 
Source df Sum of Mean F Huit. 
Squares Sguare __R__ 
Regression 5 15. 1558 3.0312 2 . 4 5 8 *  .2%%* 
Residual 194 239.2242 1.2331 
Corrected Total 199 254. 3800 
Construct df Sequential Bsta 
Number 1 ss 
Mean 3.5427 
9 1 4.6359 -0.0026 
7 1 2.4476 0.0022 
4 1 2.0196 -0.0026 
1 1 3,2636 0.0026 
8 1 2.7891 -0.0018 
Number of Construct Multiple 
_._._Bmbersl Correlation 
2 8 3 .1743* 
3 8 3 4 .1979* 
4 9 3 14 .2221* 
6 9 7 4 1 8 3 . 2561* 














Multiple Segression of Chicken Behavior, Block 2 ,  
on construct Ratings (Data from Rick, Barb, and Dot) 
Source df Sum of 
.3au ares. 
Regression 2 8,9278 
Residual 147 20 2.4055 
Corrected Total 149 21 1. 3333 




3.242* . 206* 













tive of Chicken behavior ranging in size from one to four 
variables. Again the construct, dominant-submissive, was the 
best predictor (r = .206, p<.005), with more dominant ratings 
being associated with more cautious behavior. Ratings of 
opponents as more competitive were also associated with 
cautious play (r = .171, p<.05). The regression analysis for 
the four-variable model is shown in Table 21. The multiple 
correlation analysis revealed that any two or three variable 
model could significantly predict behavior as long as the 
dominant-submissive construct was one of the variables. 
No significant model could be found to predict behavior 
over the combined first two blocks. This was also true when 
the data for Paul were eliminated from analysis. Over all 12 
trials, the only model that was significantly predictive of 
behavior contained one variable, the doininant-subiriissivs con­
struct. The appropriate regression analysis is shown in 
Table 22. The data from Table indicated that the 
constructs dominant and competitive were highly correlated (r 
= .713), It would appear that if one perceives an opponent 
as more dominant and competitive, he would estimate the 
opponent to choose Red (competitively) more often. In that 
case, the better Chicken move is Blue (caution), and this was 
how the subjects behaved. 
Further analysis was attempted in order to ascertain if 
any set of constructs could predict behavior for one 
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Table 21 
Multiple Regression of Chicken Behavior, Block 3, 
on Construct Ratings 
Source df Sum of Mean F Huit. 
Squares Sguare 
Regression 4 16.1355 4,0339 2.540* .223* 
Residual 195 309= 6845 1 . 5 8 8 1  
Corrected Total 199 325, 8200 
Construct df Sequential Beta 
Number^ SS „ Value 
Mean 1.7042 
3 1 13.7707 0.0016 
8 1 1.2519 -0.0011 
2 1 0.5892 - 0 . 0 0 0 8  
7 1 0=5237 0.0008 
^Constructs: 3, Dominant-Submissive 
» Tr J ^ w ^ 






Regression Analysis of Chicken Behavior, 12 Trials, 
on Ratings of the Construct Dominant-Submissive 
Source df Sum of Mean F Mult. 
«Squares Sguare R 
Regression! 1  34. 8616 3 4 . 8 6 1 6  5 . 0 1 0 *  .  1 5 7 *  
Residual 198 377.8934 6.9591 
Corrected Total 199 412. 7550 
^Intercept = 4.3414; Beta value = 0.0038. 
* p < . 0 5 .  
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opponent. Caution against Barb was predicted on the first 
sight trials and over all twelve trials by ratings on the 
merciful-vindictive construct; higher merciful ratings were 
associated with more competitive moves (r = -.281, p<,05). 
Behavior against Hick was not significantly predicted. Be­
havior against Paul, the more dominant male, could be pre­
dicted to a highly significant degree (F 5,44 = 4.203, 
p<.005), on the first block only, by the five variable model; 
cautious play was associated with ratings indicating him as 
more dominant, selfish, friendly, lackadaisical, and competi­
tive. 
The more interesting data are those of play against Dot, 
who had been preceived as highly submissive. As play pro­
gressed, subjects appeared to use different constructs to 
guiuG their behavior. For Block 1, the best model is com­
posed of four variables; competitive (red) moves are associ­
ated with ratings of Dot as more selfish, affectionate, 
ambitious, and cooperative (F 4,45 = 3.648, p<,012). During 
the second block, the subjects appeared to be guided in 
competition by ratings of Dot as submissive (F 1,48 = 4,483, 
p<.05). By Block 3, while the dominant-submissive construct 
by itself was still predictive, the better model contained 
three variables, competitive play was associated with more 
submissive, merciful, and selfish ratings (F 3,46 = 3,801, 
p<,016). No model was predictive of play over the first 
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eight trials or over all twelve trials. These data would 
appear to indicate that the play of subjects over time was 
not guided by any one construct or any single set of 
constructs. Rather, as play progressed, subjects appeared to 
change the constructs used to predict what the stimulus 
opponents would choose to do in Chicken play. This change of 
the constructs used by the subjects may also explain why var­
iation in behavior was not associated with higher DC-Providad 
scores over numerous trial blocks. 
When the DC scores and cognitive complexity measures 
were used as independent variables to explain variation in 
behavior, no concern was given to which constructs 
individuals used to distinguish stimuli. The DC scores al­
lowed subjects to differentiate on whatever constructs they 
found most useful^ This yas in accord with Kelly's 
individuality corollary. On the contrary, when Chicken 
scores were regressed on construct ratings,- each, construct 
was given equal relevance; the comparisons were group 
comparisons. This assumed that there was commonality of 
meaning and ot relevance of the constructs across subjects. 
Nevertheless, the data did indicate that construct ratings 
were useful for predicting behavior. Further implications of 
these data will be examined in the next chapter. 
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DISCUSSION 
Recently there has been a renewal of interest in the 
interactionist viewpoint among personality theorists. Behav­
ior is seen primarily as a result of the interaction between 
the person and the situation. In the present investigation, 
the focus has been on a possible mechanism for this interac­
tion, namely personal constructs as conceived by George 
Kelly. The primary concern has been to examine the 
connection between personal constructs and behavior. This 
concern has been framed within the question of consistency of 
behavior. Do people act consistently toward people who are 
construed alike, and do they vary in behavior when people or 
situations are construed differently? 
Within the framework of the larger issue concerning the 
interaction bstsssn situational and personal factors, the 
present research found that when behavior in a Chicken situa­
tion was analyzed, the interaction did account for as much 
variance as person and situation factors combined. This 
result was similar to the many studies cited by Bowers (1973) 
on this very issue. However, just noting the higher percent­
age of variance accounted for by the interaction does not in 
any way prove that constructs are involved in the interac­
tions Nor can the person or situation factors be discounted, 
since they, by themselves, also accounted for significant 
portions of the total variance observed. 
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In order to examine the role of constructs in this in­
teraction, it was necessary to provide the subjects with 
situations which could be construed differently. Examination 
of the data revealed that the stimulus opponents were 
construed differentially, and the differences were not just 
between members of the same ses. On the other hand, the 
Chicken situation was such that subjects were playing to in­
crease their own gain, not to obtain a greater score than the 
opponent. as such, this situation was the same across all 
four opponents. The changing "situation" to be construed was 
the different opponent or the different trial of play. It 
appears safe to say that the experimental manipulations were 
successfully accomplished as planned. 
As mentioned, there was a significant amount of variance 
in Chicken behavior associated with a person variable, ses of 
the subject. In general, females tended to be more cautious. 
When ratings on the particular constructs sera averaged 
across the four stimuli, females gave higher ratings in gen­
eral than did males on the construct dominant. &s revealed 
by the STEPWISE data, ratings of an opponent as dominant were 
associated with more cautious play. In the same vein, after 
the data for this investigation were analyzed, this writer 
came upon an article by Ssrmat ( 1968} where subjects had 
rated themselves on the HHP! Dominance Scale (Do). Sermat 
had observed that subjects high in dominance were more com­
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petitive playing Chicken. There was also an indication in 
his data of an interaction of the Do scores of the subject 
Hith those of the opponent in Chicken play. This one con­
struct at least, then, is evidence of some connection between 
constructs and behavior. 
There is some difficulty in classifying the constructs 
themselves. They can be conceived as a person variable. It 
is a person who applies the constructs. They also can be 
considered as a situation variable; in most cases the situa­
tion has an influence on which constructs are applied by the 
person. If the content and organization of the construct 
system along with any general tendency to apply constructs in 
a certain way are being considered, then it seems more appro­
priate to this writer to view constructs as a person vari­
able. The ezampls frca these data is the tendency of the 
female subjects to describe the stimulus opponents in general 
as more dominant, on the other hand, if one is considering 
the way constructs are applied by subjects to situations, 
then constructs should probably be considered as an interac­
tion factor, examples of which will be considered below. 
Returning to the consideration of person variables, how­
ever, one can see that the DC scores did not predict what 
kind of behavior would result in the Chicken situation. In 
the light of the several F-ratios less than one, this factor 
should probably not have been included. The data indicated 
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that variation in the construction of the stimuli predicted 
variation in Chicken behavior in some circumstances, not the 
type of that behavior. Hischel (1973c) has warned that 
predominance of person or situation variables in a given 
study can depend on what variables are chosen for investiga­
tion. It would appear, from hindsight, that a more relevant 
variable might have been based on the content of the elicited 
constructs, the number of aggressive constructs elicited on 
the original Reptest, for example. 
Considering, on the other hand, the situation variables, 
subjects were more cautious toward males. Referring back to 
Figure 5, it can be seen that male stimuli were rated as mora 
^omtnairtnnidr^t^ss mexcifuîr^TEainemale stimuli. The STEPWISE 
procedure indicated that these two constructs were both 
useful as part of predictive nodsls for the type o£ play on 
the various trial blocks. On the first amd third trial 
blocks, males were more competitive toward female opponents, 
the same opponents they had perceived as submissive; female 
subjects did not perceive male or female subjects as 
differing in dominance, nor did they play more cautiously 
against stimuli of either sex. When the data against indi­
vidual stimuli are focused upon, then it can be seen, for ex­
ample, that subjects played more competitively against Dot, 
the stimulus opponent perceived as more dominant and less 
competitive. 
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While results have indicated that the construct ratings 
were associated with Chicken behavior, the data were not 
always consistent when one changes the level of analysis. 
For example, subjects were more cautious against males than 
against females after having rated females as more 
submissive. However, subjects were slightly more cautious 
(not significantly so) against Rick than against Barb even 
though he had been perceived as the more submissive of the 
two. It appears reasonable in the light of the way the two 
sexes used the constructs across stimuli, that there is a hi­
erarchy of constructs involved, Male-female may be the 
superordinate construct under which falls the subordinate 
construct, dominant-submissive. It is reasonable, 
considering the data, that subjects were possibly judging 
wick as less dominant than Paul, But since he is a male, 
and, in the stereotypes of the subjects, males are more 
dominant than females, then he should have been played 
against more cautiously than Barb, a female. 
This possibility of changing the constructs used to 
anticipate the situation becomes more reasonable when the 
data are considered across the three trial blocks. Various 
analyses point to this possibility. First, no one model of 
constructs could be found to predict behavior across Blocks 1 
and 2 combined, even though a model could be found for Block 
1 alone, and for Block 2 when data against Paul were 
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eliminated. During Block 2, Paul was in the midst of a 
string of seven red plays. It is probable that subjects were 
not anticipating his behavior by how dominant he was. Rather 
the construct for anticipation may have been the "law of 
averages," the subjects' expectancy that one of these times 
Paul would have to change to Blue. In this investigation the 
subjects were gambling, similar to a poker game. During the 
first few hands of a poker game, the cards showing being 
relatively equal, a player must judge a possible bluff by an­
other player on characteristics he ascribes to that player. 
If however, an opponent has a number of good hands 
consecutively, a player can be tempted to bid up his own 
hand, figuring that, "on the average," the opponent is bound 
to have a loser. The subjects probably were using this sort 
of construct vhsn playing against Paul. On the contrary, the 
plays of the other opponents did not follow such an obvious 
pattern, and subjects had only their "personality" constructs 
to guide them, as Paul changed his behavior toward the end 
of the twelve trials, subjects appear to have returned to 
using personality constructs to anticipate his moves. 
Another significant situation variable was trial blocks. 
Especially as one considers the differences between Blocks 1 
and 3, it can be seen that subjects were slightly less 
cautious as play progressed. On Block 3, the means against 
the four stimulus opponents also fail in the same order as 
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the mean dominant ratings of these stimuli. But more impor­
tantly, to continue the point of the last paragraph, no one 
model of a group of constructs could be found by the STEPWISE 
technique which most accurately predicted Chicken play for 
all three of the individual blocks or for all three blocks 
combined. The combination of Blocks 1 and 2 could not be 
predicted at all. The constructs provided to and used by the 
group did provide the possibility of predicting subjects' be­
havior, But, on the other hand, as a group the subjects did 
not appear to use the same constructs continuously over all 
12 trials. The data appeared to indicate that along with the 
provided constructs, subjects may have used game related 
constructs and higher level constructs, such as male-female, 
not measured by the present instruments. In addition, the 
data sesîsed to show that different types of constructs were 
used at different times in the course of chicken play» 
As further evidence of this difference y it can be noted 
that play against Paul could be predicted by a five variable 
model on the first blocks of trials only. The data of play 
against Dot, on the other hand, showed that in that case 
subjects' behavior could be predicted across all three trial 
blocks, but the models for the first and third blocks were 
considerably different in content. 
Continuing along the same line, the present writer had 
assumed that subjects failed to indicate change in construct 
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ratings after Chicken play because of experimental fatigue 
and low pressure instructions. However, another plausible 
explanation is that subjects did not change their impressions 
of the stimuli; instead they changed which constructs they 
used to anticipate the moves of the opponents. This explana­
tion would agree with Miller (1969) who noted little change 
in cognitive complexity over time after a 20-tainute interac­
tion with a stimulus. In contrast, in the studies cited 
above dealing with construct change, either subjects were 
asked how one construct rating would change if another con­
struct rating changed, or fairly direct attempts were made to 
invalidate constructions. In this investigation, any possi­
ble invalidation was much more subtle. This change of which 
constructs are used to anticipate behavior, as opposed to 
change in construct application,- is in accord î?ith Kelly's 
(1955) fragmentation corollary where he pointed out that 
successively a person may employ "a variety of construction 
subsystems which are infer entially incompatible with each 
other" (p. 83). 
a t  this point, this writer is somewhat satisfied that a 
relationship has been demonstrated between personal 
constructs and behavior on a molecular level. He is also 
satisfied that constructs are an important factor in the 
person by situation variance noted in personality research. 
But since the data were not uniformly predictive across all 
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conditions, and since there was a sizeable amount of error 
variance, other concerns should be noted. 
First, the best construct predictor over trials was 
dominant-submissive. This was also the construct with the 
highest variance. Research previously cited (Cromwell & 
Caldwell,: 1962; Landfield, 1955, 1958) had indicated that 
greater variance of ratings on individual grids was associ­
ated with greater meaningfulnesso The strength of this con­
struct for predicting behavior m ay lie in subjects being more 
able to distinguish stimuli on this construct, Warr and 
Coffman (1970) have contended that more extreme ratings are 
due to response set. However, in the present case, individu­
al response set had been somewhat eliminated by standardizing 
grids before thsy were subjected to further analyses. Anoth­
er construct onten involved in the predictive Eodeis generat­
ed by the STEPWISE program was merciful-vindictive, a con­
struct which exhibited the third highest variance of the dif­
ferent ratings. The construct, competitive-uncompetitive, 
also had significantly higher variance; however, this con­
struct was less often included in predictive models. But 
dominant and competitive were highly correlated (.713). The 
STEPWISE technique, in searching for the "best" model, proba­
bly eliminated cooperative-competitive since it would not 
have introduced as much new information to a model already 
containing dominant ratings as some other, less related con­
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struct would have. Overall, prediction in this type of in­
vestigation might be improved if more constructs were used 
which were meaningful to the subjects and also less correlat­
ed with each other. 
Another aspect of the data concerns the fact that one 
construct was not enough to predict behavior on the first 
trial block, while a number of constructs considared together 
were predictive. This would be in accord with Kelly's (1955) 
concept of the construct system as analogous to a mathemati­
cal, multidimensional space. The constructs are the 
dimensions and the elements are situated at various spots in 
this multidimensional space. The multiple variable models 
observed reflect the elements being situated in this struc­
tural space. One construct may not be enough to distinguish 
a situât ion. But in the present data, the third block of 
trials was best predicted by only one construct, dominant-
submissive, even though a significant four variable model was 
found. By this time, many of the other dimensions may have 
been eliminated from consideration as being irrelevant to the 
Chicken situation. 
Reasonable explanations of the data have been offered to 
show that the connection between personal constructs and be­
havior has been supported. Some of the inconsistency in the 
data has been explained within the context of Personal Con­
struct Theory. However, from another point of view, the dis-
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cussion so far has focused upon the group of subjects as a 
whole; the individual has been somewhat ignored. Kelly's 
individuality corollary is the second of his theory; in this 
corollary he stresses the difference between individuals in 
their construction. The fact that connections between 
constructs and behavior have been demonstrated in spite of 
the neglect of the individual is evidence for the commonality 
and sociality corollaries. Subjects appear to construe the 
various stimulus opponents somewhat similarly, construing a 
stimulus as dominant allows the subject to understand the 
construction processes of this opponent and enter into a role 
with him, in this case, the role of gambler. 
Nevertheless, some of the unexplained error variance was 
probably the result of individual factors. This study was 
uesigneu to ascertain the relationship of personal constructs 
to behavior. That question was framed within the context of 
consistency. The group data shed some light on consistency. 
For example, when subjects perceived the opponent to be 
dominant, they were more cautious; against an opponent 
perceived as submissive, they were less competitive. But, as 
mentioned previously, at different times in the course of 
Chicken, subjects appeared to be using different constructs 
to anticipate the situation, among the subjects, individuals 
could also have differed in which constructs were relevant 
for them, and yet further, which constructs were relevant for 
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anticipating which opponent. 
Two of the hypotheses Here designed to take more account 
of the individual. In these cases the dependent variable was 
not the type of Chicken behavior, but rather the variation of 
an individual's play across opponents. On the first and sec­
ond blocks, the DC-Provided score was related to the standard 
deviation of the mean of an individual's Chicken behavior 
against the four opponents. On the contrary, the DC-Own 
score was not. The diffeeeace may be that the provided 
constructs were more relevant to anticipating the Chicken 
situation, subjects were asked to differentiate stimulus 
opponents on the constructs elicited during the original 
Beptest, However, across the sample, subjects obviously 
differed in what constructs were elicited and in how relevant 
they were to the Chicken situation. 
Probably the DC-Own score is a measure of diverse con­
struction of the opponents in areas of no consequence for 
Chicken play. At least on the first two blocks, however, 
when the provided constructs were considered, the hypothesis 
vas Supported that as a parson construes people differently, 
he behaves differently toward them; as he construes persons 
alike, his behavior towards them is similar. 
Previously in this discussion, it was mentioned that the 
constructs used to guide behavior were part of a construct 
system, a multidimensional psychological space. The FIC and 
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Sum scores were measures of how complex this space is, how 
many different dimensions are contained within the system, 
and how differentially elements are placed within that 
system. Complexity of the system by itself was not associ­
ated with behavior variation. 
However, when both the DC-Provided and cognitive com­
plexity scores were used as independent variables for the 
STEPWISE technique, the association between the 
differentiation of construction and the variation of Chicken 
play in the first block of trials was improved {p<.005). The 
data indicated that two factors should be considered: the 
difference in construction of the situation using relevant 
constructs, and the amount of differentiation between the 
constructs within the system. Again the importance of 
considering constructs as part of a multidimensional system 
becomes evident. The DC-Provided score considered the 
constructs as part of a nine-dimensional space. The cogni­
tive complexity measures give an indication of how close the 
dimensions are to each other, standardizing the grids only 
controlled for response set. The complexity measure con­
trolled for differences in the construct space within which 
response set operated. 
The six cognitive complexity measures were highly 
intercorrelated. However, the Sum measures appeared to have 
a slight edge over the FIC scores. The difference is that 
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the Fie measure only indicates that various construct 
dimensions are close to one another in the construct space; 
the Sum scores take more account of how tightly the 
dimensions are related to each other within that space. In 
the models associating DC scores and cognitive complexity 
with variation in Chicken behavior, the Sum-C score also had 
a slight edge over sum-P. Sum-C measures how closely the 
construct dimensions are to each other; Sum-P indicates how 
closely elssents are placed to each other within those 
dimensions. The DC scores also give some indication of how 
close the elements are to each other; therefore Sum-C, in 
contrast to Sum-P, adds more information to the model since 
it focuses on characteristics of the construct space, not on 
applications within that space. 
It should be pointed out that DC-Provided scores snd 
cognitive complexity measures have different data bases. The 
DC-Provided scores were a summary of 36 different cells, the 
ratings of the four stimuli on the nine provided constructs. 
The complexity measures were based on 357 cells, the ratings 
of the original 17 elements and the 4 stimuli on the 17 
constructs elicited from individual subjects on the original 
Reptest. The assumption was that the nine provided 
constructs were part of the larger construct system, which 
system has a certain complexity or simplicity. The DC scores 
were a person by situation interaction factor; the complexi­
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ty of the system is rather a person factor. Basing the Sum 
scores and DC scores on the same data probably would have 
produced redundant information; this situation would proba­
bly have produced less reliable complexity scores since the 
data base would have included only four elements. 
The question does arise as to why a model could be found 
to explain some of the variance associated with variation in 
the first block of trials of Chicken, but not for the other 
blocks. However, the STEPWISE data for the type of Chicken 
behavior indicated that as play progressed, the best model 
for prediction contained less constructs. It was concluded 
from the group data that subjects may have used fewer 
constructs to guide behavior in later trials. If this is so, 
then, for purposes of understanding behavior in later trials, 
DC scores contained irrelevant data. DC scores indicated the 
degree to which subjects differentiated the stimulus 
opponents on constructs both relevant and irrelevant to their 
anticipation of the situation. Thus, for analysis of later 
trials, even DC-Provided may have contained a large amount of 
"error" variance. 
Nevertheless, on the first two blocks of trials, DC-
Provided scores were related to the standard deviation of 
Chicken play by individual subjects. This allows the conclu­
sion that as one construes people alike, he acts in similar 
fashion toward them. As a person anticipates situations or 
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people differently, his behavior varies. To understand or 
predict when a person will act consistently, one iBost know 
not only the construct dimensions used by the subject as rel­
evant for anticipating events, but how much the subject can 
differentiate on those dimensions. The review of the litera­
ture mentioned a dispute as to what deficiency is the basis 
for low intensity and consistency scores in thought-
disordered schizophrenia. The present data fit an argument 
that a very loose, unrelated system may not allow a person to 
apply his constructs consistently, thus producing the erratic 
behavior often associated with schizophrenia. 
While the present investigator is satisfied that 
personal constructs are related to behavior, and that 
constructs are responsible at least in part for consistency 
and diversity of behaviDC- the nata have also made his a%sre 
of the difficulties in supporting this concept experimental­
ly. a number of factors appear necessary for consideration 
when the experimental sample is greater in size than one 
subject. Carlson's (1971) question about the person in per­
sonality research is very pertinent. When the data were 
analyzed using the kind of Chicken moves as the dependent 
variable, the individual was somewhat lost. This type of 
analysis is in answer to Carlson's questions 6f whether all 
people are alike or whether members of a particular group are 
alike but different from members of another group (males 
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versus females, for example in these data). In the present 
case, group data revealed ratings on certain constructs by 
members of the group were associated with more cautious 
Chicken behavior. This type of analysis allows an 
investigator to establish which constructs the group finds 
useful for anticipation of events. This approach is one way 
of studying the content of the construct system. The problem 
is that in some cases, given subjects within the sample pool 
may not be using the "group" constructs, nor can the experi­
menter be certain ahead of time that he has provided relevant 
constructs for the group. This method of analysis made it 
possible with the STEPWISE program to discard irrelevant 
constructs. The disadvantage is that to make such 
comparisons across the group, constructs must be provided and 
the experimenter may not be using the constructs ordinarily 
used by the individual subjects. 
Carlson (1971) also suggested that light could be 
focused on some unresolved problems by examining systematic 
differences within the individual. This was the focus of 
this investigation when the relationship of a subject's 
differentiation of construct ratings to variation in his be­
havior was analyzed. The advantage to this approach is that 
the individual can use the constructs he wishes. The disad­
vantage is that the experimenter still has irrelevant 
constructs in his data, and, as with DC scores, both relevant 
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and irrelevant constructs are given egual weight. This 
method also allowed the varying differences in the individu­
al's construct system to be taken into account through cogni­
tive complexity measures. As with the group method, there 
are still problems with making sure one is examining data 
using relevant constructs. Unless the constructs are provid­
ed, one has little knowledge about the content of the system, 
but with the more individual method, the subject can use 
whichever constructs he himself finds relevant. 
Another problem is that the relevant constructs may 
change over time, ' In a short period of time, an experimenter 
would usually not be willing to interrupt a subject, 
searching for which constructs he was using. The present 
investigation indicated that posibly subjects do not change 
the construct ratings over à short time, bnt rather they 
change which constructs are used to anticipate behavior. If 
an investigator has a larger number of construct ratings 
ahead of time, perhaps the problem would' be solved. In the 
investigation of long term change, the Reptest can be repeat­
ed. 
There is one final thing of note. In this study no at­
tention was given to the content of the construct system. 
Duck {1973a) has pointed out the value of this type of inves­
tigation. 
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Finally, one might ask how this small piece of research 
fits into the overall picture of psychology. Obviously, this 
is only a small piece of evidence for the validity of 
I 
Personal Construct Theory. But as more and more evidence is 
amassed, the skeletal theory takes on flesh. It is the 
ramifications of the theory that are important for the ap­
plied practitioner. Knowledge of how one interprets the en­
vironment or how the self is perceived helps in predicting 
one*3 behavior. Changing a person's constructs can have an 
effect on his behavior. Enlarging a person's construct 
system should enable him to exhibit more diverse behavior. 
In the field of cognition, much research has been done 
looking for the strategies which people use to encode what 
they learn. Constructs are a form of code. If basic experi­
mental psychologists are interested in which strategies of 
encoding enhance learning, counseling psychologists are like­
wise interested in which constructions lead to more adaptive 
behavior. If basic research endeavors to ascertain how to 
change strategies of encoding, counseling psychologists are 
interested in how to change people's construction of events. 
On the more applied level, Ellis' (1973) rational-
emotive approach to therapy is a method of changing a 
client's constructs. With this type of therapy, clients 
often learn to be more discriminant in their constructions, 
Desensitization is another method with the same goal—change. 
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With this procedure an attempt is made to have the client 
construe a feared situation as nondangerous. Kelly's fixed 
role therapy is most obviously an attempt to help a client 
construe the environment differently. In learning terms, the 
role play provides reinforcement through more adaptive antic­
ipation of events; behavior (and the constructions) are 
thereby changed. 
In this paper, emphasis has been placed on the relation­
ship of personal constructs to molecular behaviors. That 
this relationship holds true is important to therapists since 
their task often involves helping a client change molar be­
havioral styles through changes in more discrete, molecular 
behaviors. Loveless and Brody (1974) stated this very 
succinctly in their paper on the cognitive base of 
psychotherapy. They wrote; 
The major category of patient's difficulties consists of 
automatic, reflex-like, often times unconscious modes of 
judging in thought, mood, and behavior, which are 
ineffective, inappropriate, and painful. For the cogni­
tive therapist, the global notion of a complete person­
ality change as a goal is too general a notion to permit 
careful analysis. Such change is better understood as 
consisting of a series of discrete psych^lDgical changes 
in the client which interlocks conceptually and affec­
tively to result in modified behavior patterns. The 
therapist's task is to examine specific 
cognitive-affective-behavioral reaction sequences 
singly and to generate conceptual keys to guide behavior 
modification, (p. 135) 
However, most therapists will willingly state that just 
telling a client about a different construction is often not 
enough to change the client's behavior. For this writer 
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therefore, further research should be directed toward ascer­
taining the best means of helping a client to change 
constructions for various problem behaviors. It is the 
feeling of this writer thay no one method will prove to be a 
panacea. The rational-emotive type therapy seeks to change 
the constructs first; fixed role therapy, on the other hand, 
appears to start by changing some behaviors, providing the 
client with the impetus to form a new construct system for 
later behaviors, in all probability, the most effective pro­
cedure will end up being different for various problems and 
persons. Nevertheless, this writer is convinced that 
Personal Construct Theory offers a useful framework within 




This paper began with a discussion of the current 
developments in the field of personality theory. Recent 
review articles have centered on the importance of the person 
by situation interaction in understanding behavior. To 
achieve this understanding, consistencies must be found in 
personal behavior, or else the world becomes totally 
unpredictable. 
It was posited that cognitive factors may provide some 
light on this often illusive search for consistency in per­
sonality studies. In the present instance, the focus was on 
the personal constructs of the individual as described by 
George Kelly, kn extensive review of the literature 
pertaining to Personal Construct Theory revealed that re­
search in the area «as alaost completely limited either (i) 
to characteristics of the constructs themselves and their 
measurement, (2) to paper and pencil measures of behavior, or 
(3) to gross, molar types of behavior. Therefore, this in­
vestigation attempted to study the relationship between 
personal constructs and a more molecular behavior, 
specifically, gambling in a Chicken situation against a pre­
viously unknown opponent. 
Results indicated that such a relationship exists. This 
relationship can only be shown, however, under limited 
conditions. It appeared that as people construe people or 
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situations the saae, they behave consistently, as 
constructions of the environment differ, behavior varies. 
Placing these results in the context of the discussion of the 
person by situation interaction, it appeared that person, 
situation, and interaction effects were all important. 
Differences in construct ratings were found in connection 
with both person and situation variables. From the results 
obtained, it appeared reasonable to conclude that the inter­
action can at least be partly explained by the application of 
specific constructs by the subjects to the situations at 
hand. 
But, as noted, these relationships were shown under lim­
ited conditions. To establish the relationship between 
constructs and behavior, it appears necessary to use 
constructs which the subject finds relevant to the situation. 
These constructs can change in the course of an investiga­
tion, The complexity of a subject's construct system must be 
taken into consideration, since the difference between vari­
ous construct dimensions is not the same for all subjects, 
nor do all subjects generally make the same amount of 
.distinctions in their construals of other people. 
Difficulty was also noted in the experimental methods 
used to examine the relationship between constructs and be­
havior. ahsn the data were pooled across the group, 
relationships were found between specific constructs and the 
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type of behavior exhibited in the Chicken situation. With 
this type of analysis, however, data based on an individual 
who finds different constructs relevant as compared to the 
group usage, end up contributing to error variance. On the 
other hand, when the analysis concerned variation of con­
struction and variation in behavior, again a relationship was 
found. But in that case, all constructs are treated as of 
egual relevance, again introducing error variance into the 
data. In either case, one has the problem that construct 
relevance changes over time. 
Overall, this investigator is satisfied that personal 
constructs are related to behavior on the more molecular 
level. Evidence has been obtained to show that as a subject 
perceives stimulus à and B similarly, he behaves in like 
fashion toward them. If stimuli c and D are construed 
differently from & and B, behavior varies accordingly. 
This investigator is also satisfied that at least some 
of the variance associated with the person by situation in­
teraction noted in personality studies can be accounted for 
by Personal Construct Theory. Finally, a brief attempt was 
made to tie these results to investigations in the field of 
cognition and therapy. Suggestions for further research cen­
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AND SAMPLE PROTOCOL WITH CALCULATIONS 
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ROIE SHEET 
Directions; On the Grid Sheet, write the names of the 
persons who fit the descriptions below in the spaces on 
the left that correspond by letter. You may use initials 
if you wish. 
A. Your own name. 
B. Your father or the person who has played the part of a 
father in your life. 
C. Your mother or the person who has played the part of a 
mother in your life. 
D. The brother nearest your age. If you have no brother, the 
person who is most like one. 
E. The sister nearest your age. 
person who is most like one. 
.
If you have no sister, the 
FROM THIS POINT ON, DO NOT REPEAT ANY NAMES. IF A PERSON 
HAS AIBEADY BEEN LISTED, SIMPLY MAKE A SECOND CHOICE. 
F. Your spouse or closest friend of the opposite sex. 
G. Your closest present friend of the same sex. 
H. A very aggressive or competitive person known to you 
personally. 
I. The present neighbor you know best. 
J. 'ibe teacher who influenced you the most when you were in 
your teens. 
K. The teacher whose point of view you found most 
objectionable. 
1. An employer or supervisor under whom you have worked. 
ÎÎ. ft person wactn you would racst like to help or for whom you 
feel sorry. 
K. A very cooperative and kind person known to you 
personally. 
0. A person whom you dislike. 
P. A person with whom you feel very comfortable and at ease. 
G. Your ideal self - yourself as you would like to be. 
251 
CONSTRUCT SHEET 
In the left column below, there are three letters in 
each line; they refer to the persons with the same letters 
on the GEID SHEET, fisk yourself about these 3 persons, In 
what important way are two of these people ali,ke and, at the 
same time, essentially different from the third?" 
After you have decided what the important similarity is, 
write an adjective or short phrase descriptive of this 
similarity in thp blank under CONSTRUCT. When you have 
completed the construct cslumn, write down what you believe 
to be the opposite of these constructs in the blanks under 
CCHIBaST. 
PERSONS CONSTRUCT CONTRAST 
1. JIM 
2. ACH 
3. EI H _j6kCI]l_ 
(t. Hcp 
5. DCQ ÙMJjÂtjàc 
6. AIN Jllfifijf 
7. FGQ 
8. F HN 
9. Gij — 
10. EPS — 
11. EKL 
12. DJK 
13. HOP — —— 
m. M-JMs:éii^ L 
15. ADF 
16. CKO 
17. GLN .£déf?jj^ , 
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GRID SHEET 
A8 9^ 9? 0^ 75 95 10 5^ 
—j 
fç '^ 0 as 9ù /Û «1 
.X<2.b.O 10 Sil 
5 
/i) 5 fâ •75 /o (û 75 
c tf\(krif 45" no yy jû Zù 5b 25 is Jô 0^ 
I (aÙ V 25 n ff S lô ff i>0 IÔ 15 é>0 75 
ys /S' 3f 5 f9 15 50 y5 /ô gf 
F Don y n A u to n fy 5 W 40" JO 
G Ddvleng ÎS % (b 0^ 9û Sû So %" /o 
H _ _ |7^  fû éû fû Sà 9o 60 f5 So m:id % éo 
I (yrahJiyjâ. B 1S 5o 5b s fû yo âù ÙO So 2Ô 5(; IS to % 
J  M s .  f là 3o 5S p 90 5ô ff Sù %r So /ù 7J 10 AS 
K |Ar S 55 Sù Ho no 5 5û 5û I^ Q IS 9o IS 
L (^ocje. r  5ù f? )0 5 <^ û 26 5b isO y) ¥â Va to 
M R 0^ n tù Jû % Jû 19 A 3û So 20 7S Ù0 Jo %7 
. . 
s (Xùk i 'A ïù ù>% lO /O 96 Jo \^ 'S S's 
i 1' 
7ùh>o So \ f û  7-5 j5 
L 
\vo i% 
C Sus. • n6 25" fP 5o 5^ Jù $ù 5ù k 5ù|f4 50 7(0 s^Us 
F Ga'il )&_ fo 1S !ù 6 fo &û 
4. 
S(j \ (f?û So fÙ 
I 
c __ IS / ! /  lo 5?|S5 2i 75 / IS 
1 2 i  4 0 6 7 ri 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 
r,atç each person iis-.ei anov^; on a scale of 1 to 99. Use one 
pair of descriptors (i. e. c ens tract and contrast) at a time, 
rating all persons before usinq the next pair of descriptors. 
Each column is numbered at the bottoE to correspoEd with the 
'It-scriptors. Use the following rating scale: 
9 9 7 5 50 25 1 
ÎÎDCH SOMEWHAT CAS'T SOMEWHAT MUCH 
like LIKE DECIDE, LIKE LIKE 




GBÏD SHEET II 25 50 25 1 
MUCH ~SÔiiiHAT~" CÂN'Î'T SOMEWHAT MUCH 
LIKE LIKE DECIDE, LIKE LIKE 




JMmA!Â£S& -ÂûMAÂ^ âÈ. 
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& m DO n M# C/1 
Transformed Grid 
lenentsi 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Const ructs2 
8 9 10 11 12 1 3 in 15 16 17 
104 205 21 0 -67 16.4 -84 67 164 52 a 0 -52 -67 128 -128 104 
25 -67 -128 -67 - 57 0 104 - 128 233 - 164 -25 0 67 -128 128 -128 67 
1 0<4 164 52 117 -1 28 — 16(4 25 128 13 128 -84 0 -67 25 104 -128 84 
13 25 52 -67 164 104 -164 - 13 233 -164 52 233 25 52 -67 25 67 
^Oli 117 104 117 -67 - 164 233 104 13 104 67 0 -13 128 -25 -128 123 
164 205 128 128 -1 28 -164 128 164 -1 64 164 -84 -126 -13 128 128 - 128 128 
128 104 1 17 128 -1 28 - 164 128 128 - 84 123 -84 0 -13 -67 104 -128 128 
67 0 25 25 1 28 0 128 0 164 25 104 0 128 104 -84 128 25 
67 0 25 0 25 -164 128 0 -84 25 -84 0 -84 0 67 - 128 67 
0 -233 -1 28 -52 13 84 128 0 233 0 164 0 164 -128 67 -128 -67 
13 0 -25 -52 52 -164 164 0 -84 0 16» 233 128 -25 -67 128 -67 
164 0 1 17 117 -1 28 -164 164 128 -84 0 84 25 25 -25 -25 - 128 123 
128 128 164 84 - 1 28 233 - 84 164 - 84 164 -52 0 -84 67 25 -128 128 
1 28 47 1 64 -13 -1 28 164 -84 164 104 52 -52 0 128 57 - 6 7 -25 128 
1 —67 -67 -128 0 104 0 0 0 0 0 104 0 128 0 -84 0 -67 
1 28 84 1 28 67 -1 28 - 164 84 128 25 104 -84 0 25 0 -67 -128 128 
23J 67 233 233 -233 -233 233 233 1 28 123 67' 0 1 3 -67 67 -233 233 
84 0 104 104 -1 04 0 0 67 67 104 84 128 25 0 67 128 128 
-25 25 -25 25 67 0 0 67 67 84 128 128 128 0 84 128 104 
-67 '] -104 -67 -67 0 0 -67 128 -67 67 67 233 -67 67 67 -67 
67 0 67 0 67 0 0 67 -67 123 -67 67 -6 7 0 -67 67 0 
Mean = 28.165 Standard Deviation = 102.377 
Provided Constructs 
Element Construct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Rick 0 128 67 0 128 0 25 0 0 
Barb 0 10 4 233 128 25 104 233 128 0 
Pau 1 -67 0 233 128 -67 -67 128 -128 -1 28 
Dot 67 0 -67 -6 7 0 0 -84 128 25 
^ Element s fl-Q listed on Role Sheet; R = Bicfc; S = Barb; T = Paul; D = Dot. 
^Constructs listed on Construct Sheet. 
standardized Grid 
Elements 1 Constructs^ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
A 57a 672 493 472 4 07 632 390 537 6 32 523 472 472 421 407 597 34 7 574 
B 496 407 347 407 4 07 472 574 347 700 312 448 472 537 347 597 34 7 537 
C 574 632 523 586 3 47 312 496 597 485 597 390 472 407 496 574 34 7 554 
D 485 496 523 407 6 32 574 312 459 700 312 523 700 496 523 407 496 537 
E 574 586 574 586 4 07 312 700 574 485 574 537 472 459 597 448 347 592 
F 632 672 597 597 3 47 31 2 597 632 312 632 390 347 459 597 597 34 7 597 
G 597 574 586 597 347 312 597 597 390 597 390 472 459 407 574 347 597 
H 537 472 496 496 5 97 47 2 597 472 632 496 574 472 597 574 390 597 496 
I 537 472 496 472 4 96 312 597 472 390 496 393 472 390 472 537 347 537 
J 472 244 347 421 4 85 55ft 597 472 700 472 6 32 472 632 347 537 347 407 
K 485 472 448 421 523 312 632 472 390 472 632 700 597 448 407 597 407 
L 632 472 586 586 3 47 31 2 632 597 390 472 554 496 496 448 448 347 592 
S 597 597 632 554 3 47 70 0 390 632 390 632 421 472 390 537 496 347 597 
N 5 97 518 632 459 3 47 63 2 390 632 574 523 421 472 597 537 407 448 597 
0 407 407 347 472 5 74 47 2 472 472 472 472 574 472 597 472 390 472 407 
P 597 554 597 537 347 312 554 597 496 574 393 472 496 4 72 407 347 597 
Q 700 537 700 700 2 44 244 700 700 5 97 597 537 472 485 407 537 244 700 
E 554 472 574 574 3 70 47 2 472 537 537 574 554 597 496 472 537 597 597 
S 448 496 448 496 5 37 472 472 537 537 554 597 597 597 472 554 597 574 
T 407 472 370 40 7 4 07 47 2 472 407 597 407 537 537 700 407 537 537 407 
C 537 472 537 472 5 37 4 72 472 537 407 597 407 537 407 472 407 537 472 
const ructs_ 
Ele isr.t Cons tract 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Pick 472 59 7 537 47 2 597 472 496 472 4 72 
Har b 472 574 700 597 496 574 700 597 472 
Paul 407 472 700 59 7 407 407 597 347 347 
Dot 537 472 407 407 472 472 390 597 496 
lElements A-Q listed on Role Sheet; H = Rick; S = Barb; T = Paul; U = Dot. 
^Constructs listed on Construct Sheet. 
Differentiation of Construction (DC) Scores 

























DC-Own = 736 4 
DC-Provided = 6052 
DC-Total = 13416 
Original Grid Transformed for FIC analysis* 
Elements Constructs 
1 2 3 # 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
k 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 u 0 2 2 l "  •~2  ~ï 
B 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 0 1 2 1 2 1 
C 1 1 1 1  2 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 
D 1  1 1 2 1 1  2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
E 1 1 1  1  2 2 1  1 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 
F  1 1 1 1  2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 
G 1  1 1  1  2 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 1 
H 1 0 1 1  1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 
I  1 0 1 0 1  2 1 0 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 2 1 
J 0 2 2 2  1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 
K 1 0 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 
L 1 0 1 1  • 2 2  1 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 
a 1 1 1 1  2  1 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 
N 1  1  1 2 2  1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 2 1 
o 2  2  2  0  1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 
p  1 1  1  1  2  2 1 1  1 1 2 0 1 0 2 2 1 Q 1 1 1 1  2 2  1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 
S 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
S 2 1  2 1  1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
T 2 0 2  2  2  0 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 
u  1  0  1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1  0  
^Transfornation: 1-49 = 2; 50 = 0; 51-99 - 1» 
Fie Column (Construct) Comparisons: Relationships between Constructs 
Construct 
1 2 3 5 . 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 1M
 
13 14 15 16 17 
1 - 11 18 11 - 14 -9 11 14 10 15 -12 6 -11 8 -10 -14 17 
2 - 13 12 - 11 -1 1 -9 14 8 13 -8 4 -9 11 8 -9 14 
3 - 14 - 15 -9 9 14 -10 15 -13 -4 - 14 11 -11 -14 18 
4 - - 12 -12 12 15 -10 14 -10 -7 -11 12 10 -12 1 5 
5 - 9 -9 - 12 - 12 -11 13 5 12 8 - 14 16 -15 
6 - - 18 -10 10 -9 7 -5 8 1 1 -7 10 - 10 
7 - 9 -9 10 8 -3 9 -13 9 -12 1 1 
8 - -9 18 -9 8 — 10 9 9 -13 13 
9 - 10 13 6 15 9 11 — 11 12 
10 - -13 -5 - 11 9 10 -13 14 
11 - 8 16 -9 -12 14 -12 
12 - 7 -7 -5 8 4 
13 - -10 -13 13 -1 1 
14 - - 10 9 1 1 
15 - -13 12 








Compare Columns 6 and 7 
Number of Matches (1-1, 2-2) = 1 
Number of Opposites (2-1, 1-2) =13 
Mumber of ? Matches (0-0) = 5 
Relationship = Opposites ^  ? Hatches = -18 
Constructs 1 and 2: 
Compare Columns 1 and 2 
Number of Matches (1-1, 2-2) = 
Number of Opposites (2-1, 1-2) = 
Number of ? Matches (0-0) = 
Relationship = Matches + ? Matches = 
Fie Row (Person) Comparison; Relationships between Constructs 
Element 
A B C D E F G H I J K L H H 0 P 0 R S T D 
A - 8 12 - 7 1 1 10 1 2 -7 9 -7 -9 7 13 12 -9 10 12 8 5 -7 6 
B 9 -8 — 1 0 -8 9 -10 7 10 -6 7 -10 9 -7 9 10 -7 -9 10 -9 
C - - 10 15 15 1 5 9 11 -10 -10 9 14 12 -9 14 14 9 7 -10 6 
D — -8 -12 -12 10 -3 -7 8 -8 -9 1 1 -4 -8 -9 8 8 8 6 
E — 13 1 3 11 9 -10 -8 11 12 12 -7 14 14 9 7 -10 6 
F - 1 5 7 1 1 -10 -10 10 1 4 10 -8 12 12 8 -8 -12 7 
G - -8 12 -10 -8 1 1 1 4 10 -9 13 14 8 -7 -10 7 
H - 9 -8 9 9 -8 9 7 10 10 11 9 -10 3 
I - -8 -8 8 10 -7 -10 10 9 -7 -7 -10 10 
J - 10 -8 -11 -9 9 -9 8 -5 6 8 -6 
K - 1 1 -1 1 -9 8 -7 -7 -7 6 9 7 
L - 8 8 -5 11 12 10 -6 -9 7 
H - 13 -9 11 11 8 -7 -11 7 
H - -7 13 11 8 -7 -9 6 
O - -8 -7 -8 8 7 -8 
P 14 10 8 -9 7 
Q - 11 9 -7 -5 
B - 13 10 10 
S - 10 -9 
T - -12 
Computation of Eelationshlje 
betgeen: 
Elements A and Bs 
Compare Bows h and B 
iHElber of Matches (1-1, 2-2) 
number of Opposites (2-1, 1-2) 
Bnmber of ? Hatches (0-0) 
Selationshxp = Hatches * ? Hatches 
C and D: 
compare Roes C and D: 
7 number of Hatches (1-1, 2-2) = 6 
6 Bumber of Opposites (2-1, 1-2) =10 
1 Bum be r of ? Matches (0-0) = 0 




Clusters are formed by 
connecting all constructs 
which have a relationship of 





Clusters are formed by 
connecting all elements which 
have a relationship of 13 or 















FICC = 11 












FICp = 12 
SuE-P = 20 
Sua-C score equals the 
number of significant matches 
(16 or greater) in FIC 
construct matrix. 
Sam-P score equals the 
number of significant matches 
{13 or greater) in FIC 
lelement laatris. 
FIC Total = 23 










Each of you will be involved in a situation which has 
certain payoffs. You cannot by yourself control the payoffs; 
rather the outcome will depend on what the other person doss 
as well as what you do. You are person 1, while Person 2 is 
one of the people you have just seen on videotape, 
\t the top of this page is a matrix indicating the 
payoffs. Your payoffs are always on the lower half of each 
cell. There are several trials against a given videotaped 
person. A trial consists of your choosing Blue or Red, 
Person 2 has indicated his choice on vid-sotape. 
If Yon choose BLUE, two possibilities occur -- either 
you both gain 10 points (Person 2 chose Blue), or you gain % 
points {Person 2 chose Red and earned 15 points). If YOO 
choose RED, you have a chance to gain 15 points (Person 2 
chose Blue and earned 4 points), or you both gain zero points 
(since he chose Red) , 
The goal is to earn as many points as possible. You 
therefore should try and figure out what choice Person 2 is 
likely to have made if you want to gain as much as you can. 
Blue offers intermediate gains, while Red offers both higher 
and lower gains. Person 2's score is not important for your 
purposes. 
For every 10 points you earn throughout the research, 
you will gain a chance in a lottery. Prizes include 3 cash 
prizes of $5,00, and 7 prizes of *2,50. Ho one will be 
awarded more than one prize. Since approximately 60 people-
are participating in this research, you have about a 1 in 6 
chance of winning. The more points you earn, the better your 
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odds. 
Practically speaking, you are to indicate your choice 
for each trial in the first column of your response sheet. 
Then indicate your guess as to the other person's decision in 
the second column. All choices are final, once you have in­
dicated your choice, you will not be allowed to change to the 
other alternative. You will not be allowed to communicate 
with each other. This means no sighing, laughing, or any 
other form of communication which might indicate to others 
how you feel about the various decisions made. After each 
trial has been completed, I will indicate what choice the 
other person has made, and you may write your gain in the 
third column. While the number of points you earn does not 
affect your credit for participation in this research, it 
does affect your chances in the lottery. Therefore, 
considering what you know about the other person, try to gain 
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Experimenter: What î would like you to do first is tell th* 
people who are watching this tape something about 
yourselves, sort of introduce yourselves, tell us 
something about your background, what you do. 
Rick: OK. Why don't you go first? 
Barb: My name is Barbara Tirrell, and I'm from New Jersey. 
At ^he present time I am an instructor of nursing at 
Iowa Methodist Hospital. I have obtained a degree in 
nursing. ... That's good. 
Rick: OK. Ah.. My name is Rick Tirrell, and I'm married to 
Barbara, and I'm a graduate student at Iowa S^ate in 
psychology. And I guess that's about what I do. 
Experimenter: Could you tell us something about why you got 
into those professions? 
Barb: This may sound corny, but I always wanted to be a 
nurse. And the reason that I got into instructing is 
because I was not satisfied with the job that I had 
prior to that. And job opportunities in this area 
weren't the greatest, so that's how T got into 
instructing. But I always wanted to be a nurse. 
Pick: OK, Ah... 
Experimenter: What is it about nursing that's attractive? 
Barb: To me? 
Experimenter: Yes. 
Barb: Now, or when I first... 
Experimenter: Now. 
Barb: The fact that job opportunities are available. The 
fact that the pay scale is basically competitive with 
other professions. The fact that I can go someplace 
else and still get a job. Ah..., and the fact that I 
can feel like I'm really doing something, which is a 
need that I have. 
Experimenter: And you? 
Rick: (Laugh) Oh ! Well: That's a difficult question, I 
think. Uh.o. How did I get into psychology? I think 
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mostly I like to deal with people, àn3 in picking a 
profession, it's hard to find one where you just have, 
where that's what you do. Usually you do something, and 
the dealing with people, that's on the side. Uh... So 
if you're going to be a public relations man, you have 
to know about business and things like that, and also 
one of the skills you have to have is to deal with 
people. But one thing I really like is just focusing on 
dealing with people, and so I really enjoy the 
interactions and things like that, and 
Barb: I don't think that's only in psychology. 
Rick; OK. 
Barb: I think that we do that also. 
Rick: OK. (Laugh) My point there was that you need to, in 
your field, you need to know about medications and 
treatments, and... 
Barb; Well, hopefully you would too. 
Rick; OK, 
Barb; Hell, I talk about this all the time. 
Rick; OK, My point wasn't that only psychologists deal with 
people, but that what attracted me to it %as that that's 
what it focuses on. OK? So that's what got me into it. 
Experimenter; Can you tell us something about your hobbies, 
or what you do for recreation? Hobbies is a corny worl. 
Barb; Well, I've always liked to do sports, hobbies, such as 
swimming, tennis. Those I get a lot of enjoyment out 
of. But since I moved to Iowa, I also have done a lot 
of cooking and domestic types of things, ah ... 
Rick: Canning, 
Barb; What do you call that thing? 
Sick; Canning. 
Barb; Yeh. And wait a minute, I just finished that thing, a 
crewel type thing. 
Rick: tJh hum, needlepoint. 
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Barb: Yeh, that's what I'm into now. 
Rick; Yeh, she's really become talented, craftsy. That's 
mostly lately, right? 
Barb: Yeh. 
Experimenter: How about you? 
Rick: Mostly ... anything that can get rae to relax and enjoy 
some time, like o.. tennis and swimming I like a lot. 
It takes a whole block of time to do it. That's nice 
and I enjoy that. Also just going out for an evening, 
like that, relaxing, maybe going out to dinner. I 
really enjoy that kind of thing. 
Experimenter: How about competitive sports? 
Barb: I love it, (Laugh) I have always liked competition. 
However, I'm a terrible sport, and I only play the game 
to win. 
Sick: Yeh, she beat me one time 19 times in a row at ping-
pong. All I wanted to do-was win once. And I had 
trouble even doing that. 
Barb: Even when we go bowling, I have to win. 
Rick: Yeh, we've known each other about five years, I guess, 
something like that, and just two weeks ago was the 
first time I ever beat Barbara in bowling. So, (laugh) 
you might say my ego has been boosted. Oh... 
Experimenter: Speaking of competitive sports, Iowa State is 
building a new football stadium, I think to the cost of 
seven million dollars. What do you think about that? 
Barb: I think it's terrible. I think that much money should 
go for something more worthwhile, really. There are so 
many oth3r things that need to be done. They had a good 
stadium and they waited until ... and this one fell 
down. All that money and all that planning and it's not 
even good. And it's not even finished. 
Rick: Oh,,. I happen to have a different type, kind of a 
different view. Seven million dollars is an awful lot 
to spend. But, a lot of these sports type things pay 
for themselves, you know. 
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Barb: At seven bucks a ticket, I should hope so. 
Hick: Oh... Spectators come and pay a lot of money, appar­
ently it must be worth it. The teams are very much 
self-supporting. I don't know if they're money-making 
or not. I think that sports seems to be carrying its 
own weight, and if they have enough money to build a 
seven million dollar stadium heh... 
Experimenter: would you say that sports in the university is 
a good thing, or is it only to make money, or neutral? 
Sick: Yeh. I don't know, I'm sort of neutral about it. If 
people want to get into sports, that's fine. The thing 
that I don't feel too good about is when sports, when 
the university becomes known for sports. 
Barb: I don't think that's so bad. It's when the students 
don't have to go to class because they are in sports all 
the time, when they are never worried about their 
grades and only worry about the meet that's coming up, 
Bick: Yeh, 
Experimenter: Let me change the subject. The women's 
Liberation Movement is popular today. What are your 
views about that? How do you see it? what do you think 
its goals are? or should be? 
Barb; I think it has good points and bad points. Some of 
the things that they are asking for, uh, many women had 
a long time ago. And some of the things they are asking 
for are hurting others. Like the statistics show that 
there are less people in public office now that the 
Women's Liberation Movement has come by, that are women, 
simply because the public now is more aware of the fact 
that women are fighting. But there are a lot of women 
who never did get equal wages, equal opportunities, and 
sometimes they are getting it, sometimes to the disad­
vantage of other people. But they are getting a lot of 
things now that they didn't have before. 
Pick; It seems that the Women's Liberation Movement, you 
know, the underlying causes are really good. ... HK, 
they are saying that women have been getting less wages 
for the same job, and all these things are true. Yet, 
at the same time, there is so much more that will have 
to be done before it will all balance out. Ancî so, 
whereas one particular woman was in public office and 
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now people aren't voting for her because they are 
thinking, "Well, she's a woman, and she must he into 
this Women's Lib stuff." And so it's not balanced at 
all. And, uh... in all competition levels they are 
starting to look into how many women do we have, how 
many blacks do we have, and things like that. And so 
for them to actually get a fair deal, you know... it's 
going to take such a long time. 
Experimenter: How are you going to feel when you qo looking 
for a job, and you're a white male... 
Pick: Like a minority. Although it's true — 
Barb: Well, though, men have always had it, so now if they 
feel discrimination, they'll know what it is. It's the 
first time that men have ever really been discriminated 
against. 
Sick: OK. That's true. Well, maybe it's true. Maybe as a 
group, yeh--
Barb; White males, especially. They have always had an 
upper hand. 
Rick; Yeh... One thing that seems to me to be, that works 
against these minority groups, is, they'll say to a 
graduate school, the Woman's Lib group might say, "You 
need x amount of women." or the blacks might say? "You 
need X percent black, well, say 10% black, and you have 
a program of 100 people. Then you need 10 blacks, and 
that's all you need, you know. So we want to know, do 
you have those 10 blacks?" Well, maybe if it wasn't for 
that demand, maybe they would have had 15 qualified 
blacks, that they would have hired* OK, this typically 
doesn't happen, OK. Typically they wouldn't have that 
many more. But I think sometimes it works against them 
because now they say. "Good, we've got our 10, and we 
don't have to look at any more applications from blacks 
or from women." 
Barb; Or you can get a lot of unqualified people who aren't 
motivated. 
Rick: And they might take the first 10 who come in and say, 
"OK, now we've got them. That's great. We've got our 
blacks; we've made everybody happy, and we'll look at 
the rest of the applicants." And then that's unfair 
because these black people coming in may be less quali­
fied, or the women that they accept may be less guali-
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fied for these jobs. Yet ... OK, that could happen. I 
don't know if it does, you know. I don't know how many 
programs would actually hire more than this quota 
they've been given. So ... 
Barb: I don't know, though. I'm in nursing. It's really 
strange, because where I'm employed they have tvo males 
in a class of 102 or less. And people bend over 
backwards for male nurses. They just want to keep them 
so much, and the guys that we have are real good. But 
then you say, "How listen, hum, uh-huh! 
Rick: Yeh, real strange. 
Barb; That's right. Right off the bat! 
Rick: I understand, too, that once male nurses get in jobs, 
they get treated preferentially, sort, of. 
Barb; It seems that way. Yes, it does. Then again, while 
they are a minority, they are a majority in supervisory 
positions. 
Experimenter: Again, I am going to change the subject. Some 
of the people are on trial for their involvement in the 
Watergate affair, what do you think should happen to 
them? 
Rick; QK..W huh... Hell, I don't know. I'm glad I'm not on 
the jury for one thing, I don't have a lot of feelings, 
you know, of vengeance, "Let's get these guysï Let's 
really show them!" 
Barb; well, what prisons are they going to? 
Rick: OK. Your point is that they are going to the more 
plush... 
Barb: Yeh, And what kind of sentences are they serving, 
anyway? 
Rick: The low ones. 
Barb: The short ones, yeh! 
Pick: OK. That®s true. They are getting off easy in terms 
of what the sentencing is and things like that. Yet, I 
think there is a lot of punishment going on in addition 
to the sentencing. 
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Barb: oh ,  yeh. The big male ego. They had to lose their 
jobs, and they were convicted in society. 
Rick; Well, yeh, it's male ego, self concept, too. It's 
more than just saying, "Well, he's a male, so he feels 
defeated." I think it's a matter of being disgraced in 
front of the country. But these people are being 
punished regardless of whether they get sentenced, 
whether the Satergate jury unravels everything and 
sentences all those people that are to be sentenced. I 
think that there is enough punishing going on already. 
Barb: so, don't you think that somebody who's got a, 
who's on trial and gets a mistrial, or is convicted for 
something they didn't do, is just as disgraced in front 
of their profession. 
Rick: Oh, yes! Oh, sure. I mean ... Don't ... I don't 
remember who or anything like that, but one of the 
earliest Watergate hearings in the Senate, when John 
Dean said all his stuff, you know, they had an FBI agent 
who had been fired from the FBI, and disgraced, and 
couldn't find a job, how he and his family were in a po­
sition of, say, sort of hopelessness, because of this 
Watergate thing, and so ... you know, my feeling is, 
CK, if we are going to straighten this thing out, we've 
really got a mess. Here's an FBI guy. He's low man on 
the totem pole when it comes to the hierarchy of guilt 
and responsibility, and he was disgraced. His family 
was really wrecked. They had to move out of their town. 
He still hasn't been employed, things like that. So he 
really took it on the chin. This was before Dean, 
Mitchell, Erlichman, all those guys had been brought 
into the picture, and before Nixon was really accused of 
anything. So he really got screwed, they're no two ways 
about it, T3h,.. But now, you know, you say, "See what 
happened to him. Therefore, let's screw Nixon. Let's 
show Nixon a thing or two! We're gonna show him. We're 
gonna punish him. We're going to show him how much we 
hate him for what he's done," 
Barb: well, what have they done? 
Hick: What has who done? 
Barb: The press has always been against Nixon. So what else 
have they done to Nixon? Here he's dying himself. God! 
It's his own accord. We didn't do that to Nixon. 
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Pick: OK. Uh... I see that as a result of public opinion. 
Barb; But the press has always been against Nixon. 
Rick: nh huh. 
Barb: So what's that got to do with people trying to get 
him? 
Rick: OK ... No. The thing there... I think that there's a 
general public consensus that Nixon's a bum, and no 
matter what happens to him, that'll be good. 
Barb: I don't know. A lot of people that are polled say 
that he shouldn't get it, that he's suffered enough, 
just like you said. 
Rick: Uh huh. 
Experimenter: Let me just ask you one last question. Our 
time is coming to an end. Supposing, ... Barbara, 
you're a nurse, and Rick, you say you want to work with 
people. Supposing you're in the hospital, and somebody 
has been diagnosed as terminally ill. Maybe they've got 
another month, two months, dying of cancer, feeling very 
miserable. What do you think should be done in that 
situation? 
Barb; You can't die at that quick a rate - the choice - it's 
really even hard to discuss. There are so many things 
that enter into it. if the patient, l always call them 
patients. But is the patient alone? Do they have a 
family? Do they want to return home? Or do they want 
the companionship of other people in the hospital? Is 
that what they need? So you have to look at your pa­
tient individually, and then if they need companionship 
from one place or another, you try and get it for them 
so that they can possibly die with as much peace as is 
able for them. I believe that some patients should be 
sent home to die, because that's what some patients 
really want, and if their family can really handle it, 
then that's what they need. But then other people 
couldn't handle it or don't have anybody. Ind they 
should come, and we should be able to provide them with 
what they need, which isn't always the case either. 
Rick: I agree with that, and I think that one thing that 
should bo done is that the person should be told, you 
know, "fieh, you're dying. Here's the picture»" Because 
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it's he that's dying. He's doing the dying. He may not 
be aware of it, although, I believe, usually they are. 
Experimenter; Would you, would you ever support, say, 
hastening the end? 
Barb: That's on its way out. That used to be. There was a 
big movement in New York City on euthanasia and allowing 
mercy killings, etc., etc. However now the swing is 
toward "We're cutting them off too short. We've seen 
too many people recover." find I haven't been a nurse 
that long. But I've seen people that I have said I 
would never see again, find they recovered, walked out, 
and lived years. And so, I personally don't believe ia 
not starting extraordinary measures. However, there is 
a degree of extraordinary, find to me, certain measures, 
like to me, an iv is not extraordinary. It's basically 
normal in the hospital these days. But putting somebody 
on three or four different monitors and redoing 
everything is a little extraordinary. 
Experimenter: Is there anything you want to add? 
Rick; Yeh. Like, to me an extraordinary measure is 
something like a heart transplant, not even that. No 
problem. Sure, Do a heart transplant, Tf the guy has 
a bad heart, his heart's going to go, do a heart trans­
plant, you know. That kind of thing --
Barb; Yeh, but what kind of surgical risk is he? You could 
kill him. 
Pick: I am not as much in touch with this as Barbara is, be­
cause she can look at somebody's chart and say, '"îell, 
you know, this guy wouldn't make it through heart 
surgery. He wouldn't even make it through some small 
operation. His vital signs are such and such." So I'm 
not really as in touch with what's extraordinary and 
what's not. Yet to me, life should be preserved. And 
just everything should be done. 
Barb: Well, what's your definition of life? 
Experimenter; Well, I think we are going to stop or we'll go 
on all night. I want to thank you for this, I hope the 
subjects are now able to form an impression about you. 
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VIDEOTAPE II 
Experimenter: What I'd like to do, is begin by telling th? 
people who are watching, something about yourselves, 
your background, your occupations, why you are in those 
occupations. 
Paul: Well, I always wanted to be a teacher. It was 
something that I wanted to do since I was a freshman or 
sophomore in high school. And I kind of redefined my 
goals now and then, but pretty much I had pretty 
straight direction, I had purpose and what I wanted to 
do in straight focus. Got good grades, did well, I 
thought, you know, reasonably well through college, a ni 
got a job. And I guess that would be my goal in life, 
to be a teacher, maybe someday I could be an 
administrator. I'd like to do more research. I'd like 
to go half-time research, half-time teaching. 
Experimenter; What do you teach? 
Paul: Nell I teach the interpersonal courses in the speech 
department. The old term for it is public address. I 
teach business communication, group discussion, once in 
a while a 211 class. Those would be the main areas that 
I work in. 
Experimenter: How about you. Dot? 
Dot: Well, I'm also a teacher, but I wouldn't say it has 
always been my goal. For a long time I thought I'd like 
to be a nurse. But my mom and dad were teachers, and I 
think it was sort of a matter of proximity. I just sort 
of drifted that way after a while, and sort of midway 
through ray freshman year, I decided that I would go into 
elementary education, so now I'm teaching sixth grade. 
Experimenter; Have you always been teaching? 
Dot: No, I've taught off and on since we've been married. 
I taught full-time when we were first married. I taught 
fifth grade, and I have taught remedial reading part 
time. And now I'm back to teaching half-time, although 
it's more like full time. But I enjoy it. 
Experimenter: Car. you tell us something about your hobbies, 
maybe that's a bad word — your recreation — things you 
do besides your work or your job, and why you enjoy 
them? 
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Dot; Well, want me to go first, honey? 
Paul: Yeh, that'd be alright. 
Dot; OK. Well, I like to play the guitar. And T like to 
play box-hockey with Paul and our friends. Uh... 
Sometimes T go out hunting with Paul, but I don't really 
shoot, I just sort of spot the birds for him and he 
does the shooting. And ... I like to go biking and 
swimming, occasionally some sewing, ah... that's about 
it for my hobbies. 
Experimenter; What do you find enjoyable about that? 
Dot ; About which? 
Experimenter: Bell, why do you play box-hockey, for example? 
Dot; Well, it's a game that any age can play. So if we are 
playing with our children, they seem to be about as good 
at the game as we are. And if we are playing with my 
parents or some friends, it is just a fun game where it 
doesn't really matter whether you win or lose, or wheth­
er you're good at it or not. And that's the kind of 
game I enjoy. I don't care to play bridge or some of 
these games that are, you know, everybody is, you know, 
concentrating on strategy and so forth. I just like a 
game where you can visit and relax. 
Experimenter; How about you, Paul? 
Paul: My hobbies? 
Experimenter: Yes. 
Paul: Oh... Yeh... Well, like Dot said, we do play box-
hockey, and I do go hunting. I also enjoy playing 
basketball quite a bit. I like to go out and i enjoy 
the competitiveness, the excitement of playing 
basketball. Also I look at box-hockey the same way. 
One night I stayed up till two in the morning playing 
people in box-hockey, one-to-one, two-to one, just to 
keep playing and to have a good time. But I like to win 
at the game. I enjoy it. I enjoy hunting very much. 
There's something about the excitement of a kill. Uh... 
It sounds primitive, I guess, maybe, but I enjoy, for 
example, one time r was hunting ducks, and I shot a duck 
that was probably, oh, W, 50, 50 feet away, and it just 
folded in the air and hit on the ice and crashed down. 
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It's sort of a primitive thing, but the excitement of it 
is really attractive. And I enjoy it, I like to go 
out, and 1 like, when I hunt, when I play box-hockey, I 
like to do well at it, I also enjoy being outdoors, or 
the camaraderie with the people around me -- if we're 
playing box-hockey, that's important too. Uh.., 
Experimenter: OK. Let me change the subject. Paul, you're 
involved with the university, and Dot, obviously you 
live here in Ames, so to a degree it influences you, 
Iowa State is building a new stadium, football stadium, 
at the cost of roughly seven million dollars. What do 
you think about that, and in general, what do you think 
about sports in the university? 
Paul; Well, as far as the stadium goes, I'm against it for a 
number of reasons. I think that I like competition. I 
like sports and I enjoy basketball. I enjoy football, I 
do. But I think you can get an imbalance, and I think 
maybe we have reached the point where we are losing 
sight of the function of a university. I mean, what are 
we here for? As soon as we begin to put all our empha­
sis on athletics or something, I think we are losing our 
focus,, And I think as soon as the alumni, community 
members, state members begin to tell, dictate to the 
university, "Alright, look, we want to spend seven mil­
lion dollars on the stadium, and you're going to play 
good football. We're going to fire every coach until we 
get one that wins," I think that's a lot of crap, 
myself. I think that the university should provide edu­
cational activities, and I think that football is one 
small educational opportunity, just like theater, or 
something else. So, I guess that answers both 
questions. I've told you what I think of the stadium 
and what way I see athletics in the university. I see, 
I think athletics should be something for everyone. I 
think intramurals should be developed for everyone. 
Bight now I guess the goal this year is tc get 70% of 
the university in intramurals, jogging, volleyball, 
basketball. That's terrific! But to have 22 people, 
or, you know, two teams out there playing and spending 
all that money, I think that's counterproductive to the 
goals of the university. 
Experimenter; Dot, do you have any views on that? 
Dot; I really don't have any strong opinions. It does seem 
like an awful lot of money. But, I don't care much 
about football, and, maybe, you know, to the people who 
are big football fans, or to the alumni who are trying 
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to raise money, and you know, see this as an important 
part of the university, I'm sure they would view it 
differently. But I just, I really haven't kept track of 
what was going on when all the controversy was raging in 
the newspaper and so forth, you know. I was not all 
that interested in it. 
Experimenter; OK, Maybe you would be more interested in 
this topic. I'd like to ask you what your views are on 
Women's Liberation, What do you feel—i-t'-s-liberating 
them for, or to, or from? Why don't we leave it at that 
for the moment? 
Dot; OK. Do you want to answer that, Paul? 
Paul; Yeh, I will. I think that Women's lib in general is 
a good thing, I think that we all need our ayes open to 
realize the equality between the sexes. And I think 
that we need to be educated in this area. I think it's 
something, it's like, uh, like anything else, we need to 
become aware of it. Look at the energy crisis and all, 
you know. We all have enough energy and we are used to 
flicking a light on and off and what have you, and we 
begin to take things for granted, and they become 
ingrained in your thinking. And, uh, you don't really 
give it the attention. You don't have the sensitivity 
toward it that you should, and I think that women's Lib 
is thé same kind of thing. I think in terms of people's 
lib. I think there are all kinds of situations where 
people need to be liberateu, and I certainly think 
Women's Lib is an important one. I think some of them 
go way out. There are some kooks, just ah.,, I suppose 
they're against everything. And I think they're 
paranoid. They feel like the whole world is picking on 
them, and they are trying to start a movement. But, in 
general, the philosophy of the reasonable people in 
Women's Lib is healthy, I think it's important for us 
to draw the talents of our entire population out, so I 
opt for it. 
Experimenter; Dot? 
Dot: Well, I feel pretty much the sane way Paul feels. I'm 
not really a strong feminist. I mean I don't really go 
for some of the extreme things that I hear of in the 
movement. And yet, uh, even though I don't feel like a 
real radical women's Libber, I get rather incensed when 
I see some of the sexist things that they have in the 
textbooks that I'm actually teaching from right now, 
And I have even eliminated certain stories from the 
reader. I've skipped them. (We don't have the newest 
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set of textbooks around .) and I am really surprised at 
some of these things that I find. You know, it's "just 
... to me ... uh... you know, so far behind the times. 
And yet T feel like I'm very moderate when it comes to 
Women's Lib. I want to see equal pay. and of course in 
the field that I'm in, really, there is equal pay for 
the women. The two teachers that I have the most 
contact with are both men, the fourth and fifth grade 
teachers. They receive the same wage scale that the 
women teachers in the school receive. So I really don't 
feel this kind of prejudice or imbalance or anything. 
Experimenter; OK. Paul, supposing you were applying for a 
job, and, you know, for certain govermnent contracts 
there is a requirement now that, say, certain minorities 
be hired. Obviously many efforts are being made to hire 
women for many jobs where they haven't been hired be­
fore. Suppose you were applying for a job and you were 
faced with this obstacle, how would you feel? 
Paul: You mean, uh... 
Experimenter: Well, you're a white male ... 
Paul; If T had equal credentials with a woman and ... 
Experimenter: Yes. 
Paul: I felt like they would opt for her? Hell, I think 
that that's a lot of garbage. I think that we are 
getting some backlash here to the point where a woman, 
or a black even, will get hired above someone that 
actually has more solid credentials. I've seen this in 
a number of cases, not in, well, I've seen a couple in 
hiring, but particularly in committee assignments on 
campus. If you're a black woman, you're going to get 
put on a committee, maybe a prestigious committee 
somewhere, even a woman, put her, you know, everyone's 
drawn in for a committee and they're going to get put on 
the uh... they may chair it, you know. And this as far 
as I am concerned is backlash. I think it's 
unreasonable. What I would like to see, and what I see 
the Liberation Movement doing at its best, is saying to 
everyone, "Here are the credentials of human beings, 
irrespective of their sex, color, or what have you. 
Let's judge them that way." Unfortunately, with the 
quota system. Affirmative action, we are getting a lot 
of garbage. We're getting ... Affirmative Action means 
not that you have to get equality. It means you have to 
go out and seek a minority or a woman. This to me is 
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putting the pendulum equally out of balance the other 
way with what we've had. And as tar as I'm concerned, 
it's wrong. It's going to have to quit, and I think it 
will. I think eventually some people who have 
farsighte^iess and clear thinking will get on the stick, 
and they'll put an end to that kind of trashy thinking. 
Experimenter: OK. We are going to change the subject again. 
In the ... Well, yesterday was Election Day, but it 
brings to mind Watergate, the resignation of the 
President of the United States, and to a degree, it 
brings the problem of amnesty. Well, just in general, 
(I realize it's a vague question), can you give some of 
your views about, well, fairly recent problems in this 
area? 
Paul: Do you want me to, uh... 
Experimenter: I don't care. 
Paul: well, I'll go ahead and talk about it for a minute. 
Watergate, I think, was a really bad deal. I think that 
the people involved in Watergate did a lot of wrong, and 
we have all done wrong things, and I'm not casting any 
stones. To me it just pointed out how deep the 
corruption was with that administration irrespective of 
Republican or Democrat, ah... my feeling is that Nixon 
is a crook. My feeling is that the people working under 
hint felt the aura of what that man wanted,- and that's 
the behavior we got. amnesty, I feel a little bit 
differently. I would like to look at that, ah, in a 
little bit more personal light, some of the kids, I 
work with kids a lot, who defected, who went to Canada, 
who decided to evade the draft, were,pretty darn 
sincere. And I think that we have to somehow try to 
gauge their sincerity, you know, and then make whatever 
kind of judgments about them after we find out -- some 
of them were just copping out- But some of them I think 
were pretty sincere, and I think as far as amnesty goes, 
uh... we ought to look at each individual case and try 
to gauge it to the best of our judgment. Rnd if the kid 
meant it, then let's give him a break. 
Experimenter: What should we do with those involved in 
Watergate? 
Paul: Well, I know when I went to vote yesterday, when I 
pushed buttons, a lot of those were just plain get-even 
votes0 I think they were, you know, they weren't 
really, oh I suppose you try to justify, in being 
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honest, you try and justify anything you do with 
kind of balance the dissonance you have in your mind, 
here's why you're doing it. But a lot of it was, I'm 
going to click that button down not so much as a vote 
for that person as against that guy who was up here on 
the line above. So I guess I was kind of vindictive. 
Experimenter: Dot, we have sort of neglected you. We have 
let Paul do much of the talking. 
Dot: Well, as far as Watergate is concerned. I think we are 
doing the right thing with the officials who were in­
volved. But I also think that Nixon should have equal 
treatment under the law, regardless of his state of 
health, if he is well enough to stand trial. I really 
think that Ford made a mistake in pardoning him. Al­
though he says it's for the good of the country, it's 
going to be a long time before the country gets over the 
pardon of Nixon. 
Experimenter: Do you think Nixon should go to jail? 
Dot: This would depend on the outcome of the trial and the 
evidence and so on. 
Experimenter: And how about, say, draft dodgers? 
Dot; Well, I don't think they should just go scot-free. I 
think that, you know, there should be a method of having 
them put in a time of service as they are doing. It 
wouldn't be fair really, just to provide amnesty when 
there were so many that went to Vietnam and lost their 
lives. I really don't think that there's ever going to 
be a perfectly fair decision that they'll come to. But 
T feel they should have some, some kind of amnesty. 
Experiment:-; Alright. I am going to ask you one last ques­
tion, but our time is almost up. Some discussion 
recently has focused on euthanasia and whether people 
who are terminally ill should be allowed to die, or 
maybe even their death hastened a little. Do you have 
any views on that, Dot? 
Dot; Well... I, I know that 
Paul: He's talking about murdering old people, that's what 
it is. 
Dot: Yes, I know ,.. I really think that, uh»,» if the 
person is, you know, dead in about every sense of the 
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word except for the fact that his heart is still beating 
and they're being kept alive by machines, then fine. 
They can pull the plug and let the person die. But to, 
uh, just decide to inject something, no I don't believe 
in euthanasia, 
Paul: I think I parallel that view. I think if someone 
can't make it on his own, you pull the plug on the ma­
chine, hit or miss. If he can make it, fine, good. If 
he can't make it, I think... I don't think that's 
killing. I myself don't define that technically as 
euthanasia. I consider that passive euthanasia, maybe. 
Active euthanasia, as Dot said, you know, putting ten 
cc.'s of air in a guy's jugular vein and it gets to the 
heart and he's gone, I think is wrong. I think it's 
murder. I think it's killing old people. And ... I'm 
very much against that as much as I'm against abortion, 
the same way. I don't think that we should actively 
kill any human being. 
Experimenter: OK® I realize that's a hard note to stop on, 
but our time is just about up. So I'd like to thank you 
very much. 
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Choices for Chicken Made by Each Stimulus Opponent 
Trial Rick Barb Paul Dot 
1 Blue Blue Red Red 
2 Blue Red Blue Blue 
3 Bed Bed Blue Blue 
4 Red Bed Red Red 
5 Blue B1 ue Red Red 
6 Elue Red Red Blue 
7 Blue Red Red Red 
8 Red Blue Red Blue 
9 Bed Bed Red Red 
10 Blue Red Red Red 
n Blue dlue Blue Blue 
12 Elue Blue Blue Red 
13 Red Bed Red Red 
14 Blue Red Red Blue 
15 Red B1 ue Bed Red 
